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SUMMARY 
 
 
This assignment deals with the relevance of Public-Private Partnerships in the 
South African context and particularly the role it can play in realising the 
developmental goals of the economic policy. The value of the unique relationship 
that is possible between the public and the private partner goes beyond the 
formalised legal agreement as the mix of cultures and different managerial 
approaches hold benefits for both parties. There are many aspects of the PPP, 
especially as a management tool, which grow beyond the boundaries of a work 
of this length and which will hopefully entice the reader to further reading. 
However, in this work the main thrust of the argument is that the PPP offers an 
alternative, or maybe rather a supplementary vehicle to address a number of 
managerial problems experienced in the public sector. 
 
 
 
 
  
OPSOMMING 
 
Hierdie werkstuk handel met die relevansie van die sogenaamde “Public-Private 
Partnership” in die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks en meer spesifiek die rol wat dit kan 
speel om die ontwikkelingsdoelwitte van die ekonomie te bereik. Die waarde van 
die unieke verhouding wat moontlik is tussen die publieke en die private party 
venoot verder as die formele regsverhouding aangesien die vermenging van die 
kulture en verskillende bestuurstyle voordele vir beide partye inhou. Daar is vele 
aspekte van die PPP, veral as ‘n bestuursmeganisme, wat buite die grense van 
‘n werk van hierdie lengte gaan en hopelik word die leser gestimuleer om verder 
oor die onderwerp op te lees. Die vertrekpunt van hierdie werk egter is dat die 
PPP ‘n alternatiewe, of selfs ‘n bykomende meganisme om verskeie 
bestuursprobleme wat in die publieke sektor ervaar word, aan te spreek. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 All philosophy has its origins in wonder 
- Plato 
 
Imagine that the way in which business is conducted, and the role that participants play 
in the development of our economy, can look totally different. Open your mind to expand 
your perceptions of what kind of role government can play in business transactions, and 
by the same token, what the expectations and participative approach should be of the 
other role-players in the long term. Accept for the moment that there are many new 
opportunities to be explored and that the state of affairs as regards public–private 
participation in the economy can be vastly different. 
 
If these avenues are to be explored, the journey should start with a few probing 
questions: what philosophical approach to governance would be the most insight-
yielding and productive? And what questions need to be asked in order to interrogate the 
nature of human behaviour in confined relationships? 
 
The behaviour, and more specifically the moral behaviour and therefore moral choices of 
the individual, will always elicit endlessly fascinating philosophical discussions – after all, 
it remains the unanswerable question for the philosopher. Even more fascinating is the 
subject of morality in business. Whether the morality of choices is discussed in a 
confined circle of like-minded individuals, or in the classroom, or (as has happened of 
late) in the boardroom, one of the most central questions remains: what are the moral 
considerations on which decisions are to be made? In the world of business, the 
financial implications of these decisions obviously provide strong direction, as 
justification needs to be found for the implementation of decisions that have financial 
implications. And the morality of the decision should, for the ethicist, not be solely 
directed by its anticipated financial implications, but the stark truth is that money matters 
and that it will always need to be considered. 
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Long ago Socrates posed the question: “what is the good life? How can we achieve it?”  
In the world of business, I want to pose the same question: what is the good life in 
business? Should the application of ethical principles and values in business, such as 
trust, transparency and accountability, not add to the expectation that we all have, which 
is to experience what the good life is? This is a particularly relevant expectation in view 
of the government’s objective to “create a better life for all” and public–private 
partnerships can, and should, play a paramount role in realising this objective. In 
exploring the interpretation of arguments on what is the good life, a strong emphasis will 
be given to the Aristotelian approach, and it will be argued that this approach lays the 
foundation for applying the principles of virtue ethics. 
 
1.1 Plato and Aristotle
 
While both Plato and Aristotle agree that the good life is the exhibition of perfect virtue, 
they disagree on the particular definition of virtue, and its relevance to happiness, and 
therefore they disagree on the means of attaining happiness.1 Plato sees the good life as 
being attained through perfect love and lack of desire, while Aristotle believes that the 
good life is achieved through a perfect state which causes its citizens to act upon their 
virtues. Ultimate happiness occurs when a person's actions are all virtuous and when a 
person has goals that are virtuous. It also implies that, in order to live the good life, there 
must be no action that is unnecessary, but for the sake of virtue there are three things 
that make men good and excellent: nature, habit and reason. Therefore the path to 
happiness is through formation of habit and reason, which create virtuous action, but 
which should also possess a nature that agrees with these. When the core of a person's 
nature cannot change,2 he is then unable to lead the good life. 
 
Both Plato and Aristotle see the good life as the state in which a person exhibits total 
virtue, and since each person has different virtues, Aristotle argues that the good life is 
different for each individual because it comes from living one's life according to one's 
virtues. The question prompted by Aristotle as to which are the right actions one should 
 
1 www.philosophypages.com: 1-2 
2 Ibid 
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take to live the good life, takes on another character when applied to virtue ethics. 
Instead of asking “what is the right action?”, one should then ask “how should one 
live?”;3 in other words, what kind of person should one be to take the right action every 
time in order to live ethically? 
 
The central questions asked by Plato in The Republic to some extent would also need to 
be considered here: “what is justice in the State or what would an ideal State be like?” 
and “what is a just individual?” The virtues that would need to be found in the just State 
would also include the following: courage, wisdom, temperance, and justice. By the 
same token, Aristotle recognised a plurality of virtues which are good in themselves, 
such as honour, pleasure and intelligence.4 However, he also meant that virtues are not 
striven for as ends in themselves, but are also aimed at for the sake of happiness. This 
would mean that in order to be truly happy one should have (and practise) the virtues, 
but true happiness can only be found in itself. This is probably what we experience as 
the “meaning” of life.5 Similarly, in the endless quest by the individual for these virtues, 
finding them in the business environment would also ensure that both employee and 
employer would be “most happy”.  
 
In acknowledging that we are all aspiring to experience the good life, we need to 
consider the question: what is the ultimate action and what is it that our actions finally 
aim at? How will we ensure that we obtain what we are looking for? In considering this, 
Aristotle’s phronesis is to be referred to when he emphasized the difference between 
practical and theoretical knowledge. Practical knowledge is concerned with particulars, 
not with universals, and to possess it is to know what to do here and now. “It is not a 
matter of appealing to rules and general principles, not a matter of logical argument or 
intellectual ability. It consists simply in knowing, in a particular situation: this is what I 
should do.”6 This knowledge is acquired both by practical experience and by habit. 
Therefore, in deciding how to act in a specific situation, for example where one is 
angered, one’s moral education would direct one how to act. The knowledge that we 
 
3 The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Virtue Ethics 3 
4 www.philosophypages.com 2 
5 Norman The moral philosophers, an introduction to ethics 30 
6 Norman 39 
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acquire enables us to understand how to act in certain situations – not by learning 
theoretical examples, but by moral training, as we should have been brought up in a 
morally civilized society.7 It follows, then, that good habits are learnt: that it needs to 
become habitual to exercise good judgement, and to make decisions based on sound 
moral values. This will ensure that one develops good character as character is about 
“doing” and it follows that when one has managed to develop virtuous characteristics 
one will also then act in accordance with them. Such characteristics are stable, fixed and 
reliable and a person with a certain character can then be expected and relied on to act 
consistently. 
 
1.2 Virtue Ethics  
 
In asserting in his Nicomachean Ethics that human beings move towards a certain telos, 
Aristotle’s work is regarded as the foundation of virtue ethics.8 He also argued that one 
should habitually make good decisions in order to develop good character, and it then 
follows that good character develops over a long period of time. This is true both for the 
individual and the organisation: an organisation which is consistently seen to make 
ethical decisions in business will be viewed to demonstrate good character and 
consistency in ethical decision-making. The values on which such decisions are based 
are also normally well known, as the organisation would normally publicly declare which 
values it aspires to uphold in its course of business.  
 
Aristotle claimed that character is developed through good actions and habits, which 
focuses strongly on the moral characteristics of the individual: the assessment would be 
which moral characteristics the individual managed to develop through consistent good 
actions and habits. The emphasis on virtue in everything we do can be regarded as one 
of the cornerstones of virtue ethics. There is a strong emphasis on the person who acts, 
also referred to as the “agent”, instead of on the moral or immoral act.9 In applying virtue 
ethics, the focus is not on adherence to moral law or optimising wellbeing, but on the 
rationality of virtue itself. The reason, then, not to act in a certain manner, for example, 
 
7 Norman 39 
8 The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Virtue Ethics 5 
9 The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Virtue Ethics 7 
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would be found in the quality of the action itself: one does not lie, not because of 
obligation or consequences, but because it is dishonest. One’s action would therefore be 
viewed within the larger context of life instead of the context in relation to the individual. 
But the focus in terms of virtue ethics is that if one is to exercise judgment in making 
decisions, one would need to be informed on the values that need to be maintained and 
it therefore follows that moral education and development should form part of the 
development of the virtuous person. This would be particularly relevant where ethics is 
to be taught and implemented in an organisation. An important distinction, however, 
needs to be made here: although staff members need to be informed on the values that 
an organisation strives to adhere to, it is not a subject that can be taught and it cannot 
be expected that “ethics training” or “creating an ethical culture” would have been 
successfully implemented just because the staff is then deemed to have been educated 
on the subject.  In this regard there is room for the Aristotelian view that good character 
is developed by consistently enforcing good habits: in order to instil certain values in an 
organisation, especially taking into consideration typically African values in the South 
African context, the issue would need to be approached differently. A noble expression 
that I heard recently about the implementation of values in the African cultural work 
environment is that people need to be convinced to want to “come into the house”. What 
was meant by this is that values need to be “negotiated” in order to be accepted. This 
type and level of negotiation means that staff all need to agree on what values would be 
considered acceptable and necessary in their work environment: by getting all to accept 
the identified values, one ensures better commitment to the process and its 
implementation. This could therefore be viewed as informing or educating staff on what 
should be done in order to take good decisions, but at the same time also allowing them 
to demonstrate good habits that will eventually become part of their environment. The 
good habits should then become entrenched in the environment and hence all those 
who are part of the particular environment will adapt the “good character” that had been 
formed. The morality of the community will thus shape the individuals to develop good 
character. 
 
 
 
 
 5
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.3 Virtue Ethics in the Business World
 
In applying this principle to the lack of ethics that can be observed in the business world, 
the clear deduction that can be made is that, maybe without even realising it, we have 
developed immoral habits: our values generally have become so questionable that it has 
become socially acceptable to do things that previous generations certainly would have 
questioned. When allegations of corruption were brought against the former deputy 
president, Jacob Zuma, many concerned South Africans waited with bated breath to see 
what the president would do: would he dismiss his deputy or not? How could we have 
doubted what he was expected to do? How could we anticipate that the criminal charges 
that were to be laid could possibly be condoned? Many even proclaimed that it was not 
“wrong” for Zuma to have accepted any money as this is the way that business is done. 
Similarly, even though Judge Hillary Squires in the Shabir Schaik trial found the 
Frenchman Alain Thetard to have been an intermediary in the bribe secured for Zuma 
from the French arms company Thomson-CSF, it seems that to date no steps were 
taken in his country against him for his involvement in the corrupt dealings. Surely if the 
values that are to be adhered to in a state that aspires to uphold good governance were 
applied, Thetard would (should) have been held responsible for his actions – but, again, 
the values to which his society has grown accustomed do not seem to require such 
accountability. It seems that it has become the norm not to take a definite stance on 
what is wrong or right; it seems that we often want to leave room for alternative 
interpretations of what morality is supposed to be in a given situation. 
 
Could this lack of values be the reason why there is so much fresh interest in re-
assessing our values? An interesting point of view is taken by Patricia Aburdene, who is 
of the view that “the focus on spirituality has become so pervasive . . . that it stands as 
today’s greatest megatrend”10 and as such has a huge impact on individuals’ personal 
lives – and, of course, this is spreading into institutions. This spirituality in businesses, in 
turn, is fostering a moral transformation in capitalism as it is converging with other socio-
economic trends.11 More and more businesses take their responsibility towards 
communities and shareholders more seriously. Aburdene is of the view that we are at a  
 
10 Lampman, J. “Trend-watcher sees moral transformation of capitalism” Christian Science Monitor, 2005 
11 Ibid 
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point in society where social transformation is brought about because of the combination 
of economic necessity and new values: at the same time, however, she points out that 
there should also be a positive sense of new options which should exist in the form of  
“rising interest in spirituality in business, the dynamic growth of socially responsible 
investing, shareholder activism, and the power of values-driven consumers in the 
marketplace.” 
 
Another fairly recent interpretation of the focus on values in business was given by 
Stephen Covey12 in a book that has since its publication sold millions of copies.  
Although Covey he does not specifically argue the Aristotelian point of view that good 
habits are learnt, the title already indicates that his approach seems very Aristotelian: he 
called it “the seven habits of highly successful people” and works with a number of 
identified values that should become habits in order to be successful. His approach 
entails that, based on the premise that perceptions are deeply imbedded, “… we must 
look at the lens through which we see the world, as well as at the world we see, and the 
lens itself shapes how we interpret the world”.13 He also identifies what he calls the 
“character Ethic” “as the foundation of success – things like integrity, humility, fidelity, 
temperance, courage, justice, patience, industry, simplicity, modesty, and the Golden 
Rule . . . .The Character Ethic teaches that there are basic principles of effective living, 
and that people can only experience true success and enduring happiness as they learn 
and integrate these principles into their basic character.”14 I am of the view that what he 
states here could be brought within the argument that the approach of the individual 
should be based on moral choices in order to experience the good life. The habits he 
regards as identified principles for success, which are essentially value-based, are 
described as representing “the internalization of correct principles upon which enduring 
happiness and success are based.” 
 
Striving to be virtuous is nothing new. Experiencing a lack of ethics in everyday 
situations is not new either. But for the individual or the manager who strives to maintain 
a standard of ethical behaviour, finding practical ways to ensure that a climate is 
cultivated in which it can be implemented will always be important. This is also true for  
 
12 Covey The seven habits of highly effective people  
13 Covey 17-18 
14 Covey 3 
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the manager who strives towards ethical dealings between the public and the private 
sector. I hope to demonstrate that the weaknesses that I identified can be addressed 
and that solid governance can be achieved, especially in Public–Private Relationships. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
GOVERNANCE EXPLAINED 
 
The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. 
 The (person) who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the 
prejudices derived from common sense . . . . To such a man the world tends to become 
definite, finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions,  
and unfamiliar possibilities are contemptuously rejected. 
- Bertrand Russell 
 
Writing, or philosophising about a subject such as governance could become an exercise 
which is fenced in with great difficulty. Much literature is available on the subject, 
especially in view of the identified need in business to develop an approach that would 
hopefully avert further corporate collapses such as the ones so often quoted in an effort 
to alert the listener or reader to the ongoing battle against greed. So, applying suggested 
principles to identified problems in management would not be justified without 
exploring a few of the myriad interpretations offered, on what the term ’governance’ 
could amount to, which is offered in this chapter. 
 
2.1 Introduction
 
Any reference to the by now well-known “corporate scandals” (the Enron scandal being 
probably the most notorious of these) prompts discussion about how the concept 
“corporate governance” is to be interpreted. Clarke even goes as far as to suggest that 
the concept itself needs to be re-conceptualized.1 The author furthermore is of the 
opinion that although the way that people have always organised themselves could 
always be called “governance”, the term itself has only recently emerged to describe 
how the power of an organisation is harnessed for an agreed purpose rather for 
something else entirely.2 This seems to suggest that institutions are to provide a 
framework within which the social and economic life of countries is to be conducted. 
Against this backdrop, Clark developed a number of theories3 that can be used for 
interpreting governance.  These will not be discussed in detail, but a brief glance at the  
 
1 Clarke Theories of Corporate Governance, the philosophical foundations of Corporate Governance 1 
2 Ibid 
3 See in general Clarke 2-14 
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definitions confirms that it does go beyond the “boardroom” description. The first four 
theories focus on internal monitoring dilemmas and the rest explain the external 
challenges in terms of building relationships and securing resources in dynamic 
environments. 
 
2.2 Theories of corporate governance: 
 
2.2.1 Economic foundations:  this suggests the economic development of industrial 
capitalism under which different governance structures evolved with different 
corporate forms designed to pursue new economic opportunities or resolve new 
economic problems. 
 
2.2.2 Agency theory:  this theory is based on the contractual relationships within a firm 
between management and stakeholders as well as relations within the firm itself. 
The governance issues mainly revolve around the constraints on managers that 
are put on them either by themselves or by investors in order to ensure that 
funds are not misallocated as well as to induce investors to provide more funds. 
This means that the shareholders or investors are regarded as the “principals” 
and the managers as the “agents”. 
 
2.2.3 Managerial hegemony:  this description refers to the complete control that the top 
management team in the organisation has over the Board of Directors. It implies 
passivity on the part of Boards – that they have little influence on corporate 
decision-making, insufficient influence over the chief executive, and consequently 
reduced capacity to represent the interest of shareholders. 
 
2.2.4 Stewardship theory:  conflicts of interest between the manager and owner of the 
enterprise have been identified and suggestions were made to remedy the 
situation through incentive schemes based on money and promotions as well as 
negative sanctions. The stewardship theory disputes this conflict, however, and 
views the manager as being in a position of stewardship vis-à-vis the enterprise: 
this entails that the coordination of the enterprise is achieved effectively and that 
managers are authorised to act not as opportunistic agents but as good stewards 
who will act in the best interests of the owners. A strong relationship between the 
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managers’ successful pursuit of the objectives of the enterprise exists, not only to 
the principal’s satisfaction, but also to that of other participants in the enterprise’s 
collective reward. 
 
2.2.5 External pressures: these would relate to “the open systems nature of 
organisations, transacting with environments, and constrained by networks of 
interdependencies with other organisations, rather than understanding the 
behaviour of organisations simply in terms of rational, intentional managerial 
action”. The relationships so established can be referred to as “network 
governance” which has a social, as opposed to a legal, foundation. 
 
2.2.6 Stakeholder theory:  although relationships with employees are both formally and 
informally arranged to ensure delivery for shareholders, a relationship with 
stakeholders also exists. This is an external relationship with groups such as 
customers, suppliers, competitors and special interest groups which also has its 
own formal and informal rules. Furthermore, governments and local communities 
also set legal and formal rules within which businesses must function optimally. 
 
2.2.7 Theories of convergence: the theories in this category more often referred to 
include the following: 
 
• Outsider system of market-based corporate governance, which is characterised 
by dispersed ownership; the primacy of shareholder value is dominant but 
principal–agent problems are prevalent; 
• The relationship-based system of governance which primarily reflects mutual 
history and values; 
• Insider systems which are dependent on loans from banks and tend to be 
supported by close business networks; 
• Family-based corporate structures which reflect different cultural traditions and 
aspirations. 
 
An ongoing debate about the development of global convergence towards the 
“Anglo-Saxon market based outsider model” of corporate governance signals the 
development of a growing trend and yet another theory. The strongest criticism 
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against a global theory is that there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach that can 
work for any type of organisation as it is culturally and economically insensitive.  
 
2.2.8 Critique of shareholder value: long-term shareholder value should be protected 
by balancing the interests of different stakeholder groups in order to promote 
better cooperation between them. This would entail not only accounting for 
business in financial terms, but also giving account of the organisation’s 
relationship with employees, customers, suppliers and others on whom it is 
dependent for its success. 
 
2.2.9 Post-Enron theories: corporate failures the size of Enron had some questioning 
the universality of corporate governance theories and one contention was that 
these concerns could be based on the challenge of core beliefs and practices 
“that have underpinned the academic analysis of corporate law and governance”. 
Clarke goes on to state that: “we have come to rely on a particular set of 
assumptions about the connection between stock market prices and the 
underlying economic realities; the reliability of independent auditors, financial 
standards, and copious disclosure in protecting the integrity of financial reporting; 
the efficacy of corporate governance in monitoring financial performance; the 
utility of stock options in aligning managerial and shareholder interest, and the 
value of employee ownership as both an incentive device as well as a retirement 
planning tool”.4 He therefore suggests that weaker market focus must be 
upgraded in tandem with market developments in order to protect the market 
from manipulation as well as to distortion by self-interested managers. 
 
The various interpretations of the concept and the need for ongoing development and 
research to improve governance confirm its continuing relevance in the business sector. 
However, Björk and Johansson5 are of the opinion that because governance theory 
tends to remain at a pre-theoretical stage of critique, it is actually much clearer what the 
notion of governance is against than what it is for. They present a framework for 
governance which focuses on the change of society and argue that since governance  
 
4 Clarke 14 
5 Björk, P.G and Johannsson, H.S.H “Towards Governance Theory:  in search for common ground” 
Public and Private Sector Partnerships, the Enabling Mix 140-141 
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is not about values, it cannot be normative: it is regarded as a theory based on empirical 
observations which does not have a hidden agenda driven by normative beliefs.6 The 
various approaches suggested amount to the following: 
 
2.3 Theories based on the changed society 
 
2.3.1 The minimal state: the argument is that “the socio-economic, political and 
technical changes that we will meet in the 21st century will make the public 
bureaucracies of today obsolete”. The reason given is that they have become too 
large and too expensive and resources should rather be spent on other activities.  
As public bureaucracies are often inefficient in providing public services, reforms 
are necessary and this should include conceding that the private sector can 
provide a higher quality service. Therefore the private market is perceived to be 
more efficient because competition is created by market mechanisms, a criterion 
that the public sector does not meet. 
 
2.3.2 Corporate governance: this term can be stated as the common reference to a 
large number of theories and studies about governing and managing companies, 
or as stated in the Cadbury report: “the system by which organisations are 
directed and controlled”.7 It can, however, also be discussed in terms of the 
social responsibility that companies must show for employees and stakeholders 
and therefore, in general terms, it can be said to be about accountability, 
supervision, evaluation and control. 
 
2.3.3 New public management: from a different angle, this as yet another form of 
governance refers to several similarities, which would include the changed view 
on politicians and problems of accountability. It is increasingly perceived that 
politicians should not only steer but formulate goals and NPM’s focus is on the 
market, in other words focusing on what the people prefer.  A third similarity is 
the denial of the dichotomy between the public and private sector: the 
governance perspective is that the two parties must work together while the NPM  
 
6 Björk and Johannsson 140-141 
7 Ibid 
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states that the government and its bureaucracy has become obsolete and needs 
to improve efficiency. Yet another similarity is that both emphasize the control of 
output instead of input and both have governing as a central concept. 
 
2.3.4 ‘Good Governance’:  the modern interpretation of governance is that it is about 
more than efficiency, and that it is about accountability between the state and its 
citizens. Furthermore, it would include accountability, control, transparency and 
responsiveness, which are at least as important as economy and efficiency. 
 
2.3.5 Socio-Cybernetic System:  because of the growing realisation of the complexity 
and diversity of the world we live in, the democratic structures that are to deal 
with this need to be complex, diverse and dynamic. This will entail that the 
processes will need to include a higher level of interaction between public actors, 
target groups and individuals. There are three concepts from the theory of socio-
political governance: governing, governance and governability and the meaning 
has therefore changed to coordination, guidance, influence and the balancing of 
interactions. The result is that the way in which society is to be steered is 
changing: “Governing in an interactive perspective is directed to ‘balancing’ 
social forces and social interests and to ‘enabling’ social actors and systems to 
organize themselves”8 and it must thus be clear that socio-political governance 
relies on mutual trust and understanding, accepting common responsibility and 
some degree of political involvement and support from society.  There also needs 
to be an interdependency between formal and/or relatively autonomous political 
and societal actors and because no one single actor can create and develop a 
structure it should be the result of actions of all actors. Therefore, governing and 
governance interact all the time: those who govern are affected by the pattern 
and structure but at the same time it changes them. Lastly, governability 
combines the qualities of governing and governance. 
 
2.3.6 Self-organising networks: governance, where there was a change from governing 
to governance, can also be said to be about the coordination of self-organising 
networks which are a complex mix of public, private and voluntary  
 
8 Björk and Johannsson 141 
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organisations. This would mean an erosion of the borders between these sectors 
and the reason for the emergence of these networks is the need for resources 
between actors and the exchanges of these resources. Through the exchange of 
these resources within the networks, participating actors can realise their goals, 
maximise their influence and be independent from others. The idea of networks 
has been viewed as an alternative to markets and hierarchies in terms of 
coordination mechanisms: they are also self-organising and self-governing. The 
role of government in this approach is that the state should, instead of focusing 
on the planned governing of the system, instead focus on the mediation role. 
 
2.4 Conclusion
 
The interpretation of and approach to “governance” as suggested by Björk and 
Johansson is like a fresh breeze in the wake of the need for strong, good governance. 
Although theoretical approaches have much merit in laying a foundation for further 
interpretation and development of the concept, the approach by Björk and Johansson is 
preferred. The suggestions that the cooperation between the public and private sector 
needs to be improved and boundaries reduced in order to improve service delivery, offer 
concrete support for the public–private relationship development. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
SOUTH AFRICA AS A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
 
The society we have described can never grow into a reality… 
Till philosophers become rulers in this world, or till those we now 
call kings and rulers really and truly become philosophers… 
-  Plato 
 
The aspirations of our country to strengthen the economy and thereby to create a better 
life for all who live here are meant to be realised in various ways. One of the 
perspectives to describe this drive is the reference to South Africa as a Developmental 
State and how we need to transform the economy. The importance of this concept is 
explored in this chapter, and an elaboration is offered on how Public–Private 
Partnerships can play an important role in this transition.  
 
 
3.1 What is a Developmental State? 
 
A Developmental State can be described, with reference to the DS in Japan, as “one 
that was determined to influence the direction and pace of economic development by 
directly intervening in the development process, rather than relying on the uncoordinated 
influence of market forces to allocate economic resources.”1 As such the DS in Japan 
took up the task of guiding the processes of development and social mobilisation by 
establishing “substantive social and economic goals”.2
 
The success of East Asia after the Second World War offers convincing proof that the 
DS approach can be highly successful and this may ensure that the DS may still remain 
an “appropriate element of economic development”.3 Beeson also takes the stance that 
one of the requirements is that a “pilot agency” needs to drive the process in order to 
ensure its success, as was done in Japan by the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry.  This ministry had the task of directing the course of development as well as  
 
1 Beeson, M “The rise and fall (?) of the developmental state:  the vicissitudes and implications of East 
Asian interventionism” www.eduprint.eq.edu.au/archive 2 
2 Ibid 3 
3 Ibid 
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employing policy tools to ensure the nurturing and management of indigenous business 
in the overall “national interest”.4
 
Beeson also emphasises state capacity as a key component: by this he means “the 
ability to formulate and implement developmental policies”.5 He furthermore points out 
that in order to do this a DS needs more than a competent bureaucracy:  it also needs to 
cultivate an effective relationship with business which will then be at the centre of all 
successful developmental initiatives.6   
 
3.2 South Africa as a Developmental State
 
The concept of SA as a Developmental State is an important consideration from which to 
discuss the relevance that PPPs will and should have in realising the objectives set by 
the government.  In this regard the involvement of the private sector in the development 
of the economy is particularly important.  Not only can the economy and specifically the 
public sector benefit in terms of infrastructural developments through private sector 
involvement in PPPs, but the private sector can and also should be seen as a partner in 
the development of the economy. The “partnering” concept is advanced by the 
Development Bank of SA, as it is stated as one of their primary objectives to fill a vital 
gap between the private and public sectors.7 As such the DBSA has invested substantial 
amounts in social and infrastructural development, which also to date includes three 
PPPs, something which is discussed in more detail infra.   
 
But apart from the infrastructural development with which the private sector can assist, 
or rather in addition to that, there is another vital contribution that it can make to the 
development of SA as a DS: in my experience, and I am convinced that many would 
share my view, the productivity in the public sector can be greatly improved if a culture 
change can be effected.  In this sense the private sector can assist:  it is also discussed 
as one of the advantages of PPPs, infra, that the private sector can bring skills into the  
 
4 Beeson 5-6 
5 Ibid 
6 Ibid 8 
7 Coulson, M. “Corporate report: the Development Bank of South Africa: advising partner” Financial Mail, 
50 
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public sector and that the public sector therefore can benefit greatly thereby. These skills 
not only include technical skills, but especially in terms of management and leadership 
skills, the public–private relationship will allow for and hopefully promote the cultivation 
of cross-sectoral exchange of these skills, which will include staff management, time 
management, general project management, to name but an obvious few. 
 
It is quite evident how many advantages the public–private relationship can bring to the 
success of a DS but the successful execution of any incentive is reliant on the structure 
and systems within which it is to operate.  In the case of a government, and especially 
one with DS objectives, the importance therefore, as mentioned by Beeson,8 of a 
competent bureaucracy cannot be underestimated. This was also stressed by 
Esterhuyse9 when he stated that the bureaucracy needs to be competent and dedicated 
and would need to be committed to the importance of economic development in the DS. 
It would be presumptuous to suggest what the requirements for a competent 
bureaucracy should be:  however, I would like to explore a few ideas that may be of 
value, or at least of interest, to consider. 
 
3.3 “Kill the King” 
 
“Executing the king, piece by piece, entails changing the language that is in the citizen’s 
head”.10 The reference to the “king” is the11 “king as president, prime minister, CEO, or 
administrator”.  Furthermore, it is the open-minded thinker who is prepared to 
contemplate constitutive patterns, “almost like Plato’s philosopher-king”.12 He argues, in 
my view very convincingly, that the reason why bureaucracies as a specific form of 
organisation are by nature inefficient is that the “king”, in other words the authority in 
power, disallows sufficient participation and free-thinking by other members of the 
organisation, in other words, the employees.  Furthermore, the functions of the king 
include all coordination, direction and control over the subordinates and there is not  
 
8 See discussion supra  
9 Esterhuyse, W “ Whereto with the developmental state (DS)? Or:  the struggle for the soul of the ANC” 
Institute for Futures Research 2 
10 Farmer To Kill the King, post-traditional governance and bureaucracy 184 
11 Farmer 18 
12 Farmer 184 
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sufficient, if any true, collaboration of efforts.  The citizens thus are not sufficiently part of 
the process and it follows therefore that they do not share enough, if any, responsibility 
for the organisation’s success. 
 
He suggests13 that his approach is ideological, but that it could assist towards a process 
of “opening democracy” – by which he indicates that the focus in change should be on 
the citizen as opposed to the process.  Much of this is based on the social contract as 
argued by Hobbes and Farmer, which emphasises this social contract between every 
citizen and then the social contract with the king.14 He points out that, unfortunately, the 
king then overturned this social contract, took absolute power over subjects who have 
made a social contract to turn over all liberties to the boss. It follows, then, that the 
sovereign has absolute power over his subjects as long as he succeeds in keeping them 
alive.15 He ascribes this undesirable outcome to the limitations of language:  he quotes 
Wittgenstein as saying that “The limits of my language are the limits of my world”, and 
this is particularly applicable to political theory and more specifically to governance.  Our 
ability, he says, to “kill the king”, in other words to think more imaginatively about how we 
can change our world, is limited by ourselves because we think within the constraints of 
our language.16 The language of governance, for example, does not contain “a rich set 
of symbols, signs and concepts for the varieties and nuances of hierarchy”.17 Because 
we then talk in hierarchical terms, the shades of meaning can get lost and that is why 
thinkers should find new words or symbols even though they may have to face an uphill 
battle against the pressure of current symbolic systems.  
 
A distinction is also made18 between two perspectives, the institutional and the 
comprehensive, and it is suggested that governance should primarily be concerned with 
the comprehensive.  The institutional, for example the bureaucracy, is compared to 
fleas: “it’s a chief flea on the back of a deputy chief flea, being on the back of the 
assistant deputy chief flea, being on another flea’s back, and down to the back of the 
lowest flea in the hierarchy”.  On the other hand, the comprehensive view recognises the  
 
13 Farmer 184  
14 Farmer 185 
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid 
17 Farmer 186 
18 Farmer 186-187 
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hierarchy from the perspective of the individual-in-himself in-his-difference in society and 
as such the focus is on the perspective of an individual who has an array of different 
characteristics that can contribute to the larger good (of the organisation). The aim is 
therefore to emphasise the representative hierarchy.  In an open democracy this would 
mean that in both public and private sector governance, the individual plays the type of 
role that allows him/herself to realise his/her expectations.19   
 
A similar point of view is taken by Collier and Esteban,20 who discuss the Participative 
Organisation and argue that organisations, for survival in a turbulent environment, are 
dependent on the extent to which they allow creativity in purposeful and responsive 
interaction with the changing environment. What is meant by this is that the focus should 
move towards the participation of all in the organisation to ensure its success. The 
governance in the organisation is compared to a boat, while the role players’ 
involvement is described in the following way:21
 
“‘Governance’ becomes a quality of the boat itself and the shared responsibility of all in 
it.  The steersman keeps the rudder, the lookouts look for obstacles, others measure the 
depths, read the currents and the winds, trim the sails, balance the ballast, drop the 
anchor to steady the ship, row, repair the damage, and finally redesign the ship with the 
lessons learned from their last adventure.” 
 
The view is also taken that organisations fail to be effective in a climate of continual 
change because they keep on re-engineering existing processes, such as bureaucracy, 
without allowing for shared responsibility.22 In a climate of participation, the employees 
would then not only be “part of” the organisation, but would “take part” in every aspect of 
its existence. Creating a trust relationship will23 also be facilitated by exploring new 
boundaries in communication and teamwork. The change in focus would then mean 
that:24
 
19 Farmer 186-187  
20 Collier, J Esteban, R “Governance in the Participative Organisation: Freedom, Creativity and Ethics” 
Journal of Business Ethics 173-183 
21 Collier and Esteban 180 
22 Collier and Esteban 176 
23 Farmer 30 
24 Collier and Esteban 177 
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“The dualism of thinking and doing is replaced by a fusion whereby decisions are made 
by those who implement them.  Authoritarianism is replaced by a leadership which 
facilitates self-management.  Control is replaced by trust, privileged information by 
managerial transparency.  Learning is an integral part of organisational processes: 
people learn together and teach each other, so that knowledge belongs to all.  
Responsibility and accountability are thus shared by all stakeholders. 
 
From this it is clear that values are an integral part of the success of the participative 
organisation, especially values such as trust, commitment and communication.  Part of 
the success of the process is communication by participants to always ensure that 
processes are improved and that all participants remain part of the success of efforts 
and as such organisational team-working and group decision-taking constitute a 
relational context.  In this type of environment, freedom and creativity would form the 
basis of the ethical quality of participative governance.  It follows that the positive result 
would be that because the organisation is not driven by hierarchical control but by the 
freedom of the organisation’s members to participate in autonomous decision-taking, 
they will constantly pursue and achieve outcomes that are valued both by themselves 
and others. Alasdair MacIntyre compares this value-based participation to the ethics of 
virtue, as participation realises the “goods internal to a practice” because “human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions to the ends and goods involved”, 
are systematically extended and it is in this context that “the notion of virtue gains 
meaning”.25 The relevance to these arguments to the discussion of the Developmental 
State is that a bureaucracy can be much more effective as a participative organisation in 
which the employee is valued as an individual who can, and should, play an important 
role, and take part in the success of the organisation. As stated earlier, a strong and 
efficient bureaucracy is essential for the success of a Developmental State and these 
arguments, in my view, constitute a convincing approach to improve the efficiency of the 
SA bureaucracy in government. 
 
 
 
 
25 Collier and Esteban 182 
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3.4 The role of Public–Private Partnerships in the Developmental State
 
The concept of the Developmental State is an important one, especially in the South 
African context. Prominence was given to it by Minister Trevor Manuel26 during an 
address at an SMS Conference in Cape Town held on 20 September 2004, when he 
discussed a number of challenges the Department of Finance is facing in terms of 
budgeting in the DS. He pointed out that it was of vital interest that the budget of a DS 
must reflect its endeavours to fight poverty and expand economic opportunities to the 
poor. In addressing this he emphasised how important it was for the budget to balance 
two main pillars: firstly, how much the DS spends fighting poverty and deprivation, and 
secondly, how much of the country’s resources are to be spent on expanding the 
economic opportunities of its citizens.27 It is especially in terms of the second 
consideration that the PPP can play a vital role. 
 
The prominence given by the government to the importance of a DS was also 
illuminated by Esterhuyse28 when he discussed it with specific reference to the 2005 
ANC congress. The Congress lent particular reference to the role of the DS in the 
development of the country: “… what should the role of the state be in development, 
poverty alleviation, transformation, land reform, labour relations, redistribution of wealth, 
the creation of wealth, etc?”29 The important point was made that President Mbeki was 
very clear about the direction of future events to address these concerns. This is 
particularly relevant when focusing on the transformation of South Africa as a DS:  “the 
main policy objective of a DS is to influence the objectives, direction, pace and 
‘recipients’ of economic development through broad-based consensus-seeking on policy 
issues, collaboration on projects and negotiated agreements on what the national 
agenda should be.”30
 
There can thus be no doubt how important realising the development objectives as a DS 
is for the successful re-engineering of the economy and without a doubt PPPs should 
 
26 Manuel, T “Budgeting challenges in the Developmental State” at Senior Management Service 
Conference 1 
27 Ibid 
28 Esterhuyse 1-2 
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid 
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play their part. Teamwork between the public and private sector in this regard is 
important, especially if consideration is given to the argument by Greer31 that 
organisations or institutions cannot find and implement solutions to current problems on 
their own: “organisations and institutions that share objectives must also partly share 
resources and authority to achieve goals.”  It is thus considered necessary that a vehicle 
such as a PPP be utilised for this purpose, but as Collier and Esteban32 point out, in 
ensuring good management and corporate competitiveness, responsibility and 
accountability should be accepted to function both ways, and governance, as “the 
relationships among various participants in determining the direction and performance of 
companies”33 should involve all key stakeholders in this process. The PPP offers a first 
class means to achieve this, as the partnership relationship that is to be formed between 
the private and public partners should offer a platform to establish this type of 
participatory relationship. 
 
Another angle from which to appreciate the benefits of improved cooperation between 
the public and private sectors is to see that decision-making and implementation 
capacities should be transferred to lower levels, for example local municipalities and 
state authorities. It can also be argued that the shift will result in a limitation of scope and 
can also be seen as a form of public intervention, where civil servants’ discretion is 
limited and the public sector is fragmented. The end result of all this is that there can be 
said to have been a move away from government to governance, where the term 
“governance” is used to reflect the fact that the conditions for governing society have 
changed.34  
 
The public sector culture will not change overnight, even if the concept of the 
participatory organisation is favourably accepted, but the PPP offers new possibilities to 
explore new relationships. In view of future planning and exploring new horizons, it is 
also important for corporations35 to have a public and private purpose with the decision 
influenced by “community impact statements”. Interpreting this against the backdrop of  
 
31 Greer, J “Partnerships and Public Policy:  implications for future governance of Northern Ireland” Public 
and Private Sector Partnerships, the Enabling Mix 259 
32 Collier and Esteban 175 
33 Björk and Johannsson 140  
34 Farmer 166 
35 Collier and Esteban 182 
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the PPP objectives once again emphasises the importance of the public and private 
sector identifying, agreeing, and working together towards goals that are not only in their 
own interest, but also in the interest of the “greater good” for SA as a DS. 
 
3.5  Conclusion
 
 
In view of the arguments about representation in participatory government and realising 
the expectations of citizens, the PPP thus can allow for these objectives to be achieved.  
Certainly the poor have an expectation for development that will benefit them and 
improve their standard of living, as has been the undertaking of the government since 
the birth of democracy, and which is enhanced by the slogan “creating a better life for 
all”.  Arguments will be presented on the extent to which PPPs can play a role in what in 
this sense can be called regeneration.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERHIPS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Perhaps the imagination is on the verge of recovering its rights …  
We are still living under the reign of logic, but the social processes of our time 
 apply only to the solution of problems of secondary interest. 
- André Breton 
 
Given the success of public–private collaboration in many countries, our own country 
embarked on this venture after first comparing notes with the United Kingdom. A brief 
look at some of the methods, principles and successes in the UK would therefore 
provide a sound foundation for the investigation of Public–Private Partnerships locally. 
  
4.1 Introduction
 
The provision of private activities and the contracting of government with outside 
agencies for the provision of other services has been a common feature of 
organisational life for at least two hundred years.1 It amounts to a combination of two 
different sets of organisational skills and human capital and has the potential to yield 
better results than a single set of organisational skills and capital. Linder2 even suggests 
that management reform should include that traditional governance be changed and the 
basis for this approach is the postwar efforts (in the UK) to reform the public service.  In 
this sense he regards it3 as “the epitome of a new generation of management reforms” 
because it is suited to the contemporary economic and political imperatives for efficiency 
and quality. 
 
The emphasis on a mutually beneficial relationship between public and private parties in 
economic development is welcomed by some as an improvement on the command-and-
control style of doing business in the provision of goods and services, and to others it 
seems to indicate that public decision-makers are displaying more of a business-like 
 
1 Davies, B and Hentschke, B “Public/private partnerships” Journal (Education) 6 
2 Linder, S. H. “Coming to terms with the Public-Private Partnership: a grammar of multiple meanings” 
American Behavioural Scientist 38 
3 Linder 35 
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tendency in the running of public affairs.4  This is confirmed by the fact that both parties 
tend to work together under free-market conditions in allocating resources. Moreover, 
indications are that PPPs in the UK will become an even more significant part of 
economic policy for the 21st century, and this is emphasised by the concept of third-way 
economics.5  The concept refers to a new social, economic and political ways of thinking 
where economics is primarily based on the idea of economic democracy, which means 
that democratic control is extended to the economic sphere.6  It is a new way of thinking 
beyond the old binaries of capitalism and socialism, where the economic focus is on the 
people. This is particularly important in developing countries and in SA as a DS this 
approach can be very valuable. 
 
Partnerships can also be viewed as a mechanism of governance and as such they 
redefine the role and domain of political-administrative authorities by allowing private 
actors to play a role in the delivery of services and community development.7 As such, 
the PPP concept is being implemented successfully in many countries and the concept 
and policies in SA have many similarities with PPPs in the UK. The UK government also 
sponsored the establishment of PPPs locally and much information gained and lessons 
learnt can be attributed to support and advice from the UK. Therefore, it would be 
valuable to first gain some insight in the concept and development of PPPs in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
4.2 Public–Private Partnerships in the United Kingdom
 
The Public Ministry in Britain refers to the partnership concept as central to New Public 
Management8 and, since 2000, the UK government has created more than 300 task 
forces and similar bodies to advise on public policy.9
 
 
4 Ibid 
5 Montanheiro, L “The economic aspect within the enabling mix of Public-Private Partnerships” Public and 
Private Sector Partnerships, the Enabling Mix  425 
6 Mizrach, S “The Third Way” www.fiu.edu/~mizrachs/thirdway.html     
7 Andersen, O.J “Public-Private Partnerships:  Organisational hybrids as channels for local mobilisation 
and participation?” Scandinavian Political Studies 1-2 
8 Linder 38 
9 Steele, J In the Public Interest?  Engaging the private sector in government 5 
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Joint efforts by governmental and non-governmental actors are often carried out to 
revitalise stagnating industrial regions10 and in the UK, for instance, state inducements 
offered by the Conservative Thatcher government played an important part in launching 
new local initiatives.  In accordance with this liberal ideology, the business community 
was given a leading role in the restructuring and revitalisation process, and separate 
bodies were established outside the local government system. 
 
4.3 Historical background  
 
A number of reports and codes were developed in order to guidance, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, to serve as a regulatory business tool to ensure that companies 
comply with expected levels of good governance in the way they conduct business.  
Formalising, or even codifying, corporate governance in the UK started with the 
commissioning of the Cadbury Report by Sir Adrian Cadbury, in 1982.  Incorporated was 
a Code of Best Practice (the Cadbury Code) which was then used by the London Stock 
Exchange as part of its Listing Rules.  This meant that listing companies had to report in 
their annual report whether they complied with the Cadbury Code, or not, and 
simultaneously had to report on any non-compliance – hence the expression “comply” or 
“explain” which is still used.11
 
The Greenbury Committee, which followed the Cadbury Report, had to focus and report 
on directors’ remuneration and their accountability.  A Corporate Governance Committee 
chaired by Sir Ronald Hampel was subsequently established, and this Committee found 
that the Cadbury Code as well as the recommendations of the Greenbury Committee 
amounted to a “box ticking” mentality.  This meant that the company could not really be 
measured in terms of its governance if it only had to comply with formal requirements.12  
Based on recommendations by the Hampel Committee, companies now also had to 
report on how the principles were “applied”. The stock exchange subsequently added 
this to its listing requirements, which meant that it now had to report on how the 
principles as recommended were applied and also to state whether it complied.  In  
 
10 Andersen 9 
11 See in general Smerdon A practical guide to Corporate Governance 2 
12 Ibid 
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addition, failure to comply still required an explanation. The result was a Combined 
Code, which was the combination of the principles of the Hampel Committee and the 
provisions of the Cadbury Code.13  
 
4.4 Current relevance 
 
PPPs play a significant developmental role in the economy of the UK and the political 
will to encourage the public sector to engage in PPP agreements is a strong driving 
force behind these types of agreements as they are regarded as “central to the 
Government’s programme of modernizing public services”.14  Currently, fifteen percent of 
public expenditure is delivered under PPPs and this contributes to the emphasis on 
service outputs as sites of transformation rather than as ends in themselves.15  
Therefore, the principles of “value for money” and “good governance” in terms of PPP 
characteristics can be viewed as an approach that could be followed in various countries 
at various stages of development. 
 
PPPs in the UK have been a huge success and they are attributed to a number of 
factors:  during the 1980s non-adherence to timelines and budgets was often the 
consequence of conflict between public sector institutions and contractors.16  It was also 
found that public sector services were suffering as a result of poor maintenance of 
buildings in the education and health sectors in particular. In order to address these 
shortcomings, some of the measures implemented included the identification of 
incentives for the private sector to build assets on time and maintain and deliver high 
standards throughout contracts on projects on which they bore the capital risk. A second 
measure that was implemented was that the government would have to demonstrate a 
strong commitment to the PPP process where private sector money and acceptance of 
risk was to be attracted. This would include the government giving clear indications on 
project priorities and demonstrating a “deal flow” of projects.  
 
 
13 Smerdon 2-3 
14 “Public-Private Partnerships” www.CIPS.org 1 
15 See in general “How to access UK expertise in Public Private Partnerships, a brief guide from UK Trade 
and Investment” www.uktradeinvest.gov.uk 1-8 
16 Ibid 
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4.5 Successes in Public–Private Partnerships in the United Kingdom
 
Setting up an initial high-level taskforce comprising experts from both the private and 
public sectors to assess critical issues and also to focus on driving the process is 
regarded as one of the main reasons for the success of UK PPPs.17 The UK taskforce 
was disbanded in 2000 and the UK Treasury, as is the case in SA, now takes 
responsibility for policy issues arising from PPP Procurement. However, part of the 
taskforce’s responsibility was taken over by Partnership UK, which functions as a PPP 
with 51% of shares owned by the private sector. Although the NBI in SA plays a 
mentoring role and the PPP Unit drives the PPP process on national and provincial level, 
a similar initiative such as the taskforce or PUK does not exist. 
 
Success is also attributed to the Public–Private Partnerships Programme (4Ps), which is 
involved in local authorities’ development programmes by providing practical support 
and guidance particularly for large projects. By November 2003 a total of 617 projects 
with a capital value of £36 billion were signed off.18   
 
4.6 Role-players in the process
 
Currently, and to ensure the ongoing success of UK PPPs, a number of role-players are 
still involved in the process:19
 
4.6.1 Public Finance Initiative (PFI): a mechanism developed by the government to 
raise money to fund new buildings and services. As such it involves the private 
sector in public sector projects such as PPPs; 
 
4.6.2 HM Treasury: this office provides publications and advice for parties involved in 
PPPs; 
 
4.6.3 Partnerships UK (PUK): a private sector company in which the government holds 
a minority stake to take forward and expand the development of PPPs; 
 
17 Ibid 3 
18 Ibid 4 
19 Ibid 7-9 
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4.6.4 Public Private Partnerships Programme (4Ps): a local government project 
procurement agency which provides practical support and guidance to local 
authorities to enable them to improve their procurement capability, particularly for 
large projects and through partnership structures; 
 
4.6.5 National Audit Office: all spending on behalf of the government is scrutinised by 
this office and it is a totally independent institution. It reports to the government 
on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness in which government institutions 
use public money, and its responsibilities include reporting on value for money in 
PPPs;  
 
4.6.6 Department for Constitutional Affairs: this department is responsible for 
upholding justice, rights and democracy and in terms of the PPP focus this 
includes seeing that PPP projects and the PFI are supported in the UK legal 
system;  
 
4.6.7 Law Society: ensuring access under the law and professional standards in the 
legal profession will also contribute to professional legal standards in PPPs. This 
is especially vital where British law firms oversee government on key aspects of 
legislation to be complied with in PPPs.   
 
4.7 UK Public–Private Partnerships defined
 
The definition of a PPP in the UK is not as comprehensive as the definitions in the SA 
context. The UK Treasury defines PPP as follows:20   
 
“Public private partnerships are defined as bringing the public and private sectors together in 
long-term partnerships for mutual benefit.  The public private partnership label covers a 
wide range of different partnerships, including: 
• The introduction of private sector ownership to state-owned businesses using the 
full range of possible structures (whether by flotation or by the introduction of a 
strategic partner) with sales of either a majority or minority stake 
 
20 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/public_private_partnerships/ppp_index.cfm  
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• The PFI (Private Finance Initiative) and other arrangements whereby the public 
sector contracts to purchase quality services on a long-term basis so as to take 
advantage of the private sector management skills incentives by having private sector 
finance at risk.  This includes concessions and franchises, where a private sector 
partner takes on the responsibility for providing a public service, including 
maintaining, enhancing and constructing the necessary infrastructure; 
• Selling government services into wider markets and other partnership arrangements 
where private sector finance and expertise are used to exploit the commercial 
potential of government assets.” 
 
The PFI was established during the early 1990s on the premise that the public sector 
could learn from successful private sector management and furthermore that public 
funding might be made available for other uses if there were private sector investment.  
The UK government’s policy is that all public procurement of goods, services and works 
is to be based on the principle of value for money and public sector purchasers 
furthermore need to ensure compliance with the EC procurement rules.21   
 
A number of advantages have been identified22 in setting up PPPs: 
 
• It is a disciplined and structured approach to contracting; 
• It demands the production of a robust business case; 
• It requires a clear definition of the outcome/requirements to be established at the 
outset; 
• It requires a rigorous method of supplier selection and recruitment; 
• It facilitates the establishment of long-term relationships on a non-adversarial 
basis; 
• It brings together design and construction and service delivery so that the whole 
project is seen as an entity; 
• It encourages the proper assessment of risk; 
• It requires skilled project management techniques;  
• It requires benchmarking and revitalisation, which should generate continuous 
improvement; 
 
21 “Ethical Business Practises in Purchasing and Supply Management” www.CIPS.org 1   
22 “Public-Private Partnerships” www.CIPS.org 1  
 
 31
Chapter 4: PPPs in the United Kingdom 
 
• It demands clear change-control procedures and a professional approach to 
change management; 
• It allows for the mutual exchange of valuable skills; 
• It requires clear thinking on the exit strategy from the outset. 
 
Although there are a number of clearly distinct advantages in PPPs, a disadvantage that 
has been identified in local authorities (in the UK) is what is called the “lock-in” problem, 
which means that local authorities need to set aside a large part of their income to cover 
payments, which reduces their flexibility elsewhere. 23 This is not a problem experienced 
in SA, as projects are allocated on fixed budgets.24
 
4.8 Partnering
 
Since the members in a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) consortium play a crucial part in 
the successful participation in a PPP, it is vital for them to establish beforehand what 
their goals are and what they want to achieve from the PPP. At the start of the PPP 
process this needs to be negotiated and it could have a bearing on the choice of the 
consortium, as the aims of the buying organisation and the consortium members should 
be aligned where possible.25 In this sense, a distinction of the concept of “partnering” 
should be made and one definition of this is:26 “Partnering is a long-term relationship 
requiring the development of trust, commitment and free-flowing communication 
between all parties. It is the sharing of risks and rewards, technology and innovation, 
with the aim of creating synergy and long term competitive advantage for both the buyer 
and the supplier”.  
 
Partnering should be undertaken strategically, professionally and selectively as it could, 
and should, be an effective and beneficial approach to manage relationships with 
suppliers.27 A distinction also has to be made between “partnering” and “partnership” as 
 
23 Ibid 
24 Personal interview held with Dr Petra Bouwer Pretoria 
25 “Public-Private Partnerships” www.CIPS.org 1  
26 Greenwell, Z.I and Shaw, B “Uneasy bedfellows?  Public-Private Sector supply chain partnership in the 
NHS” Public and Private Sector Partnerships, the Enabling Mix 245 
27 “Partnering” www.CIPS.org 1  
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the latter has a clearly defined legal basis:  partnering relates to the relationship between 
the different partners and as such has an important bearing on the expectation of the 
values that the partners should agree to adhere to in the partnership. It can be defined 
as an approach “with an attitude, or management ethos of openness, effective 
communication, close collaboration and cooperation, trust, honesty, transparency, 
sharing and mutual benefit”.28 As such the aspiration is that the ethical values in the 
relationship would form the basis on which the concept of partnering is to be based. The 
relationship between the business partners can therefore be seen as independent of the 
legal arrangement, although they are connected by their contractual relationship. In 
terms of the legal criteria of the relationship, the focus is its legal nature in terms of 
which two or more parties joint carry out the same business and are jointly liable for the 
risks and costs of that business. It goes without saying that the legal aspects would be 
directed by the legal system applicable, and this process could be managed with ease, 
and without unnecessarily emphasising the ethical principles that are to play a part. In a 
solid partnership, ethical values are expected to be adhered to for the successful 
execution of the agreement. 
 
The partnership idea has also been explored by Linder,29 who advocates that the 
partnership idea should be revitalised in three principal areas: 
 
4.8.1 On economic grounds, the traditional binary division between the public and 
private sector invites new discourse on distinctive institutional concepts; 
 
4.8.2 Influence of political values and commitments; 
 
4.8.3 On a more pragmatic level, management reform trends are turning away from 
leadership and behavioural principles and towards more structural emphasis on 
flexibility and innovation, which reinforce partnership ideals. 
 
It is thus clear that the idea of solid partnerships, beyond the confines of legal  
 
28 Ibid 
29 Linder 38-39  
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descriptions and boundaries, finds application on the smaller scale between partners 
reciprocally, as well as partnering between the public and private sectors in their 
business relationship. 
 
4.9 Ethical Business Practises
 
Ethical standards can be set by various institutions and role-players in the PPP process.  
One version occurs in an excerpt from the Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability:30
 
“The best and most successful organisations recognise that they will only prosper in the 
long term if they satisfy the aspirations of their stakeholders; including customers, 
suppliers, employees, local communities, investors, governments, public interest and 
environment groups. To satisfy this intense scrutiny and the demands for greater 
accountability in society, businesses and other organisations are increasingly 
recognising the need to measure, track and report on their social and ethical 
performance.”   
 
Based on this view, the members of the CIPS need to comply with their Personal Ethical 
Code, which sets out the principles of: 
 
• Integrity 
• Professionalism 
• High standards 
• Optimal use of resources  
• Compliance with legal and other obligations 
 
It also offers guidance in relation to: 
 
• Declaration of interest 
• Confidentiality and accuracy of information 
• Fair competition 
 
30 See in general “Ethical Business Practises in Purchasing and Supply Management” www.CIPS.org 1-2  
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• Business gifts and hospitality 
• Seeking advice 
 
The Code forms a basis for expected conduct in the purchasing and supply profession 
and addresses business-to-business ethical issues and social responsibility issues 
within supply chains.  It also takes into account other issues that may arise during 
business transactions, such as social responsibility, personal accountability and 
corporate governance.  It is therefore expected from purchasing and supply 
professionals to demonstrate that they take ethical and social responsibility issues into 
consideration.  
 
As an annexure to the PPP manual,31 the PPP Unit of National Treasury has a 
document available called the “template code of conduct for bid evaluation panel 
members” which is aimed at evaluating transaction adviser bids and PPP bids.  Every 
member of a bid evaluation bid is expected to sign the Code before receiving bids and 
as such the process fails to address the specific ethical issues and expectations as this 
approach does not indicate the extent to which it is expected from those involved, to 
adhere to a certain ethical standard.  Merely having bidders sign a document is not 
sufficient to ensure their personal commitment to ethical conduct.  Neither can it be said 
to be similar to the CIPS Code applicable to professionals in the UK as its main purpose 
is to promote transparency in the allocation of bids.  As for Municipal PPPs, apart from 
the Code of Conduct for directors and members of staff of municipal entities which form 
part of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, no specific code is prescribed in relation to 
MPPPs.  
 
In the management of PPPs, ethics relate to a wide range of issues from doubtful 
suppliers to corruption, and the following concepts are therefore to be considered to 
ensure ethical business practices: 
 
• Fair trade 
• Ethical trading 
 
31 ”Annexure 6: Template Code of Conduct for Bid evaluation and Panel members” PPP Unit manual 85-
86 
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• Ethical sourcing 
• Social accountability 
• Social auditing 
• Corporate social responsibility 
• Corporate citizenship 
• Codes of conduct 
• Reputation assurance 
 
These guidelines can be interpreted in the following way: 
 
Although the ethical guidelines in the CIPS Personal Ethical Code are intended mainly 
for purchasing and supply professionals, they also apply to anyone responsible for 
managing the supply of goods or services from an external source and would therefore 
apply equally to PPPs. This means that any person or business engaged in purchasing 
and supply management would be expected to have a thorough understanding of the 
ethical guidelines applicable and to adhere thereto. It is to be noted that the ethical 
guidelines would apply differently in different conditions and thus would be interpreted in 
different ways. That implies that the professional facing an ethical dilemma would need 
to be informed on how the guidelines are to be applied in a given situation and this 
places a duty on such person or business to familiarise him/herself with the guidelines 
as they could apply. A duty also rests on such individual or business to engage 
stakeholders in the process. As regards the (similar) guidelines provided by the PPP 
Unit, it can be assumed that an equal expectation exists that parties dealing with the 
PPP Unit would familiarise themselves with, and adhere to, the ethical guidelines 
applicable.  What is of concern, however, is that there does not seem to be sufficient 
emphasis on the importance of this:  in an interview with the business manager of the 
PPP Unit, he indicated that “service delivery is the first requirement: ethics is important, 
but secondary”.  This for me was a clear indication of a lack of awareness or emphasis 
on the importance that ethics is to play in good governance in PPPs. 
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4.10 Best Value
 
A distinction can be made between the “best value” approach and the “best value for 
money” approach.  An important correlation exists, though, as the PPP option for best 
value can only be adopted once it has been established that the planned infrastructural 
development would provide value for money.  In the UK context, this would mean that 
the transaction needs to meet the following criteria:32 
 
• Good design (incorporating cost, impact, and sustainability); 
• Risk allocation and the ensuing benefits and disadvantages of transferring staff; 
• Non-market factors, for example environmental impact and strategic risks 
affordability; 
• Protection of staff terms and conditions; 
• Range of services included; 
• Discount rate; 
• Optimism bias; 
• Tax; 
• Cost and benefits. 
 
Narrowing it down to the test for “best value for money”, the criteria could be: 
 
• Fitness for purpose and other considerations of quality; 
• Performance; 
• Price; 
• Delivery; 
• Accessories and consumables; 
• Service support; 
• Disposal. 
 
This demonstrates that price is just one of seven listed criteria to be judged from a 
perspective that should encourage a long-term view of a good service to be procured.   
 
32 ”The ‘best value’ approach to PPP & public contracting” www.chapmantripp.co.nz/resource_-
library/published_article.asp?id=3419 1-6 
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The benefits in making a proper assessment are clear and therefore a practice of “Best 
Value” came into force in April 2000 in the UK where it was developed as part of a far-
reaching modernisation agenda for the UK government at all levels.33 The concept 
involves four “C”s: Consult, Compare, Challenge and Compete. The CIPS provides 
some guidelines on its interpretation and a few categories are to be distinguished. 
 
4.11 CIPS Best Value Guidelines 
  
 The following were offered as general “best value” practice guidelines published 
by the CIPS for its members. 
 
4.11.1 Purchasing and supply management professionals and best value:  the focus in 
this regard is mainly on the Local Authorities. It would include that they undertake 
a review of their effectiveness of purchasing and supply management and ensure 
that value for money and high quality services are ensured.    
 
4.11.2 Stakeholders, Suppliers and Partnering:  the objectives of the public sector 
partner need to be clarified in order to ensure that Best Value services are 
provided. A key goal is to develop marketplaces in order to gain advantage of 
contemporary advances in relationship thinking and eCommerce. Furthermore, 
stakeholders such as suppliers and service providers need to embrace issues 
such as equal opportunities, eCommerce, true partnering as well as economic 
development. It is also important to balance the strategic importance of a service 
against the maturity of the market and its ability to deliver the level of service 
which is required as it is difficult to have a strategic alliance or partnering 
arrangement with a contractor who does not have sufficient experience in the 
marketplace.  
 
When a partner is to be selected, a comprehensive, competitive tendering 
process with outcome-based specifications is necessary.  An example would be 
to stipulate that innovation in providing a service would be required.  As it is of 
vital importance to select the right partner, certain values in the process are 
 
33 See in general “Ethical Business Practises in Purchasing and Supply Management” www.CIPS.org 1  
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important such as trust, openness, frankness, common joint objectives and 
balance of risk. Skills such as project management and cost control are 
necessary. True partnering and traditional purchasing are vastly different in 
nature and this also entails that with partnering a change of culture would be 
necessary. 
 
4.11.3 Local Authorities and Best Value:  improved service and repositioning can be 
attained through organisation-wide purchasing and supply management reviews 
which will in turn facilitate Business Process Re-engineering and Re-design by 
encouraging challenge, collaboration and innovation. By following procedures, 
Local Authorities will be able to expose the hidden costs which are often part of 
relationships between Local Authorities, their customers and suppliers. The 
principle is about outcomes and not just outputs and inputs, and the whole cost 
of the local economy is therefore to be considered. Another aspect which needs 
to be noted is that there may be conflict between Best Value and PFI:  the reason 
is that PFI facilitates an asset and services as a combined package where Best 
Value would entail that they are viewed independently. Furthermore, PFI should 
not be confused with being a means to obtaining Best Value as it is merely an 
option for funding. 
 
Another feature of Best Value is that it concerns customer needs, which often include 
sustainable employment. As such it should fit government organisations at every level 
because it is as much about effectiveness and quality as it is about cost and efficiency.  
Finally, the public consultation phase envisaged should challenge traditional thinking 
about how and by whom services are provided. 
 
4.12 Lessons learnt
 
Important lessons were learnt during the initial PPPs in the 1990s.34 The approach from 
inception was that policies with practical solutions were to be developed where problems 
were identified and as a result major cost savings and improved service delivery could  
 
34 “How to access UK expertise in Public Private Partnerships, a brief guide from UK Trade and 
Investment” www.uktradeinvest.gov.uk  5 
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be achieved over the life of the project. This also entailed that the right focus was to be 
maintained on priorities, sufficient competition introduced and the workforce kept 
involved in the process of change and drawing up of service requirements.  
 
It was recognised early on in the process that primary legislation was to be reviewed and 
amended where necessary in order to enable PPPs to operate more effectively. Another 
important lesson learnt was that it was recognised that the base of expertise also lay 
within the private sector and that innovative developments in PPP solutions were to a 
large extent driven by private sector advisers, financiers, contractors and operators. 
 
4.13 Significance of Public–Private Partnerships in the South African context
 
Politicians have often stated why it would be beneficial for the South African economy to 
privatise state assets.  As early as 1999 a Community Private Partnership Programme 
(CPPP) was launched at Helderfontein, Johannesburg, and in his address the then 
deputy president Jacob Zuma35 emphasised that the objective of the programme was to 
“revitalise the rural economy, whilst ensuring empowerment and sustainable resource 
use”.  Furthermore, he stated the following:36
 
“It is our intention that the political transition that has been achieved be underpinned by 
an equally challenging economic transition rooted in, and benefiting the African 
inhabitants. The complexities of globalisation coupled with the dwindling availability of 
international aid present serious challenges. This is exacerbated further by the 
recognition that reserves of natural resources such as minerals are finite, forcing Africa 
to rely on partnerships for self-reliance and sustainability. These partnerships should 
form part of strategy formulation based on coherent policies. They should also ensure 
collaboration in the implementation of such programs as these, in addressing the 
overwhelming socio-economic ills as well as environmental degradation.” 
 
This is an important objective that has been reiterated by the SA government on various 
occasions. During a previous budget address in parliament, Minister Trevor Manuel  
 
35 Zuma, J “Keynote address by the deputy president at the launch of the Community Partnership 
Programme, Partnerships for Growth” Helderfontein 
36 Ibid 
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confirmed specific challenges as the importance of accelerating the pace of economic 
growth, as well as the importance of investment in the industry and expansion of 
infrastructure.37 The significance of this undertaking was again stated during the 2005 
budget address38 when he repeated the importance of growth, development and equity 
as long-term development goals. These goals cannot be realised by the government 
single-handedly and the joint responsibility between the government and the private 
sector was acknowledged in the signing of the Financial Sector Charter, setting out 
specific transformation commitments. This also included the drafting of a Code of 
Practice for empowerment in PPPs as well as a Code of Practice in terms of the BBBEE 
Act. The significance of this step was carried further during the 2005 budget when more 
specific details on its implementation were spelt out. The realisation of a balanced 
development between the first and second economies by investing in infrastructure and 
building programmes that are job-creating are important steps towards meeting the 
goals of the Charter. This will also include public and private sector funding of 
infrastructure, housing, empowerment and business development. In part, the 
development goals of the government are realised through the National Empowerment 
Fund, which supports and enables small businesses and black-owned or women-owned 
businesses. The main differences in these types of projects are the means by which they 
are financed as well as their size:  the value of the smallest PPP is R226 million,39 
whereas the projects funded by the NEF are significantly smaller. The process in 
obtaining finance is also different as a feasibility study will determine whether a PPP is to 
be proceeded with, or not. In the objectives identified during the budget speeches, as 
mentioned, PPPs will play an important role in realising these and will also contribute to 
the government’s commitment to Batho Pele. In view of these many expectations, 
arguments will be presented that the value of PPPs goes beyond the PPPs as 
envisaged in terms of the Treasury Regulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
37 Manuel, T 2004 “Budget speech"  
38 Manuel, T 2005 “Budget speech” 
39 Personal interview Kogan Pillay Pretoria 
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4.14 Conclusion
 
The confirmation of successful PPPs as a business development concept to the benefit 
of thse economy in the UK, demonstrates its relevance for the SA economy as well.  The 
private sector seems to be more involved than is the case in SA, and this is probably 
one of the more obvious differences between the SA and the UK PPP.  It must also be 
clear that PPP’s are utilised on a much broader scale than is the case in SA and it would 
be regrettable if the same measure of success in the SA PPP cannot be achieved. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS DEFINED 
 
I don’t question that social science analyses are important, but still,  
if you want to get a broad view and a long view  
you read  a novel rather than social science. 
-  Leo Strauss 
 
Formalising Public–Private Partnerships is necessary to regulate their role in the 
economy and the industries in which they can be operative, especially as they constitute 
a specified form of procurement.  Sometimes another form of procurement may be more 
suitable for the needs of the public party, and the distinction emphasises the relevance of 
always bearing in mind the main objectives of the PPP agreement. 
 
5.1 Introduction
 
Large-scale political reforms after the 1994 democratic elections brought with them the 
need for efficient public procurement for the national economy and thus a major public 
procurement review via a taskforce was established in 1995.1 This was headed by the 
State Tender Board under the direction of the Ministry of Finance and the Department of 
Public Works as well as the World Bank, which provided technical and financial support.  
The strategy of the taskforce included simplification of the procurement process; they 
also had to formulate principles and policies for equitable and transparent public 
procurement. This was especially important in view of the planned merging of the dual 
economy and one of the goals identified was that previously disadvantaged individuals 
and groups should be included in public contracts. The policies formulated to ensure 
realisation of this goal include the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework and Black 
Economic Empowerment.  One of the important vehicles through which this goal can be 
attained is Public–Private Partnerships. 
 
The term public–private partnership reflects the proposed incentive to engage and 
sustain a long-term relationship with the external market and at the same time it creates 
a credible expectation that the public and private sector will be working together for the 
 
1 Gauteng Provincial Government Supply Chain Management Manual 12 
 43
Chapter 5: PPPs defined 
management of safe, regular and reliable public service for the community.2 These 
partnerships can also be referred to as private finance initiatives (PFIs),3 build-operate-
transfers (BOTs) or contractual agreements and in these types of projects a number of 
key indicators can be defined:4
 
5.1.1 Output-based specifications, where services are specified as outputs and 
payment is linked to the quality and timing of their delivery; 
 
5.1.2 The long-term nature of contracts, which provides scope to recover the initial 
capital investment, to develop alternative approaches to service delivery and to 
focus on whole life costing; 
 
5.1.3 Performance measurement and incentives, which provide the means of securing 
the value for money compromised by the original deal; 
 
5.1.4 Competition, which makes it easier to demonstrate that value for money has 
been achieved; 
 
5.1.5 Private sector management skills delivering efficiencies and innovation with the 
financing, construction and operation of the total project. 
 
From these indicators, it is possible to identify five advantages of PPPs:5  
 
5.1.6 Partnerships as management reform are promoted as an innovative tool that will 
change the way government functions by largely tapping into the discipline of the 
market; 
 
5.1.7 Partnerships as problem conversion are viewed not as a tool for changing 
managerial practices, but rather as a universal fix for most problems attendant on  
 
2 Kroukamp, H “Public-Private Partnerships:  problem solver for improved service delivery?” Gauteng 
Management Development Programme Leadership journal (1) 19 
3 Sullivan, H and Skelcher, C “Working across boundaries, collaboration in public services” 80, is of the 
view that PPPs replaced PFIs 
4 Kroukamp 1 19 
5 Ibid 
 44
Chapter 5: PPPs defined 
public service delivery; 
 
5.1.8 Perspectives depicting partnerships as a vehicle for bringing government closer 
to the private sector are relevant, but another more subtle point is that 
partnerships can be morally regenerative, given the effects that partnerships may 
have on the people involved; 
 
5.1.9 The usage of a partnership as risk-shifting portrays partnering as a means of 
responding to fiscal stringency on the part of the government; 
 
5.1.10 Although privatisation, as an alternative service delivery method, has been 
promoted as a form of empowerment because it devolves control vertically 
downwards towards the consumer, partnerships as power-sharing spread control 
horizontally, especially in regulatory matters where control has been 
concentrated in the government. 
 
The advantages of closer cooperation between the public and private sector were also 
emphasised by Steele6 when she stated that “government’s purpose in involving 
business in policy development is to introduce new thinking and relevant experience in 
the resolution of long-standing policy problems in meeting the innovative challenges of 
modernising government”. The tangible benefits that are to be gained by the public 
sector in terms of skills development and new approaches to solving existing problems 
are more immediate but one of the most important gains in my view is that the 
combination of the two cultures would in the long run reap equally great benefits when 
public servants are offered the opportunity to broaden their views and to learn different 
ways of doing things.  Steele made some interesting findings as regards the cooperation 
and results of this type of culture blend.7 These included: 
 
5.1.11 The challenge for government is to be open to change: developing policy through 
partnership means that traditional ways of doing things as well as traditional 
assumptions of what needs to be done need to be challenged; 
 
 
6 Steele, J In the Public Interest?  Engaging the private sector in government 5 
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5.1.12 The different experiences that public sector employees and business people 
have of their collaboration reflect their different experiences in their respective 
employment environments; 
 
5.1.13 The success of a process is assessed against different criteria by public servants 
and business people; 
 
5.1.14 Business people are more likely to encounter difficulties with a process and 
would make suggestions for changing it, whereas public servants, where they 
have designed a process, are more likely to accept that it meets their needs and 
less likely to be critical of it; 
 
5.1.15 Public servants and business people often give priority to different features. 
 
The conclusion can thus be drawn that the merging of the different cultures could 
highlight differences which, if accepted positively, could offer opportunity for growth.  
Furthermore, these advantages clearly confirm the notion that public–private 
participation is a concept that has found favour for obvious reasons. In South Africa in 
particular, these advantages can play a vital role in the developmental objectives of the 
government and an open-minded approach could ensure that PPPs realise many of 
these expectations. Furthermore, as Linder8 points out, the hallmark of partnerships is 
not competition, but cooperation, and the disciplining mechanism is not customer exit or 
profit margins, but a joint venture where financial risks are spread between both sectors.  
Other considerations that need to be borne in mind is that arrangements which seek to 
be termed as PPPs can be measured against different criteria9 depending on whether 
the target is limited, for example building a hospital, or broad, for example a community 
development. Further considerations may be whether agents are local or international, 
and whether participating partners are confined to the public sector or span sectors, as  
 
7 Steele 35-37 
8 Linder, S. H “Coming to terms with the Public-Private Partnership: a grammar of multiple meanings” 
American Behavioural Scientist 26 
9 Andersen, O.J “Public-Private Partnerships: Organisational hybrids as channels for local mobilisation 
and participation?” Scandinavian Political Studies 4 
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well as the degree of formalisation. 
 
5.2 What is a public–private partnership? 
 
A PPP can be defined as a legal contract and the definition will set the boundaries that 
would direct the parties on what role they would play in the performance of the contract.  
As pointed out previously,10 factors such as the level of trust and commitment, free-
flowing communications, sharing of risks and rewards, differing power bases, 
expectations, motives, culture and the role that individuals play in the process, are vital 
to a successful partnership as they are interrelated and can make or break a 
partnership.11
 
As regards the formal description of a PPP, there is no unique or universally 
standardised definition of the concept12 but it could acceptably be described as a “legally 
constituted relationship between the state or its agencies with private sector firm(s) in 
which the latter substitutes the former in the provision of public goods and services over 
a specified or indefinite period, for mutual benefit”. In terms of this definition, the use of 
the term “mutual benefit” is paramount, as it emphasises the nature of the relationship in 
terms of which the state essentially transfers a part of its public responsibility to a private 
organisation. The other side of the coin is the responsibility that the private organisation 
has to ensure that the public will continue to enjoy the benefits of the services provided 
and that such supply of services will then hopefully be more cost-effective and provide 
value-for-money. In the SA context the concept is regulated and is defined in terms of 
both the Treasury Regulations and the Municipal PPP Regulations. These Regulations 
are issued in terms of the Public Finance Management Act and the Municipal Finance 
Management Act respectively.  
 
The definition in terms of the Treasury Regulations is fairly comprehensive, and amounts  
to the following: 13
 
10 See chapter 4 supra 
11 Greenwell, Z.I and Shaw, B “Uneasy bedfellows? Public-Private supply chain partnership in the NHS” 
Public and Private Sector Partnerships, the Enabling Mix 244-245 
12 ”Public private partnership capacity building programme: phase 1” Case study: the Maputo development 
corridor roll road report 6  
13 National Treasury: Public Private Partnership Manual 4 
 47
Chapter 5: PPPs defined 
“public private partnership” or “PPP” means a commercial transaction between an 
institution and a private party in terms of which the private party –  
(a) performs an institutional function on behalf of the institution;  and/or 
(b) acquires the use of state property for its own commercial purposes;  and 
(c)  assumes substantial financial, technical and operational risks in connection with the 
performance of the institutional function and/or use of state property;  and 
 (d) receives a benefit for performing the institutional function or from utilising the state 
property, either by way of: 
 (i) consideration to be paid by the institution which derives from a revenue fund 
or, where the institutional is a national government business enterprise of a 
provincial government business enterprise, from the revenue of such 
institution;  or 
 (ii) charges or fees to be collected by the private party from users or customers of 
a service provided to them;  or 
(iii) a combination of such consideration and such charges or fees; 
 
From this it is clear that it would entail a contract between a private party and a public 
sector institution in terms of which the private party assumes substantial financial, 
technical, and operational risk in the design, financing, building and operation of a 
project.  Two types are specifically identified: firstly, where an institutional function is 
performed by the private party, and secondly, where the use of state property is acquired 
by the private party for its own commercial purposes.  Furthermore, a PPP can also be a 
hybrid of other types of a procurement transaction where payment in any scenario 
involves one of three mechanisms:  firstly, the institution pays the private party for the 
delivery of the service, or, secondly, the private party collects fees or charges from users 
of the service, and lastly, it could be a combination of these two. 
 
The Municipal PPP Regulations section 1 defines a PPP as: 
 
“public private partnership” means a commercial transaction between a municipality and a 
private party in terms of which the private party –  
(a) performs a municipal function for or on behalf of a municipality, or acquires the 
management or use of municipal property for its own commercial purposes, or both 
performs a municipal function for or on behalf of a municipality and acquires the 
management or use of municipal property for its own commercial purposes;  and 
(b) assumes substantial financial, technical and operational risks in connection with – 
(i) the performance of the municipal function; 
(ii) the management or use of the municipal property;  or 
(iii) both;  and 
(c) receives a benefit from performing the municipal function or from utilising the 
municipal property or from both, by way of - 
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 (i) consideration to be paid or given by the municipality or a municipal entity 
under the sole or shared control of the municipality; 
 (ii) charges or fees to be collected by the private party from users or customers of 
a service provided to them;  or  
 (iii) a combination of the benefits referred to in subparagraphs (i) and (ii); 
 
 
The Municipal Regulations therefore also provide for the performance of a function or 
acquisition of municipal property or a hybrid of the two possibilities, similar to the 
specifications laid down in the Treasury Regulations.  From the wording of the Municipal 
Regulations, however, it seems that more emphasis is given to the rendering of services 
to Municipalities, whereas PPPs in terms of the Treasury Regulations, especially 
considering the examples given on PPPs already completed,14 seem rather to indicate 
the need for the establishment and management of infrastructure over the long term. 
 
 
5.3 What a public–private partnership is not  
 
Not meeting the criteria in terms of the Regulations would obviously result in an 
agreement not being recognised as a PPP. The PPP Unit at National Treasury has done 
a feasibility study in order to determine whether a proposed agreement would meet the 
criteria of a PPP and whether it would be classified as an ordinary procurement deal.  
According to TR16, an agreement between a public and a private entity will in the 
following instances not be defined as a PPP: 
 
• it is not a simple outsourcing of functions in the event of substantial financial, 
technical and operational risk being detained by the institution; 
• it is not a donation by the private party for some public benefit; 
• neither is it the privatisation or divesture of state assets and/or liabilities; 
• it also does not amount to a commercialisation of a public function through the 
creation of a state-owned enterprise; 
• it does not constitute borrowing by the state. 
 
The assumption of risk seems to be one of the critical areas in meeting the criteria of 
TR16 and where the private party is not prepared to assume substantial risk it could for 
instance then be decided to proceed with the transaction as a standard procurement  
 
14 See page 17 infra 
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transaction and not a PPP. 
  
The definition of a “private party” in terms of the Municipal Regulations needs to be 
mentioned specifically, as its application has an important influence on the formation of 
MPPPs.  In terms of the Regulations the following are excluded as a private party: 
 
• a municipality; 
• a municipal entity; 
• an organ of state, including an institution listed in any of the Schedules to the 
Public Finance Management Act. 
 
Furthermore, municipalities are regulated by both the Municipal Finance Management 
Act and the Municipal Systems Act. Section 86B provides for three types of service 
providers, which are defined as: 
 
Kinds of municipal entities.- (1) There are the following kinds of municipal entities: 
(a) a private company – 
(i) established by one or more municipalities established in terms of Part 2; or 
(ii) in which one or more municipalities have acquired or hold an interest in 
terms of Part 2; 
(b) a service utility established by a municipality in terms of Part 3;  and 
(c) a multi-jurisdictional service utility established by two or more municipalities in 
terms of Part 4. 
 
Given the possibility of creating any of these three legal personae, municipalities are 
increasingly entering into service delivery agreements with private parties to outsource 
their services. 15  An example of this is City Power in Johannesburg. These clearly are 
not PPPs as they are expressly excluded by the definition of a private party, in terms of 
the Regulations, and also because there is no risk-sharing. Furthermore, in the long term 
it would probably happen that the Municipality had not accrued any or sufficient value 
and that it merely paid the private party for delivering a service. Where there is merely a 
service provider appointed from the private sector the question of affordability also arises 
as, apart from the lack of or (probably) insufficient infrastructural gain, the private party 
(probably) does not provide any substantial infrastructural investment or development –  
 
15 Personal interview Dr Petra Bouwer Pretoria  
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two things that are the biggest advantages of PPPs.  
 
Determining whether a procurement transaction meets the criteria of a PPP or not by 
following the prescribed criteria in terms of the Regulations is one way to establish the 
true nature of the transaction. However, it seems that there are numerous 
misconceptions both in the public and private sectors about what PPPs are or what they 
are supposed to be.  Room for misinterpretation exists where the private sector confuses 
the PPP concept with Corporate Social Investment. It seems that where a public sector 
party is supporting a public sector institution with development in infrastructure or social 
development, it tends to label the nature of the agreement as a partnership akin to a 
PPP.16 This is obviously a huge misconception and regrettable as it leads to an 
irresponsible use of the term. It is particularly regrettable if the term is used in this 
manner in instances where parties stand to benefit from the perception created that they 
are conducting business in line with government’s PPP developmental objectives.  
Taking responsibility for CSI is great and business society should do so, but it cannot 
wear the cloak of a PPP if it does not meet the legal requirements. 
 
As stated previously, Treasury needs to determine whether a transaction is to be termed 
a PPP or a procurement transaction. Most transactions between the public and private 
sector amount to procurement transactions where services and products are purchased 
against a fixed price. A few differences between the procurement process and the PPP 
process therefore need to be elaborated on. 
 
5.4 Difference between Public–Private Partnership and Procurement
 
Are PPPs not just another form of procurement? This is a question which needs to be 
determined during the feasibility study phase: the objective of the investigation 
undertaken is to determine whether a specific transaction has the potential and 
characteristics of a normal procurement agreement or whether it complies with the 
criteria of a PPP. Obviously, should the PPP criteria not be met, the normal procurement 
procedures are to be followed and the feasibility study will not pass the initial stage  
 
16 Workshop attended: Gauteng Management Development Programme Senior Management Service 
Networking session:  “Key-lessons in Public-Private Partnerships” 
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(Treasury approval I).  As for MPPPs, a feasibility study is also to be conducted which 
must be submitted to the National Treasury PPP Unit for its comments and overview.  
 
The standard procurement process needs to be distinguished on national and provincial 
level, although section 38 of the PFMA sets out the general responsibilities of accounting 
officers in the process: they need to ensure that an appropriate procurement and 
provisioning system that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective is 
followed.  Insofar as the process goes, a number of key aspects need to be elaborated 
on.  
 
5.5 The Webb report
  
During 2000 a study into the procurement process, the Webb report, was published.17  
One of the findings of the report was that government procurement systems are very 
centralised and process-driven. It was also found that the present public procurement 
approach at national level broadly exhibits a number of characteristics which will be 
referred to briefly. 
 
5.5.1 Public Procurement characteristics identified: 
 
• Public procurement is highly prescriptive and is focused on process; 
• The principal objective is to achieve “value for money” but this often appears to 
mean value for money equalling lowest price; 
• It is used to provide indirect assistance to SMEs and HDIs; 
• In both period contracts and ad hoc contracts the range of commercial activity 
and industry sectors involved is extensive; therefore the amount of money that 
the national and provincial governments spend can have a profound economic 
effect;  
• From 1 April to 31 December 1999 total contracts awarded by state and 
provincial tender boards (but excluding those awarded by individual departments 
under delegation) amounted to more than R8.710 billion;  two-thirds of that  
 
17 Gauteng Provincial Government Supply Chain Management Manual 13 
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• amount (R5 733 billion) was contracted at national level. 
 
As a result of the Webb report, a number of weaknesses in government procurement 
were identified that merit discussion. 
 
5.5.2 Government procurement weaknesses identified: 
 
The weaknesses that were described in the report are: 
 
• Procurement has been used to provide indirect assistance in SMEs, although 
tracking of the impact is inconclusive; 
• The procurement system is highly prescriptive and focused on compliance with 
procedures;  
• The objective of achieving “value for money” is often confused with approving a 
bid with the lowest price; 
• There does not seem to be an indication that the procurement process is cost-
effective; 
• There does not appear to be data on the use made of money saved through the 
present procurement system.  
 
Although these findings were published a number of years ago, they are still included as 
part of the current GPG Procurement Manual in order to focus on improving the 
procurement process and as such are still relevant. 
 
5.3 Overview of the Procurement Process
 
Although the process is very formalised and prescriptive, “Identified Values” and a Code 
of Conduct is prescribed to all procurement staff and it is expected of them to maintain 
high levels of professional ethics and a high standard of personal integrity.18 The 
standard of behaviour expected of these officials is based on the following: 
 
• Open, honest and cooperative business relations with colleagues and vendors; 
 
18 Ibid 25 
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• Confidentiality of both government and commercial information; 
• Avoidance of conflict of interest or a perception of bias; 
• Disclosure of possible conflicts of interest, whether real or capable of being 
perceived, to the delegated authority as soon as they arise; 
• Fair dealing and impartiality in the conduct of bid evaluations, recommendations 
and adjudications; 
• The highest possible standard of professional competence and the 
encouragement of similar standards amongst all GPG staff. 
 
The ethical values prescribed in any workplace to its employees is generally accepted as 
guidance given by management on how staff is expected to behave and which values 
the organisation strives to adhere to in conducting its business. As such, it is valuable in 
setting the tone. However, processes also play an important role and the emphasis on 
processes in the public sector, as is evident from the discussions on regulatory 
practices, is probably much stronger than in the private sector.  
 
In order to improve the procurement process in the public sector, strong emphasis on 
efficient supply chain management is being implemented to develop and set a standard 
for best practice, particularly in the Gauteng Province. This can be seen as complying 
with the direction given by National Treasury,19 and especially to address the 
weaknesses identified in the Webb report. SCM as an integral part of financial 
management was formalised in the Policy Strategy to Guide Uniformity in Procurement 
Reform Processes in Government.    
 
5.4 Phases in the Procurement Process
 
In broad terms, the procurement process amounts to the following: 
 
• User Requirement definition 
• Preparation of Task Directive (specification) 
• Evaluation, Recommendation, Allocation 
 
19 Ibid 27 
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• Administration of Contract 
 
The phases are discussed briefly and the references to the values in the process are 
included insofar as they may relate to similarities in the PPP procurement process. In 
more detail, these steps amount to: 
 
5.4.1 User Requirement definition:20  before any procurement action is to be instituted, 
user requirements must be justified. The more complex and the higher the value 
of the procurement, the more likely it is that this will involve a formal process, 
such as a detailed motivation that must be approved prior to entering into any 
procurement commitment. The value of the transaction will determine the 
process: products or services under R500 are bought with petty cash, for 
purchases of R500 to R30 000 three telephonic quotations (RFQ) and one verbal 
confirmation are required and from R30 000 to R500 000 a request for proposal 
(RFP) is required. Above R500 000 a public bid is requested. 
 
5.4.2 Specification:21  as it is vital to ensure that the service that is required in a given 
situation will render value for money, the task directive should define the purpose 
and extent of the specific task as well as provide the full background in order to 
provide prospective bidders with the opportunity to understand the requirements 
of the task. It is also desirable that the result that is to be obtained be described.  
This can take the form of a project proposal that should set out the roles and 
responsibilities of the respective parties, as well as the deliverables in terms of 
the project. 
 
Insofar as the RFP process is concerned, a few aspects need to be highlighted: 
firstly, transparency must be maintained in that all prospective bidders should 
compete on the same terms and without knowledge of their competitors’ bids.  
This means ensuring that:  
 
• All vendors are given the opportunity to submit a bid on the same terms; 
 
20 Ibid 32-33 
21 Ibid 55-56 
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• Information provided to the prospective bidders is not deceptive or misleading; 
• The conditions and protocols published in the bid request are adhered to, 
particularly when evaluating bids. 
 
In order to ensure compliance with these criteria, the staff working with the bids 
have the duty to ensure that vendors are not allowed to engage in anti-
competitive practices, for example collusion, artificial price fixing and/or operation 
of formal or informal cartels. Careful planning should also ensure favourable 
outcomes and such planning should include objectives, timelines for delivery, 
responsibilities of parties, and details of resources which would be required.  This 
should include:22
 
• Define needs accurately and in sufficient detail for prospective bidders to 
understand the requirement and to enable them to submit their best offers; 
• Set out the criteria against which all bids will be evaluated; 
• Indicate which criteria are mandatory and which are desirable; 
• State clearly that failure to respond or to comply with any mandatory criterion will 
result in the bid being disqualified; 
• Provide details of the bid evaluation methodology that will be used, including an 
indicative evaluation time frame; 
• Identify any risks that need to be taken into account; 
• Clearly advise bidders of all the information to be provided and undertakings to 
be given; 
• Identify applicable objectives of PPPFA. 
 
A distinction can be made between the RFP process in conventional 
procurement methods and the best and final offer (BAFO) process in PPPs, 
which is conducted on a larger scale23 insofar as the bidder has the opportunity 
during the BAFO to clarify possible uncertainties, whereas the bidder in the RFP 
process needs to ensure that he knows, from the outset, what is expected from 
him in order to ensure that he presents a proper proposal that will address the  
 
22 Ibid 64 
23 This distinction is dealt with more fully in Chapter 5 infra 
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needs as identified. 
 
5.4.3 Evaluation, Recommendation, Allocation of contract:24 during this phase the 
quotation or bid is evaluated and the offer that is accepted would constitute the 
formation of the agreement. During this phase, it is important that evaluation 
criteria be applied fairly and objectively in order to ensure that the process is 
acceptable both to the public sector as well as the bidders. The evaluation 
criteria applied should also correlate with the defined scope of work or terms of 
reference according to which the bid was submitted. In terms of the larger 
contracts the bids may be evaluated by either the Departmental Acquisition 
Council (for Departmental procurement) or the GPG Acquisition Council (for 
Provincial procurement.) 
 
5.4.4 Administration of contract:25 this entails the ongoing process to ensure that all 
objectives are met. Insofar as the management of risk goes, the GPG 
Procurement Manual indicates that the responsibility for managing an identified 
risk should be allocated to the party that can best manage the risk, and where it 
is clearly not only one party’s responsibility it must be shared. Except to indicate 
that risks need to be identified, evaluated and managed, not much direction is 
given on how risk management is to be implemented and it does not seem to be 
negotiated in as much detail as a specific requirement of the agreement as would 
be the case in a PPP. 
 
Taking a broad view, the standard procurement process and the PPP 
procurement process are very similar to the extent that there is a need identified, 
specifications given and proposals obtained, an allocation of a contract made 
and ongoing contract management. After all, a PPP is a specialised form of 
procurement with specific requirements that do not form part of the standard 
procurement process. However, it must be clear that the PPP process is much 
more comprehensive and approvals are required at specific stages during the 
process. Furthermore, since the allocation of bids larger than R500 000.00 lies  
 
24 Gauteng Provincial Government Supply Chain Management Manual 81-82 
25 Ibid 110 
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with either the DAC or the GPG-AC, the Accounting Officer does have a say in 
the allocation of the bid. However, since there are fundamental differences, the 
transaction under consideration would either meet the criteria of a standard 
procurement agreement or a PPP and a clear distinction should always be 
maintained. 
 
5.5 Municipal Public–Private Partnerships
 
According to Plummer,26 “municipal services and the process of their delivery are an 
integral part of a multifaceted, multifunctional organisation”. For this reason such efforts 
are not isolated initiatives but form part of a broader municipal effort. The author also 
calls for changing the approach in service delivery in municipal reforms by involving 
private sector participation in developing urban infrastructure and services to influence 
the process of municipal reform. This stance also seems to be supported by 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi,27 as he has called on the private sector to get more involved in 
the local government reform. Although his suggestion is for partial privatisation, which is 
different to PPP objectives, he recognises that the public sector can gain by “bringing in 
managers, experience and expertise from the private sector.” His argument is based on 
the premise that the community should become more involved in the process, 
particularly from the point of view of “self-help and self-reliance”. He also refers to the 
concept of the “new entrepreneurial state” in which this would be enabled. This seems to 
support the notion that development in municipalities should allow for more community 
sector participation, especially in order to advance those who were previously 
disadvantaged. 
 
Getting back to Plummer,28 she emphasises the necessity to recognise that private 
sector participation in the service sector, such as water and electricity services or waste 
removal, are not to be created or implemented in a vacuum and as such that the 
outcomes are linked to the fulfilment of a number of municipal obligations. It follows that  
 
26 Plummer Focussing Partnerships: a sourcebook for municipal capacity building in public-private 
partnerships  33 
27 Buthelezi, M “Let private sector drive reform local government” Sunday Independent 
28 Plummer 33 
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MPPPs are more service-delivery orientated and that may be why the Municipal 
Regulations provide for outsourcing as a PPP, whereas the national and provincial PPPs 
seem to focus more on infrastructural development of a product, which may or may not 
include service delivery over the long term. This interpretation may also have been what 
the authors of the DBSA report29 may have had in mind: in my interpretation the 
expectations of PPPs were based on the potential of PPPs, on a broad scale, to relieve 
the plight of the poor by ensuring enhanced service delivery, in other words that the 
focus was outcome-based and not so much based on the process. 
 
5.6 Is there room for a broader application of the concept? 
 
Given the strict criteria as laid down by the Treasury Regulations, this may be an 
interesting concept to explore. The more general definition referred to before, that it is a 
relationship for the provision of goods of services “over a specified or indefinite period, 
for mutual benefit”, in my view opens the door for a much wider interpretation and 
application than seems to be the current norm. The view is held that this is desirable, 
especially in view of the important role that PPPs are to play in the development and 
growth of SA as a Developmental State. By no means should this indicate that the 
boundaries as set by the Regulations are to be extended, as this could open the door to 
abuse. What is meant by this, however, is that the perceived misconceptions about 
PPPs, insofar as they exist, should be addressed.  It seems that currently the most 
prevalent perception held is that, because the PPP Unit drives PPPs on the bigger scale, 
that that is what PPPs do and should amount to – and my plea is that this view should 
be extended. Before suggestions as to how to approach this are offered, the 
currentapproach needs to be considered:  Currently, most PPPs that are put together 
and conducted under the guidance of the PPP Unit at National Treasury have a huge 
cost implication. The average cost to execute a feasibility study amounts to around two 
million Rand30 and it might not be viable for a smaller project to have the feasibility study 
performed. To date, twelve PPP agreements had been signed on national level and 
another fifty are to be approved. The smallest PPP at the moment is valued at RM26631  
 
29 Development Bank of South Africa ”Impact of PPPs on the poor: the South African experience”  
30 Personal interview Kogan Pillay Pretoria 
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and this demonstrates that the size and extent of the transactions facilitated and 
managed by the PPP Unit are obviously focused on the larger projects, which of course 
are all in line with the budget and the development of the macro economy. Most of these 
projects are aimed at infrastructural development; a few examples of successful PPPs 
completed to date include: 
 
• N4 West Platinum toll road 
• Inkosi Albert Luthuli hospital 
• DTI campus 
• Chapman’s Peak Drive toll road 
• SANParks concessions 
 
PPPs such as these certainly improve infrastructure and growth and to that extent they 
do fulfil the vision of PPPs in our economy. However, there may also be many 
advantages to public–private sector involvement on a smaller scale, especially to meet 
the objectives of BEE. To this extent the Development Bank of SA is contributing 
towards the establishment of MPPPs as they aim to “fill the gap” between the public and 
private sectors.32 They recognise that PPPs can unlock private-sector resources and 
provide funding in order to facilitate the establishment of PPPs that the private party 
might otherwise not have considered economical. The DBSA plays the role of financier, 
partner and adviser, and a few examples of such MPPPs33 established with their 
intervention are: 
 
• Franschoek Empowerment and Development Initiative (Fedi):  DBSA assisted in 
mobilising resources to facilitate a land development: initially R20 000 was 
granted for technical assistance, but later an amount of R60m was provided in 
grants, bridging finance and loans and DBSA assisted with raising an additional 
R35m in funding; 
• uShaka Marine World project:  R107m was contributed in loans and equity to 
establish a regeneration project, with an association between the eThekwini  
 
31 Personal interview Kogan Pillay Pretoria  
32 Coulson, M “Corporate report: the Development Bank of South Africa Advising Partner” Financial Mail 
50-52 
33 Ibid  
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• Metro Council and the private party to restore the decaying Durban seafront; 
• My Acre of Africa is a joint venture between Johnnic and SA National Parks to 
establish a R1bn endowment fund whose income will be spent on conservation 
and environmental education around Bushbuckridge. 
 
As the municipalities are not subject to National Treasury and the PPP Unit, it seems the 
DBSA plays a similar role to that of the PPP Unit insofar as they act as advisers to put 
MPPPs together – even if not officially appointed to do so. However, a huge difference 
between the PPP Unit and the DBSA interventions is that the PPP Unit does not provide 
funding and that the transaction advisers’ activities are mainly supervised and advised 
on. The DBSA plays a much more active role by initiating projects and also providing 
funding, in addition to its advisory function. Another difference is that the PPP Unit does 
not regard itself as a “partner”, whereas the DBSA in that sense is more involved in the 
day-to-day management of the project. 
 
It is the incorporation of procurement transactions on a more general level, and possibly 
also on a smaller scale, within the framework of the PPP concept, that is advocated.  
Municipalities and their partners should ensure that PPPs support the fundamental 
principles of reform in order to support broader governance initiatives seems to support 
this idea.34 PPPs can also do much more to support and promote PPPF and BEE 
objectives if a broader view is taken and the involvement of municipalities to promote 
these objectives is important in this regard. As stated earlier,35 the objectives of SA as a 
DS to develop the economy could, and should, involve more role-players and if public–
private collaboration, and partnering, can be promoted on a more local level, this could 
do much to advance the DS goals. 
 
The importance of the Regulations is not to be underestimated or disregarded:  they are 
especially important in view of managing risk in PPPs. Both from a regulatory as well as 
a governance point of view, the Regulations have a vital role to play. It is widely 
accepted that the holistic approach to risk management includes governance, breaches 
of corporate and social responsibility and unethical behaviour and that these aspects  
 
34 This suggestion is also advocated by Plummer 
35 See chapter three supra 
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must be managed, as failure to do so can result in collateral damage (reputation), 
financial losses and loss of confidence.36 From a good governance point of view, 
preventing or reducing unethical behaviour can reduce risk and many of the 
requirements in the Regulations aim to ensure that this is aspect is addressed: Ethical 
Codes form part of the Regulations and at least create awareness about compliance 
expectations.  
 
However, the comprehensiveness of the Regulations should also ensure risk 
management in the broad sense and the strict processes that need to be followed and 
adhered to aim to achieve this. Many risks are involved, and because these transactions 
involve millions of rand, the risk of loss is significant. It is only to be expected that all 
possible measures are to be taken and implemented to reduce the risk of loss. Given the 
numerous allegations of corruption that have been levelled at the public sector, the risk 
of corruption is probably one of the biggest risks that need to be managed. However, as 
is most often the case with bureaucratic organisations and the red tape that goes with 
them, these stringent procedures at the same time threaten the success of the PPP 
vision. The reason for this is that it takes so long to get any PPP on national or provincial 
level to execution phase. Meeting all the criteria and getting approval in terms of all three 
phases takes months, if not years, to complete. One example of a PPP whose feasibility 
study has taken several years is the Gautrain:  the feasibility study has been going on for 
quite some time and the project still has not been initiated. One of the delays in finalising 
the feasibility study was caused by the need to agree on the allocation of risk: as the 
viability of the project and the expected use of the train are aspects in relation to which 
the risk is difficult to determine, the parties apparently had difficulty agreeing on this 
requirement.37 Where such large projects are to be assessed, and Gautrain is a good 
example in this regard, some aspects of the process will take longer than others where 
there are more thorny issues to be finalised. At this stage the aim is to have a feasibility 
study completed in eight months38 as it currently takes much longer:  and that is only 
phase one. Although the PPP Unit is trying to speed up the process, the fact of the 
matter is that it currently still takes very long. These delays make the private sector 
 
36 Drennan, L.T “Ethics, Governance and Risk Management: lessons from Mirror Group Newspapers and 
Barings Bank” Journal of Business Ethics 258 
37 Personal interview Kogan Pillay Pretoria  
38 Ibid 
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reluctant to enter into PPP agreements. One of the main objectives of the agreement is 
to make a profit:  but if a private party can make a profit elsewhere sooner because there 
are not such long delays, it may not be that eager to go the PPP route.  
 
Another problem is that many managers in the public sector are reluctant39 to set up PPP 
agreements:  after all, they also have the option to procure the services of the private 
sector through the normal procurement process and if there is budget available to 
procure such services, then PPPs probably would not even be considered. An important 
consideration in this instance would be the funding: PPPs are normally entered into 
because the private sector puts in the capital and therefore public infrastructure is 
developed at the cost of the private sector. Given the fact that, for instance, many 
municipalities have financial problems,40 the PPP option may be a more viable option to 
obtain infrastructural development via PPPs. However, where a lack of infrastructure or 
funding is to be considered by the private party in terms of the risk criterion, it may 
become too risky for the private party to get involved. This may be of particular 
relevance where there are already levels of corruption within a municipality and this may 
greatly deter the (ethical) private party from becoming involved. The problem is that it 
could be difficult to determine the risk, especially where the parties are to agree on the 
risk allocation and the private party may thus be reluctant to enter into the agreement.41   
 
Another reason why public sector managers may be reluctant is that they would then 
have to adhere to the oversight and management involvement by National Treasury, 
whereas the particular manager can remain in complete charge when normal 
procurement is obtained. Being in charge, given the political climate and most often the 
political motives of individuals in key positions, has a significant bearing on how 
business is done in the public sector.42 Therefore, it is argued that the PPP option may 
not be all that attractive to the public sector manager, either, from the manager’s 
personal point of view. 
 
 
39 Workshop attended “Gauteng Management Development Programme Senior Management Service 
Networking session:  Key-lessons in Public-Private Partnerships” Johannesburg 
40 Paton, C “Rusting Republics. Political domination in municipal councils is destroying administration and 
infrastructure” Financial Mail 20-22 
41 See discussion chapter 8 infra 
42 Paton 20-22 
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A possible problem that needs to be pointed out is the fact that municipalities are not 
managed by National Treasury and that Treasury only has an oversight role. National 
Treasury must be consulted in terms of the Municipal Regulations: its views and 
considerations on the feasibility study performed must be obtained, but the Municipality 
is not obliged to follow any direction given by Treasury. Given the many and serious 
problems that municipalities are known to experience as a result of poor management 
and corruption, this is cause for concern. It also needs to be emphasised that PPPs are 
not a solution to poor management.43 They should therefore not be seen as the 
alternative means to procure services and infrastructure that were to have been 
delivered by the municipal council itself. 
 
Another point of view44 is that a PPP is essentially a form of government procurement, 
although it obviously still needs to meet stringent requirements as a public decision. 
When the relevance of taking a public decision on procurement is to be considered, an 
important issue would be the relevant values that are to be considered, such as 
transparency and accountability, as these need to ensure that the agreement meets the 
requirements of a public decision.45 Other criteria that will be important will be the 
success factors against which the agreement will be measured. As value-for-money is 
an overriding consideration, it will probably be the most important factor to be measured.  
Furthermore, as PPPs are expected to play an important role in advancing economic 
objectives, other considerations also come into play: these could include that the PPP 
makes a contribution to poverty reduction or that it should improve the standards of living 
of the people or groups that the government needs to serve. Important measures that 
then need to apply are job creation and the awarding of contracts to local communities 
and smaller enterprises. This will be an especially important consideration in the SA 
economic development policies as reducing poverty and creating job opportunities are of 
crucial importance. It is obvious, then, that the larger PPPs in terms of the TR16 criteria, 
which are all multi-million rand projects, are less likely to meet these criteria. The reason 
for this is that these projects take a long time to be initiated and are administered by 
huge contracting firms:  it may be more practical to implement smaller projects on a  
 
43 Personal interview Andre Fourie Johannesburg 
44 “Public private partnership capacity building programme: phase 1” Case study: the Maputo development 
corridor roll road report 6 
45 Ibid 
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larger scale to both improve service delivery where it is critically needed, and also to 
allow for smaller enterprises to partake in the PPP concept. It is thus advocated that 
PPPs be utilised on a broader scale than is currently the case:  this could be done by 
promoting them as an alternative procurement method that is not only viable but more 
advantageous than traditional approaches. This is particularly necessary in MPPPs, and 
a broader interpretation would entail that the viability, as well as the desirability, of the 
concept is to be promoted while the importance of risk management and adherence to 
the criteria in terms of the Regulations is simultaneously emphasised. 
 
5.7 Privatisation as a Public–Private Partnership prototype
 
It is interesting to note the differences between a “PPP”, “privatisation” and 
“outsourcing”. In a PPP the private partner takes a substantial part of the risk for 
financing the project’s capital and operating costs, designing and building a facility, and 
managing its operations to specified standards, normally over a significant period of 
time. The land typically belongs to a government institution, and the fixed assets 
developed in terms of the PPP become government property. Privatisation, on the other 
hand, entails the disposal of state property and functions, and thus includes all the 
assets and liabilities associated with that property and functions. The government has 
given prominence to this form of procurement by privatising state assets as yet another 
approach to enhance economic growth. As far back as 1996, former president Nelson 
Mandela announced this as a fundamental policy of the ANC. 
 
PPPs are not to be seen principally as a means of privatising state assets, as the 
objectives are different: privatising state assets, for example as was done with Telkom 
and Iscor, meant that a legal persona was created in the form of a private company 
which, when listing on the JSE, issued shares which created the opportunity for many to 
share in the benefits. The objectives of a PPP are very different in that, although many 
stakeholders are to benefit from a specific project, for instance a toll road or a prison, it is 
in a sense restricted, as the benefits are not valued in terms of monetary benefits to the 
same degree. Linder46 is also of the view that “partnerships have been viewed as a 
retreat from the hard-line advocacy of privatisation.” 
 
46 Linder 41  
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Schönteich, Minnaar, Misty & Goyer seem to argue that PPPs are to be viewed as a 
means to privatise state assets, although they also acknowledge that PPPs are to 
enhance standards and quality of public service delivery47 and a number of benefits or 
strengths are quoted as such to be more beneficial than standard public service delivery 
mechanisms.  
 
5.7.1 Advantages of privatisation 
 
The advantages proposed by Schönteich48 et al, amount to the following: 
 
5.7.1.1 PPPs require that outputs and service level standards are specified clearly and 
transparently, together with identification of costs and risks; 
 
5.7.1.2 Efficiencies arise from the integration of the design, building, financing and 
operation of assets that is intrinsic to a well-structured PPP; 
 
5.7.1.3 The private sector tends to bring a higher level of innovation to planning and 
project delivery, and has a sharper and more timely engagement with 
technology, with significant spin-offs for skills transfer in the public sector; 
 
5.7.1.4 The introduction of enhanced management skills into public service delivery 
through the PPP process is of considerable benefit in service quality and 
effectiveness;  
 
5.7.1.5 The contractual assurances of specified service standards and affordability of 
PPP agreements bring about a stricter and more effective management of risk. 
 
These suggestions seem to be very focused on the process and as such the formal 
partnership arrangement between the parties:  as these benefits are intrinsic to the PPP, 
it is not clear why the authors propose that assets need to be privatised, as the outcome  
 
47 Schönteich, M, Minnaar, A, Mistry, D & Goyer, K.C Private Muscle, outsourcing the provision of criminal 
justice services 26 
48 Schönteich et al 36 
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of privatisation, as stated, is totally different from that of a PPP. In the event of 
privatisation, these benefits, as argued by the authors, will not apply as the state assets 
will then no longer be part of the ongoing relation between the parties as the private 
party will have taken ownership of them. It is suggested therefore that the argument to 
use PPPs as a form of privatisation is not well supported. 
 
5.8 Outsourcing as a Public–Private Partnership prototype
 
Outsourcing can also be viewed as a form of a public–private partnership.49 Two of the 
characteristics of such an agreement are pointed out as: 
 
• Both parties preserve their own individuality and responsibility;  and 
• This collaboration leads to value being added for both the public and the private 
partner. 
 
In arguing for outsourcing as a form of PPP, the authors point out that it is to be 
interpreted against the backdrop of a government evolving from a rule-driven to mission-
driven government and once it had decided on the instruments and performances to 
obtain its goals, a number of possibilities are available. This is of course also true of 
PPPs in general. They also go on to distinguish between law- or decree-based PPPs 
and contractual PPPs, which are more commonly. Outsourcing based on decree would 
imply that the government enters into a strategic alliance with a third party while at the 
same time ensuring the steering capacity of the public principal. This model is based on 
the idea that a formalised partnership is created between the (private) provider and the 
(public) consumer which is to guarantee the public principal insight and control although 
the private provider will probably have the biggest autonomy. Trust is a necessary 
ingredient and to create this trust an interface should be created between the public user 
and the private provider which has a sufficient degree of legitimacy and authority. This is 
especially so since the contracting out of services within the framework of a PPP results 
in a situation being created in which the public end-user is to a degree left to the 
discretion of the private service provider. This would also then emphasise that  
 
49 Stienlet, G, Von Sprundel, P & De Ryck, W “Public-Private Partnerships, what about outsourcing?” 
Public and Private Partnerships, the Enabling Mix 577 
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accountability and control mechanisms will play an important role and are meant to 
remedy eventual interface deficiencies. 
  
What is important in this approach is the focus on questions such a future outcome, 
control and accountability.50 These values would also be important in the stakeholder 
approach, which would include that the influence of various interests that would 
constitute the outsourcing are to be upheld. This obviously is very different from the PPP 
approach, which is outcome-based and in which inputs are not part of the negotiation 
criteria. However, one of the advantages pointed out51 is that the risks involved are 
minimal and the production of services is mainly under control. 
 
5.9 Outsourcing in Municipal Public–Private Partnerships
 
A significant distinction is to be made between outsourcing in national or provincial PPPs 
and outsourcing in MPPPs as the Municipal Regulations specifically provide for 
outsourcing as a PPP prototype in Municipalities. This is addressed under “additional 
matters to be addressed in feasibility studies” and section 3(1)(d) states that the 
feasibility study must: 
 
(d) recommend an appropriate plan for the procurement of the proposed public-
private partnership agreement if outsourcing of the activity is the preferred 
option. 
 
This clearly provides for an outsourcing which should still meet the requirements of a 
PPP. However, it seems that the municipalities52 are using outsourcing in terms of 
section 86D, as discussed supra, as a hybrid of PPPs.  
 
The Regulations require that the matter of ‘procurement’ in the event of outsourcing is to 
be addressed and this should ensure that the municipality gains the advantages that are 
envisaged by the PPP concept. But it seems that the alternative of outsourcing is used 
as a short-term solution and in the long run the municipality would not have gained in 
infrastructure, which is one of the main objectives of PPPs – especially given the DS 
 
50 Ibid 583 
51 Ibid 586  
52 Personal interview Dr Petra Bouwer Pretoria  
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goals to develop the economy.53 Apart from ensuring that the municipality has some 
gains in terms of infrastructure, it is also important that the private party share risk 
otherwise it will simply be remunerated for delivering a service and the municipality will 
have no assurance that the private party will maintain the agreement. One of the risks 
identified in the Maputo report was the risk of political interference and it must be borne 
in mind that a private party may want to “walk away” from an agreement where the 
political climate changes. At least if there is an agreement that ensures risk-sharing, it 
will not be that easy for the private party to do so. 
 
5.10 Conclusion
 
Apart from the clear distinction in the definitions either in terms of the Treasury 
Regulations or the Municipal Regulations, the objectives are also dissimilar to the extent 
that MPPPs are to be utilised on a broader scale for improved service delivery. Although 
the MPPP is not to be regarded as a solution to poor management and although 
outsourcing seems to be preferred instead of the MPPP, the MPPP can and should play 
a more important role in addressing economic developmental concerns than currently is 
the situation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 See discussion Chapter 3 supra 
54 ”Public private partnership capacity building programme: phase 1” Case study: the Maputo development 
corridor roll road report 6  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
PARTIES TO A PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
 
“Leaders were afraid to actually lead, reluctant to cost businesses money,  
break jurisdictional rules or spawn lawsuits. They were afraid, 
 in other words, of ending up in an article just like this one.” 
Time Magazine, Sept 12, 2005 
 
The role-players in Public–Private Partnerships are very exposed to public scrutiny as 
the expectations for success in Public–Private Partnerships are high. Unfortunately, 
especially in the public sector, criticism comes easily in the wake of constant allegations 
of irregularities and corruption in management. Therefore, it is imperative for these 
parties to take to heart the duty that rests on them to ensure that sound ethical values 
are incorporated throughout the Public–Private Partnership process, from planning, 
inception, and incorporation right through to final delivery. 
 
6.1 Introduction
 
The quotation from Time Magazine relates to an article about mismanagement in the 
United States after the first hurricane hit New Orleans in August 2005, which illustrates 
the point that bureaucracies by nature can be ineffective and that it is not only the SA 
bureaucratic system that may be open to criticism.  However, the size and functioning of 
this type of system impacts on the delivery aspect of the PPP concept and therefore 
many aspects need to be considered.  Because public sector participants in the PPP are 
so exposed to criticism, it is also necessary to understand their roles and responsibilities 
in order to assess what their accountability in terms of good governance would amount 
to. 
 
Even though there are various definitions on what a PPP is, all are ad idem that there 
are two parties involved, namely the public sector party and the private sector party.  In 
order to assess their roles and responsibilities, a closer look is needed at how they are 
to be described.  
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6.2 Public Sector as buyer
 
Insofar as the Treasury Regulations regulate the public sector subject to the PFMA in 
PPPs, they also stipulate the levels of government that are subject to Treasury 
Regulations 16 as follows: 
 
“All references to ‘Institution(s)’ in Treasury Regulation 16 are to these particular institutions 
of government: 
• All national and provincial government departments; 
• All constitutional Institutions listed in schedule 1 to the PFMA; 
• All national and provincial public entities listed in schedules 3A, 3B, 3C and 3D to 
the PFMA and any subsidiary of any such public entity. 
 
The major public entities listed in schedule 2 to the PFMA are not subject to Treasury 
Regulation 16. Municipalities are not subject to the PFMA or to its regulations.” 
 
As for the regulation of PPPs in the Municipalities, Section 5 (1) of the Regulations 
issued in terms of the Municipal Finance Management Act applies, which determines: 
 
5. (1) A public-partnership agreement between a municipality and a private party 
must – 
 (a) provide value for money to the municipality; 
 (b) be affordable to the municipality; 
 (c) describe in specific terms the nature of the private party’s role in the public-
private partnership; 
 (d) confer effective powers on the municipality- 
  (i) to monitor implementation of, and to assess the private party’s 
performance under, the agreement; 
  (ii) to manage and enforce the agreement; 
 (e) impose financial management duties on the private party, including 
transparent processes relating to internal financial control, budgeting, 
accountability and reporting; 
 (f) provide for the termination of the agreement if the private party- 
  (i) fails to comply with terms or conditions of the agreement; or 
  (ii) deliberately provides incorrect or misleading information to the 
municipality; 
 (g) restrain the private party, for the full period of the agreement, from offering 
otherwise than in accordance with the agreement an employment, 
consultancy or other contract to a person- 
  (i) who is an official of the municipality or a municipal entity under the 
sole or shared control of the municipality;  or 
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  (ii) who was such an official at any time during a period of one year 
before the offer is made;  and 
 (h) restrain the private party, for a period of three years, from offering an 
employment, consultancy or other contract to an employee of the 
municipality directly involved in the negotiation of the agreement. 
  
 
It must be clear by now that different legislation regulates different sectors of the public 
service. The national and provincial departments are regulated by Treasury Regulation 
16 issued in terms of the PFMA, and municipalities are regulated by the MFMA. The 
legislative framework is there to ensure that procedures are followed and adhered to 
when certain actions are taken:  in this instance it would mean that all actions initiated to 
create, facilitate or manage a PPP will be regulated. The public sector environment, as a 
huge bureaucracy, is well known to have miles of “red tape” to adhere to, as is typical of 
any bureaucracy. The main reason for all the red tape is to ensure that procedures are 
followed to enhance effectiveness, to manage quality control, human relations, etcetera. 
The objectives are like those of any large organisation, but because the public sector is 
such a huge organisation, there are more and more rules and regulations to comply with. 
All public servants are therefore managed through the use of legislation. Perhaps the 
most important reason for the numerous rules and regulations is to reduce the risk of 
fraud and corruption. Unfortunately our public sector is currently perceived to have high 
levels of fraud and corruption, as is exposed in the press very regularly. 
 
But how effective are all the rules and regulations? Do they ensure an effective 
bureaucracy? It has been stated that a Developmental State needs a competent 
bureaucracy1 and that a committed and competent bureaucracy is needed2 to ensure the 
efficient formulation and implementation of policies which are important for economic 
development.  In this regard, we still have a long road ahead of us, as the governmental 
bureaucracy is not as efficient as it should be. If it is not efficient and there is the 
perception that it is fraudulent and corrupt, then it becomes evident that the public sector 
as buyer has many challenges to overcome. Good governance is essential in ensuring 
effective PPPs and as such is probably one of the most critical areas to manage in the 
 
1 See discussion in chapter 3 supra Beeson 
2 See discussion chapter 3 supra Esterhuyse 
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process. The concern raised previously about red tape being a deterring factor 
emphasises the point that the public sector would need to address this concern in order 
to make PPPs more attractive.  
 
What makes the public sector party in the PPP unique in SA is the legislation developed 
to ensure BEE. This means that the BEE PPP participation defines the composition of 
the public sector party. It is therefore important to consider the implications of BEE 
legislation. 
 
6.3 Black Economic Empowerment in Public–Private Partnerships
 
In accordance with the draft Code of Good Practice for BEE in PPPs, South African PPP 
projects are to be structured in a careful combination of financial, technical and BEE 
components in order to meet the criterion of value-for-money. This would mean that the 
BEE component of a PPP should constitute no less than 15 percent and no more than 
20 percent of the three bid evaluation components in a PPP. The remaining 80-85 
percent will be constituted by the technical components. 
 
The bid proposals are to be prepared by Transaction Advisers and the appointment of 
these advisers is also subject to BEE policy. These advisers need to provide Treasury 
on the financial, legal and technical support in order to assess and compile a bid. No 
less than 20 percent of the adviser bid will be constituted by the BEE component. This 
means that a prospective adviser will not be considered for selection if it does not meet 
the BEE threshold, even though it may pass the technical criteria. The BEE criteria, 
therefore, should ensure that there is a broad-based and sustainable BEE outcome in 
every PPP project undertaken in terms of the Treasury Regulations. The draft proposed 
code further stipulates the government’s policy objectives for BEE in PPPs as: 
 
• To achieve meaningful and beneficial direct ownership of substantial equity 
interests in the private party to a PPP agreement by black people, black women 
and black enterprises; 
• To achieve effective participation in the management control of the private party 
and its subcontractors by black people and black women; 
• To ensure that a substantive portion of the private party’s subcontracting and 
procurement is to black people, black women and black enterprise; 
• To ensure effective employment equity and skills development in the private 
party and its subcontractors throughout the PPP project; 
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• To promote positive local socio-economic impact from the project to the benefit of 
small and medium enterprises, the disabled, the youth, and non-government 
organisations within a targeted area of project operations; 
• To create jobs;  and 
• For institutions of government to be represented in all PPP transactions by 
financial, legal and technical advisers who generally reflect South Africa’s diverse 
population, and to build the professional skills and number of black people and 
black enterprises in these fields. 
 
It is thus clear that the advantages of PPPs for the development of infrastructure and 
development is not only output-based but also developed in such a way that the process 
will benefit formerly disadvantaged citizens of the country. Not only do they get the 
opportunity to benefit from the financial advantages of PPPs, but they get an opportunity 
to help rebuild the country and to gain experience in their field of expertise. In some 
instances there is a leniency in allowing BEE compliance over an extended period:  this 
means that if the bidder, for example, is only 10% BEE compliant, they will be allowed to 
become 40% compliant over an extended period. 
 
6.4 Private Sector as Supplier
 
The Treasury Regulations define a “private party” in the following way: 
 
“private party” means a party to a PPP agreement, other than – 
(a) an institution to which the Act applies; 
(b) a municipality or a municipal entity under the ownership control of one or more 
municipalities;  or 
(c) the accounting officer, accounting authority or other person or body acting on 
behalf of an institution, municipality or municipal entity referred to in paragraph (a) 
or (b); 
 
The Municipal Regulations determine a “private party” in the following way: 
 
“private party” excludes –  
(a) a municipality; 
(b) a municipal entity;  or 
(c) an organ of state, including an institution listed in any of the Schedules to the 
Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act No. 1 of 1999); 
 
 
These would then be the applicable definitions to parties who are to participate in PPPs 
in terms of the Treasury and Municipal Regulations.  
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As stated earlier, the concept of public–private participation in the Developmental State 
is to be promoted on different levels in order to give effect to the development goals of 
the government. That would mean that a private party could be a small private business 
and not a member of a bigger conglomerate participating in a multi-million-rand PPP.3  
 
The parties to the PPP can also be described as either buyers or sellers, where the 
public sector acts as the buyer of the development or service, and the private party 
supplies it as the seller. In the event of this description, the private sector buyer is 
normally a consortium of companies formed as a special purpose vehicle company for 
the sole purpose of entering into the PPP agreement. This private party SPV then enters 
into subcontracts, typically with construction and operating companies, in order to effect 
delivery. The private party supplier in the South African context is undoubtedly different 
to the rest of the world, as stated, as a result of BEE requirements and BEE promotion in 
business. 
 
The PPP unit also states as one of its objectives the promotion of BEE. Some of the key 
features that are advanced by the PPP Unit in order to promote BEE PPPs are the 
following:4  
 
• the long-term nature of PPPs provides an opportune instrument to grow black 
equity and black management over time; 
• risk is clearly identified in PPPs, clearly costed and appropriately allocated, so 
black participants know in advance what they are committing to; 
• the formation of private consortia in the form of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) 
for many PPPs facilitates long-term beneficial partnerships between new black 
enterprises and experienced, resourced companies – both as equity partners and 
in project management, and both at the private party SPV and subcontracting 
levels; 
• where government is the buyer of a service, and insofar as the service is 
provided to the agreed standards, there is a steady revenue stream to the private 
party, reducing risk to new black enterprises; 
 
3 See discussion Chapter 5 supra 
4 National Treasury: Public Private Partnership Manual Module 2 7-8 
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• Principal equity sponsors in a PPP are often also first-tier subcontractors, 
building incentives for optimal risk management; 
• PPPs provide significant subcontracting opportunities for black enterprises, 
where early cash-flow benefits can be derived as delivery commences; 
• PPPs have far-reaching broad-based PPP potential: through the subcontracting 
and procurement mechanisms they can involve a full spectrum of large, medium 
and small enterprises and bring tangible local economic development benefits to 
targeted groups of people; 
• Return on equity to the private party is competitive where risk is properly 
assumed; 
• There is an increasingly strong demand for black professionals as transaction 
advisers to both institutions and private parties in PPPs. 
 
These incentives are most attractive to the BEE enterprise meeting the criteria of a PPP. 
However, the PPP Unit emphasises that the BEE company wanting to participate in a 
PPP needs to meet certain standards in terms of its representation, etcetera.  This is 
understandable, but it still seems that the bigger companies stand a better chance of 
getting the opportunity to be selected for PPPs. 
 
To this extent, not only does BEE need to be advanced, but poverty needs to be 
reduced, efficiency increased, jobs created, and infrastructure developed – to name but 
a few of the obvious challenges. In this regard, Montanheiro5 states that both the public 
and private sectors need to work together under the conditions of a free-market criterion 
in the allocation of resources. He points out the danger of political agendas on the side 
of the public sector which might cause a conflict of personal and political interests and 
may adversely affect their decisions. This he regards as debilitating and he emphasises 
the importance of a solid relationship with the business sector to ensure effective public-
private participation. It is essential that political and business leaders be brought 
together to ensure that market-based activities are enhanced and to ensure that the 
partnerships are successful. 
 
5 Montanheiro, L “The economic aspect within the enabling mix of public-private partnerships” Public and 
Private sector Partnerships, the Enabling Mix 425-426 
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BEE should however also play a bigger role than forming part of a PPP in the bigger 
multi-million transactions. As one of the goals of government is to promote BEE 
participation in the economy, there is no doubt that it needs to happen on as wide a 
scale as feasible. The Treasury Regulations stipulate the criteria to be adhered to in the 
bigger PPPs. The Municipal Regulations, on the other hand, provide for hybrid forms of 
PPPs such as outsourcing and it seems that provision is made thereby for an expansion 
of the concept to include transactions on a broader scale. This is especially important in 
view of development of infrastructure of local authorities, as it could include more role-
players partaking in the development of the economy and would also promote the goal 
of regeneration where members of the communities are part of the “building” of the 
economy. If the view that PPPs can play a bigger role on different levels is accepted and 
if it is accepted that more role-players are to be involved, the needs of the poor can be 
addressed in line with their expectations, especially if members representing their 
communities can become more involved.  
 
A report based on research undertaken by the World Development Bank6 indicated the 
following: 
 
“The impact of public-private partnerships on the poor is measured by the contributions 
of these partnerships in addressing the service needs of the poor.  Attention is given to 
the issues of improved service delivery; the affordability of services provided, the 
expansion and maintenance of infrastructure to the benefit of all consumers, the 
promotion of opportunities for local economic development, and the implementation of 
social responsibility programmes by the private sector” 
 
It seems then that the PPPs envisaged in this context would mainly resort within the 
municipalities and as such the municipalities would be the public partner.  However, as 
for the private partner, this should then create opportunities for smaller enterprises, 
specifically BEE enterprises, to participate on a smaller scale in the economy.  
 
 
6 Development Bank of South Africa “Impact of PPPs on the poor, the South African experience” 34 
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6.5 Conclusion 
 
The public sector as buyer of private sector services in the PPP concept is very 
significant in the bigger scheme of delivery in terms of public-private sector collaboration.  
The risk that the private sector would be prepared to take on, is also measured in 
relation to the credibility of the public sector party with whom the private sector party is 
desirous to contract. This makes it absolutely imperative for the public sector party to 
maintain credibility. The regulations determine the formalities with which the agreement 
must be compliant, but the values on which the partnership is to be built, will be 
determined by the relationship as it is founded between the parties:  therefore a solid 
partnership cannot be founded where there is a lack of values. This is especially 
important insofar as the realisation of BEE goals is concerned and should not be 
underestimated. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
PROCESS IN FORMING A PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
 
After all, the cultivated person’s first duty  
is to be always prepared to re-write the encyclopaedia 
- Umberto Eco 
 
Unlike the traditional procurement process where a short-term contract for a service or 
delivery of goods is entered into, the Public–Private Partnership needs to focus on the 
long-term relationship and for obvious reasons the terms of the agreement are much 
more comprehensive. The process itself is drawn out and can take years to complete, 
which brings with it a number of complications. Municipal Public–Private Partnerships 
make provision for hybrid PPPs and the process can take less time to complete, but the 
oversight and facilitation role is a bigger problem. 
 
7.1 Introduction
 
Transparency International1 estimates that approximately 68 percent of central 
government expenditure is spent on contracts:  this is an impressive sum but it 
immediately raises the concern of abuse both by public officials and private companies 
for their own private benefit, often at the expense of the public. The risk of corruption is 
particularly high in the initial stages of the tendering process where offers and bidders 
are selected. Some projects are initiated with specific contractors already in mind, and 
too often conflicts of interests are not disclosed. Other opportunities for abuse include 
under-performance (and still getting paid), contract terms re-negotiation, over-invoicing 
and non-compliance with procedures.2  
 
A PPP does however remain a useful vehicle and efforts should be made to manage 
these identified risks. This is particularly so when the values necessary in forming a 
PPP, as pointed out by Reich,3 are considered: 
 
 
1 ”Policy and Research” world-wide web transparency.org 1  
2 Ibid 
3 Reich, M, Hershey, J, Hardy, G, Childress, J & Bernheim R “Workshop on Public Health Law and Ethics 
I & II:  The challenge of Public/Private Partnerships (PPPs) Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 91 
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• Creation of something of social value 
• A relationship of trust amongst partners 
• A commitment to partnership 
• The existence of a broader sense of social legitimacy 
 
Before the considerations of values and risk management are discussed (probably with 
a stronger emphasis on the values in risk management), an outline of the formalities that 
need to be complied with is necessary. 
 
7.2 Requirements in forming a Public–Private Partnership
 
The PPP as defined in the Regulations issued in terms of either the PFMA or the MFMA 
needs to demonstrate adherence to three main principles in all phases of preparing, 
procuring and managing a PPP.  These are: 
 
• Affordability 
• Value-for-money 
• Risk profile 
 
The criteria determined in the TR provide that all phases of the processes are measured 
throughout on these three main principles. The three approval phases in terms of TR16, 
for example, are developed in such a way that the approval of the phases will confirm 
the following: 
 
• Affordability: approval in terms of Treasury Approval I (TA: I) 
• Value-for-money: approval in terms of Treasury Approval II (TA: II) 
• Risk profile: approval in terms of Treasury Approval III (TA: III) 
 
In overseeing compliance with these criteria, PPPs are regulated by National Treasury.  
The compliance procedure for Municipal PPPs is less comprehensive, and although 
requirements must be met as laid down by section 120 of the MFMA and the Municipal 
Regulations, the approval phases are not as clearly defined as in the case of PPPs 
established in terms of the PFMA. The Municipal Regulations stipulate that Treasury 
approval or recommendations be obtained at different stages of the process, but the 
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Accounting Officer is not bound by these recommendations. Furthermore, National 
Treasury only has an oversight role as the PFMA and its regulations do not apply to 
MPPPs, although the PPP Unit is prepared to provide advice and guidance.  
 
7.3 General Procurement principles  
 
In order to better understand the PPP procedure as well as to distinguish between the 
traditional procurement process and the PPP transaction, a broader view is to be taken 
of the general principles. These principles in the procurement process are generic and 
would normally amount to a number of principal activities, which are: 
 
• Establish what is to be procured 
• Decide on the procurement strategy 
• Solicit tender offers 
• Evaluate tender offers 
• Award contract 
• Administer contract and confirm compliance with requirements 
 
In the private sector, the process is of course not as regulated as is the case with the 
public sector:  in the event of public spending, the expenses incurred in the agreement 
involve public money and therefore legislative requirements are comprehensive and 
many finer points need to be complied with. The discussion on the procurement process 
therefore will centre on the public sector procurement process in order to provide a 
broader view against which PPPs can be interpreted. 
 
Procurement in the public sector is done either as a Request for Quotation (RFQ) or a 
Request for Proposal (RFP). The RFQ process is normally used in the event of 
transactions of smaller values, where three quotations are obtained and an allocation 
made to a preferred service provider. The RFP process is much more comprehensive 
and would be the one where the distinction between the conventional procurement 
process and the PPP would be considered.  
 
The general procurement principles which are to be followed in all procurement  
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transactions4 are: 
 
7.3.1 Value for money:  this means that the transaction must be justified against this 
standard when all the relevant costs and benefits of the cycle are considered.  
Price alone is not a reliable indicator:  the “total cost of ownership” is also to be 
considered. 
 
7.3.2 Open and effective competition:  this refers to a framework of procurement laws, 
policies, practices and procedures that should be transparent and there should 
be openness throughout the whole process. Effective competition is also to be 
encouraged through procurement methods suited to the market circumstances. 
 
7.3.3 Ethics and fair dealing:  this principle stipulates the importance of value-based 
dealings where there is mutual trust and respect, and business is conducted in a 
way that is fair, reasonable and based on good values such as integrity. 
 
7.3.4 Accountability and reporting:  the importance of this principle is that individuals 
and organisations should be answerable for their plans, actions and outcomes.  
For accountability to be truly adhered to, it is necessary that there be openness 
and transparency in administration, and there should also be scrutiny through 
public reporting. 
 
7.3.5 Equity: this means that government policies should be observed insofar as they 
are designed to advance persons or categories of persons previously 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. 
 
These principles are to be adhered to in all procurement transactions and an important 
process developed to ensure that this is effectively implemented is the process of Supply 
Chain Management.  Through SCM it is endeavoured to introduce internationally 
accepted best practice principles whilst simultaneously complying with PFMA 
requirements. Currently it is followed in all forms of procurement throughout the Gauteng 
Province, although it is expected that all national and provincial departments are to  
 
4 Gauteng Provincial Government Supply Chain Management Manual 22-24 
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follow. One of the main objectives of SCM is to ensure that value is added in every 
phase of the procurement process and this requires accounting officers to meet 
specified criteria of management throughout.  
 
As indicated previously, value-for-money is an important criterion in any PPP. As the 
agreement is also meant to enhance a mutually beneficial relationship between the 
parties, a number of values need to be adhered to in the process: these include 
transparency, accountability, capability and capacity to engage in the process. The 
legislation applicable strives to ensure compliance not only with the rules but also to 
ensure that the values on which an agreement is to be based are adhered to. This may 
be one of the reasons why it is such a lengthy and comprehensive process: it is meant to 
ensure that the risk of non-compliance and unethical conduct is reduced as much as 
possible. As the public sector is subject to different forms of legislation, it is necessary to 
take a closer look at what applies to the different components of the public sector and 
how they are expected to operate within the established framework. 
 
7.4 Legal framework
 
The Public Finance Management Act, Treasury Regulations and Treasury Practice 
Notes apply to all national and provincial government departments, as well as to all 
public entities. This means that any PPP that is to be concluded with any of these bodies 
or entities needs to follow specified procedures and meet stringent criteria before a PPP 
will be approved. Legislation regulating PPPs includes the following: 
 
• Public Finance Management Act no 1 of 1999 
• Municipal Finance Management Act no 56 of 2003 
• Municipal Systems Act no 32 of 2000 
• Constitution of South Africa no 108 of 1996 
• Promotion of Access to Information Act no 2 of 2000 
• Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act no 5 of 2000 
• Promotion of Administrative Justice Act no 3 of 2000 
• Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act no 12 of 2004 
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In the nature of the PPP agreement, which involves the public sector, the laws and 
regulations will obviously go beyond the few mentioned Acts, but these are the most 
prevalent ones which relate to the application of the principles and regulations as they 
are to ensure the soundness of the PPP agreement, in terms of formalisation, 
implementation and execution alike. 
 
7.5 Public–Private Partnerships regulated by the Public Finance Management 
Act
 
The Treasury Regulations issued in terms of the PFMA set out in detail which steps 
need to be taken in entering into a PPP, and in which order the steps are to be followed.  
The basic requirements with which PPPs must comply are also explained. In broad 
terms, the main goals of a PPP are: 
 
• Targeted public spending, principally on outputs to agreed standards 
• Leveraging private sector finance and efficiencies 
• Allocating risks to the party best able to manage them 
 
In order to adhere to these goals, a comprehensive process needs to be followed which 
had been devised in a detailed project cycle. The provisions are prescriptive, and the 
only instance in which the public party may deviate from them is where this party can 
satisfy the relevant treasury that alternative provisions will provide better value for 
money. When following the project cycle, different phases can be identified which, in 
brief, amount to the following: 
 
1. Registration of project with National Treasury; 
2. Appointment of Transaction Adviser by the Institution; 
3. Feasibility Study for Treasury Approval I; 
4. PPP procurement, including: 
• Bid documentation preparation for Treasury Approval IIA; 
• PPP procurement and value-for-money report on the preferred bid, for 
Treasury Approval IIB; 
• Negotiations with the preferred bidder; 
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• Treasury Approval III for the final terms of the PPP agreement and the 
Institution’s Contract Management Plan; 
5. Contract management for the term of the PPP agreement. 
 
7.6 The PPP Procurement Process
 
An elaboration of these phases might be useful: 
 
7.6.1 Phase 1: Registration of project with National Treasury: 5
 
This is the inception of the PPP process and entails that the project that the public party 
is to initiate is to be registered with the relevant treasury. At this stage, a project officer 
and a transaction adviser also need to be appointed.  
 
7.6.2 Phase 2: Appointment of Transaction Adviser:6
 
The transaction adviser will be a consortium of professionals with the skills and 
experience to assist the public party in preparing and finally concluding the agreement.  
These professionals are hired through an open bidding process, after the project had 
been registered. The bidder first gets assessed on its BEE and technical capabilities 
before the price is considered.  As discussed supra,7 the BEE criteria are strictly adhered 
to and the transaction adviser will not be appointed if the bidder is not BEE-compliant. 
 
7.6.3 Phase 3: Feasibility Study for Treasury Approval I:8
 
The next phase is the Feasibility Study: the National Treasury PPP Manual gives a step- 
by-step exposition of how it is to be executed.  Some of the criteria that need to be met 
are: 
 
5 National Treasury: Public Private Partnership Manual Module 3 2 
6 Ibid 9-10 
7 See chapter 5 supra 
8 See in general National Treasury: Public Private Partnership Manual Module 4 1-45 
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• Output specifications: to clearly identify what the Institution wants to deliver 
• Due diligence 
• Risk identification 
• Value comparison report 
• Economic analysis 
 
It is crucial for the Institution to ensure that a proper Feasibility Study is produced:  if 
the targets are identified incorrectly this may impact negatively on the project’s 
affordability, value-for-money as well as the private party’s willingness to assume 
risk, and in the long run it will impact negatively on the sustainability of the 
agreement. During this phase the transaction adviser prepares a feasibility study 
which comprises the following: 
 
• Needs analysis 
• Options analysis 
• Project due diligence 
• Value assessment 
• Economic valuation 
• Procurement plan 
 
These different elements of the feasibility study mean the following:  the “needs analysis” 
entails that it needs to be demonstrated that the project aligns with the institution’s 
strategic objectives. This will include identifying and analysing the available budget(s), 
specifying outputs and identifying the scope of the project. 
 
The options analysis sets out the range of possible technical, legal and financial options 
which would be required to deliver the service to the output specifications, thereby 
allowing the public party to weigh up the options and exercise a choice. It is important to 
note that during this stage the public party is not yet in a position to decide whether or 
not a PPP or standard procurement is the best way to choose the preferred solution 
option. During this phase the public party identifies and evaluates the various potential 
options which would meet its need, for instance to deliver a service. After the 
assessment it then recommends one of the options and gives an indication whether it 
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might be suitable for a PPP. Only after the next phase, which would be the due diligence 
phase, would the detailed work in terms of value assessment be done in order to decide 
whether a PPP is to be pursued. The next phase, which is the project due diligence 
phase, is an extension of the solution options analysis stage and aims to uncover any 
issues in the preferred solution option that may significantly impact on the proposed 
project. This would include legal issues, site enablement issues and BEE and socio-
economic issues. 
 
Next comes the value assessment, which is the pivotal stage of the feasibility study as it 
enables the public party to determine whether a PPP would be the best procurement 
choice for the planned project. In terms of TR16, three tests need to be passed during 
this phase which means answering the following questions: 
 
• Is it affordable? 
• Does it appropriately transfer risk from the institution to the private party? 
• Does it provide value for money? 
 
If these questions are answered satisfactorily, the next phase is the economic valuation 
during which the economic information required to demonstrate that the project would 
meet the requirements for TA:I is assessed. Meeting these criteria would include that 
submissions are to be drafted which would address the introduction and valuation 
approach, the assumptions drawn, and the valuation results. Such valuations would for 
example have to include addressing issues such as giving a clear economic rationale for 
the project, detailing the calculations for costs of all inputs and outputs, and identifying 
economic benefits to BEE. In addition, a breakdown of economic costs and benefits into 
financial costs and benefits, including externalities, needs to be included. 
 
The final phase of the feasibility study is the procurement plan, which needs to 
demonstrate that the public party has the necessary capacity and budget to undertake 
the PPP procurement. This will include a project timetable for project milestones and all 
approvals which will take the project through phase TA:I to TA:III. The detailed planning 
needs to include all the aspects that are normally to be included in a detailed project 
plan and, as with all project phases, guidelines are provided in the PPP Unit manual. If 
the public party meets all criteria for the feasibility phase, then TA:I will be obtained and 
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it can proceed to the next phase, which is the procurement phase, for meeting the 
criteria of TA:II. TA:II is also divided into sub-approval phases, namely TA:IIA and TA: 
IIB. 
 
7.6.4 Phase 4: PPP Procurement:9
 
During this phase the accounting officer needs to exercise his or her responsibility to 
design and manage the procurement process in such a way that it will meet the TR16 
requirements. This is an important phase as its objective is not to be prescriptive as 
such, but rather to ensure that best practice is established as has been developed in 
PPPs to date. For ensuring good corporate governance, this obviously is a critical phase 
and the stronger the link between the project’s feasibility study and its procurement 
phase, the more likely it is that it will create a true value-for-money PPP.  
 
This process includes a number of stages, and this differentiates it from the conventional 
tender process where a single stage is undertaken where an offer is made which a 
public party can accept or not. In this procurement phase, however, the stages that need 
to be adhered to are: 
 
• Pre-qualification (RFQ) 
• Request for proposals (RFP) 
• Best and final offer, where appropriate 
• Negotiations 
• Financial closure 
 
In more detail, compliance with these stages would amount to the following:  
 
It is considered to be best practice for the public party to limit the number of private 
parties eligible to participate in the PPP procurement by carrying out a pre-qualification 
exercise (RFQ). This would mean eligibility in terms of technical and financial the 
process. Another advantage of preparing the RFP is that it can lead to a shorter bidding 
process and greater bidder confidence. During this process the procurement  
 
9 See in general Gauteng Provincial Government Supply Chain Management  Manual, Module 5 1-64 
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specifications, as well as BEE. The bidders must also demonstrate sufficient experience 
and commitment to be able to prepare and execute the planned project. During the 
second stage, RFP, value can be added to the preparation for the PPP where pre-
qualified bidders demonstrate their knowledge and capacity through their participation in 
plan, as it was communicated to the pre-qualified bidders, must clearly identify the two 
stages and set out the intention, and the rules of each. The bidder interaction at this 
stage is less formal and the prepared end-product, which is the incorporation of 
feedback from all bidders in a single, final RFP, is issued to all pre-qualified bidders. 
 
The bid documentation comprises the following: 
 
• Request for Qualification 
• Request for Proposal 
• Draft PPP agreement 
 
The Request for Qualification phase is the formal project interaction where the institution 
communicates with potential bidders what the elements and targets of the bid should be.  
This will enable potential bidders to form consortia and obtain finance. The RFQ also 
indicates that potential bidders should submit certain information about their consortia 
which will enable the institution to select those that will qualify for the bids. BEE 
compliance will be a key element to qualify for this first selection. 
 
The next phase is the RFP phase during which detailed feedback is established with the 
pre-qualified parties to establish their feedback on the criteria and bid specifications.  
Comments received by the institution on draft RFP documents are assessed by the 
institution and its transaction advisers and a final RFP and draft PPP agreement is 
drafted and issued. Once the process had come this far, the institution should indicate its 
intention to enter into an agreement and this will happen through a negotiation phase.  
 
One of the requirements that bidders need to adhere to is good corporate governance, 
more commitment to the concept of ethics in business if the PPP Unit had provided a 
Code of Business Ethics for the participants in the process, maybe similar to the CIPS  
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and the PPP Unit manual suggests that the King Report on Corporate Governance 2002 
is to be used as a benchmark. Unfortunately no guidelines are provided insofar as 
adherence to identified values is concerned:  the King Report10 provides guidelines for 
the formulation of ethical codes of conduct and to that extent it would have demonstrated 
Code of Conduct prescribed in the UK.11  The risk of poor adherence to values in the 
business relationship was also emphasized by Collier and Esteban12 when they pointed 
out that it impacts negatively on good governance where the organisation relies too 
much on the ability to remove the “institutional obstacles to proper accountability”, in 
other words the organisation should adhere to compliance measures, as suggested in 
Codes such as the Cadbury or the King Code, but governance should be about the 
relationship amongst all participants. In my view, this approach is lacking in the mere 
reference to the King Code as a benchmark for Ethics as it does not pronounce 
specifically what is expected from participants in terms of ethics and good governance in 
their dealings with one another. 
 
When the best and final offer is accepted, this means that the preferred bidder is 
chosen, which is stage three of the process. A number of governance issues are 
emphasised during this phase: these include that an anti-corruption policy is to be 
signed off by the accounting officer, with clear requirements and processes for dealing 
with corrupt activities by project team members or bidders. In addition, safeguards for 
disclosure, a code of conduct, structured oversight and internal and external audits need 
to be demonstrated in the procurement plan. Furthermore, any potential conflicts of 
interest must be disclosed and the accounting officer must evaluate this disclosure and 
see to it that an appropriate response is formulated and implemented where the conflict 
could influence a decision. Another aspect of good governance is the expectation that 
the public party’s advisers as well as all members of technical evaluation committees, 
evaluation coordinating committees and project evaluation committees will sign a code 
of conduct that requires compliance with a range of ethical requirements that ensure that 
their actions will be in the best interests of the project.  It is also expected of all pre-
qualified bidders to sign a similar code of conduct which is to be developed by the public  
 
10 King, M King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 101-104 
11 See discussion in chapter 4 supra 
12 Collier, J and Esteban, R “Governance in the Participative Organisation: Freedom, Creativity and 
Ethics” Journal of Business Ethics 175 
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party. During this phase, the bids are evaluated, but it may not be clear who is to be 
chosen as the preferred bidder and the process may have to go into a best and final 
offer process.  Two reasons for this extension of the bidding process are that the bids 
may be identical or too similar, or that no single bid meets the public party’s defined 
project objectives.  A well-structured RFP with proper bidder interaction should prevent 
such problems and BAFO should not be used to complete incomplete bids. The public 
party should therefore not plan to use the BAFO process to compensate for weak RFPs. 
It should thus not be assumed that there will be a BAFO stage as bidders may take 
advantage of such a situation by “cushioning” their initial bids with allowances which they 
may anticipate will be reassessed during a BAFO stage. The project officer of the public 
party has the responsibility of overseeing proper compliance to prevent this situation 
from occurring. 
 
The next stage is to negotiate the bid in order to have the contract awarded. It may be a 
difficult part of the process, as the parties have different perspectives:  the private party 
wants to reduce its risk and increase its margins, while the public party would want to 
reduce its costs and maximise the value of the service which is to be provided. The 
outcome of the negotiation phase will be a PPP agreement with ancillary agreements 
containing service level agreements and payment mechanisms. Upon successful 
conclusion of the negotiations, the public party proceeds to apply for TA: III.  Its report 
will now demonstrate the final negotiated project costs, the value for money, the final 
terms of the PPP agreement, and the contingent liabilities incurred. In addition, it also 
provides the PPP agreement management plan and confirms the legal due diligence on 
the competency of the parties to enter into the proposed agreement.  
 
The final stage of the procurement phase is the close-out report and case study: this 
requires financial disclosure and the transaction adviser must produce a close-out report 
for the confidential and complete records of the public party as well as a case study 
which will become available to the public.  Case studies of all finalised PPPs are to be 
made available on the PPP Unit website, as well as in the Unit library. The purpose of 
the report is that a comprehensively summarised institutional record is provided which 
will be a key document for managing the PPP agreement. This report should include all 
project documentation properly annexed, giving the details of the transaction, and should 
also include all confidential negotiated, contracted and financing matters. Unfortunately 
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the database for the case studies has not yet been established and although it is 
envisaged that it will be done in the near future, the experiences gained in previous 
PPPs that could have been shared with other PPP partners have, to date, not been 
made available. This has not only deprived current PPP project managers of insights 
that may have benefited them, but also constitutes non-compliance with the Treasury 
Regulations. 
 
7.6.5 Phase 5: Contract Management for term of PPP agreement:13
 
This is the final and ongoing phase of the PPP. Throughout the stages during which a 
business plan for the long-term management of the PPP is put together, important 
objectives had to have been borne in mind: 
 
• Managing starts in the inception phase of the project cycle 
• It is designed in detail towards the end of the procurement phase 
• It is put into practice after signing the PPP agreement, for the development, 
delivery and exit phases 
 
From now on, the project officer will be responsible for preparing and implementing the 
PPP management plan. The principles of project management are generic, and each 
PPP should identify its own features which may require a specific approach but the 
underlying principles for managing the project are prescribed in the PPP Manual. The 
general principles are: 
 
• Measure outputs, monitor and regulate performance liaise effectively, and settle 
disputes 
• Report progress in the annual report 
• Scrutiny by the auditor general 
 
For the duration of the PPP project, Treasury through the PPP Unit oversees compliance 
with the Regulations. During the contract phase both parties are to meet their respective 
obligations and this involves building and sustaining a good working relationship.   
 
13 See in general National Treasury: Public Private Partnership Manual Module 6 1-31 
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Proactive management to anticipate future needs and reacting appropriately to 
unforeseen situations which may arise are also part of the process and this emphasises 
the importance of a working relationship that is based on strong ethical values and which 
is maintained through good governance. The objectives of the PPP remain to ensure 
ongoing affordability, value for money and appropriate risk transfer. In accordance with 
the PPP Manual, the functions to be exercised in order to meet these objectives are: 
 
• Partnership management:  this concerns the structures of accountability and how 
the public and private parties relate to each other; 
• Service delivery management:  this entails the systems and procedures designed 
to manage risk and performance; 
• PPP agreement administration:  this relates to the administrative processes 
required to ensure that all procedures and documentation relating thereto are 
effectively managed. 
 
Although the preceding phases in setting up and forming the PPP are important to 
ensure that a viable agreement is formed that can indeed be implemented successfully, 
the contract phase, equally, is a most crucial phase. This is because there needs to be 
efficient contract management by the public sector party: this concern was 
acknowledged during an interview with the Director:  Business Development of the PPP 
Unit.  
 
Based on the CIPS guidelines for contract management in the UK, a few principles could 
be quoted that need to be adhered to for successful contract management:14
 
• Good contract management promotes good practice and professionalism; 
• Practitioners should possess a minimum knowledge and understanding relating 
to contract management; 
• Contract management applies equally to a simple procurement and to a 
complicated service contract; 
• Multi-disciplinary teams with a mix of skills should be established to enable 
contracts to be managed effectively and risks minimised. 
 
14 “Contract Management” www.CIPS.org 1 
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What is also emphasised is the importance of managing the relationships between all 
parties effectively to ensure that the contract meets the optimum combination of cost, 
time and quality.  In this sense, team management and the setting up of and adherence 
to SLAs are vital.  
 
7.7 Public–Private Partnerships regulated by the Municipal Finance 
Management Act
 
The Municipal PPP Regulations, section 5 (1), determine the requirements that a 
Municipal PPP must adhere to, which are: 
 
5. (1) A public–partnership agreement between a municipality and a private party 
must – 
 (a) provide value for money to the municipality; 
 (b) be affordable to the municipality; 
 (c) describe in specific terms the nature of the private party’s role in the public-
private partnership; 
 (d) confer effective powers on the municipality- 
  (i) to monitor implementation of, and to assess the private party’s 
performance under, the agreement; 
  (ii) to manage and enforce the agreement; 
 (e) impose financial management duties on the private party, including 
transparent processes relating to internal financial control, budgeting, 
accountability and reporting; 
 (f) provide for the termination of the agreement if the private party- 
  (i) fails to comply with terms or conditions of the agreement; or 
  (ii) deliberately provides incorrect or misleading information to the 
municipality; 
 (g) restrain the private party, for the full period of the agreement, from offering 
otherwise than in accordance with the agreement an employment, 
consultancy or other contract to a person- 
  (i) who is an official of the municipality or a municipal entity under the 
sole or shared control of the municipality;  or 
  (ii) who was such an official at any time during a period of one year 
before the offer is made;  and 
 (h) restrain the private party, for a period of three years, from offering an 
employment, consultancy or other contract to an employee of the 
municipality directly involved in the negotiation of the agreement. 
 
  
The autonomy of the municipality or municipal entity seems clear, in view of the phases 
during which approval and support by National Treasury, as described in the Treasury 
 94
Chapter 7: Process in forming a PPP 
Regulations, are to be obtained.  To this extent the Municipal Regulations are less 
comprehensive than the Treasury Regulations issued by National Treasury and the 
process seems to be structured to be more in line with the needs of the local and 
provincial government. 
 
7.8 Oversight and regulation of Municipal Public–Private Partnerships
 
During 1998 the Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit was created as a section 21 
Company in terms of the Companies Act, (no 61 of 1973) as a five-year intervention to 
develop a market for technical assistance for project preparation in the sphere of 
municipal infrastructure and service.  Its mandate has since then been extended to 31 
March 2006, when it will be wound up.  Much of the funding of the MIIU has been 
granted by US Aid.  It was intended to play a similar role in overseeing successful 
implementation and management of processes in municipal PPPs as National Treasury 
does in national and provincial PPPs.  
 
To date, the MIIU has recognised the importance of PPPs in municipalities as a means 
to obtain more sustainable infrastructure and service delivery solutions.  It also pointed 
out that the “test for municipalities and the extent to which PPPs are going to be able to 
assist in service delivery, is the time and increased transaction costs imposed on 
municipalities by the legal framework.”15  It has been conceded, though, that a number of 
problems have been experienced: 
 
• As more than 50% of municipal revenue is local rather than from provincial or 
national (sources), there is a real need to get better quality service delivery, 
revenue management and more capital committed to delivery; 
• According to the 2003 Fiscal Review, municipalities allocated only 6% of their 
budgets to capital programmes and there is still under-spending; 
• Problems are attributed to poor planning or an inability to turn money into 
delivery. 
 
 
15 ”Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit “The role of private participation in achieving municipal service 
delivery objectives” www.miiu.org.za 1-3 
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The MIIU also emphasised that, for effectiveness in municipalities, “laws must be 
enforced” and transparency and accountability is necessary for responsible decision-
making. Its objectives could serve to assist municipalities in setting up their PPPs. 
Unfortunately, there was no indication in the 2005 annual report of successful MPPPs 
that have been established or even finalised as a result of the MIIU’s interventions, and 
the deduction is made that the Unit’s role has not been as instrumental as it might have 
intended, especially if a parallel is to be drawn between it and the PPP Unit, where a 
number of PPPs can at least be claimed to the PPP Unit’s credit. 
 
Another government initiative launched in May 2005 was “Project Consolidate”, the 
purpose of which was to consolidate local government and address the essence of 
concerns in municipal municipalities, including private sector development.16 The 
purpose of including the private sector was specifically to “find new, creative, practical 
and impact oriented methods of engaging, supporting and working with local 
government”. The acknowledged challenge is to ensure that all municipalities develop 
the required capacity to confront and address the problems of poverty and 
underdevelopment and it is envisaged that this will be addressed by rendering support to 
the municipalities, through various means. The focal point is short-term programme 
interventions “embedded in our long-term policy goal” but it does not seem as if MPPPs 
are high on the agenda. It does not seem that Project Consolidate has the mandate to 
oversee or facilitate MPPP implementation, and neither do they have the capacity to do 
so.17 The current situation insofar as oversight and guidance in MPPPs goes, therefore, 
is that there is no single oversight body for this specific function. Although it could be 
argued that the MIIU is still operative, the Unit’s records do not seem to confirm its active 
involvement and it seems that the municipalities’ accounting officers will take sole 
responsibility for the process of establishing MPPPs.  
 
7.9 Values in Public–Private Partnerships
 
The values which the PPP Unit indicates need to be adhered to are those as phrased in 
the Constitution.  More specifically, section 217(1) states: 
 
16 Peters, D “Keynote address by Premier Dipuo Peters at the launch of Project Consolidate” Kimberley  
17 Personal interview Dr Petra Bouwer Pretoria 
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“When an organ of state … contracts for goods or services, it must do so in accordance with 
a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.” 
 
Furthermore, section 33 (1) confirms all “citizens’ rights to fair administrative action”. 
 
It seems that the regulations are to ensure that compliance promotes adherence to 
these values. Adherence to such regulations can reduce the risk of unethical conduct 
but, as Childress18 points out, “ethics is too important to be left to ethicists” and needs 
interdisciplinary and practical conversation. His view is that the language of “good and 
evil” and “right and wrong” would then be only rarely applicable and that it would rather 
be a matter of what is appropriate or not appropriate, or what is ethically justifiable or 
unjustifiable. Applying this statement to the workplace, the words of Aristotle again ring 
true, that good conduct must be learnt by behaviour: “We are what we repeatedly do. 
Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit”. Therefore, in order to demonstrate the 
differences or at least to cultivate an environment where ethical conduct would be 
expected from those within the environment, a good example of ethical conduct must be 
set. That would create the environment where, in my view, “interdisciplinary and practical 
conversation” would lay the foundation for ethical conduct. This would entail that good 
values need to be part of the PPP from the outset: where good values are negotiated 
and made part of the agreement from the first stages they would (should) also become 
part of the agreement during the ongoing execution (contract management) phase. 
 
Furthermore, as Hershey points out,19 “consumers demand accountability” and a number 
of difficulties may need to be overcome to see to it that these values are applied in the 
partnership context: 
 
• Congruency of mission and goals – are the missions and goals of the partnership 
congruent with that of the public partner? 
• Conflicts of interest – is there a perceived or real conflict of interest in the 
partnership? 
 
 
18 Reich et al 92 
19 Ibid 91 
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• Conflicts of obligation / accountability – to whom and to what is the public sector 
party accountable? 
• Balancing Ethical Rules and Values – what ethical rules and values is the public 
sector balancing?  Whose rules and values should they protect?  What is the role 
of the public sector professional? 
• Allocation issues – who decides what gets funded? 
 
The parties in the PPP, but especially the public party that might be more subject to 
public scrutiny, thus need to bear in mind that they always have to adhere to ethical 
values and prevent giving rise to a situation in which their ethics are open to question.  
This would mean that in all their dealings and in the way in which the contract is 
performed they would need to be transparent, honest and prepared to be held 
accountable for their actions. Hierarchies and bureaucracies are notorious for allowing 
managers to get away with poor decisions and the true leader in the PPP will bear this in 
mind and set the value-based example. This point of view also seems to be supported 
by Greenwell and Shaw20 when they emphasize that because a PPP is not a normal 
procurement relationship and because it is to be regarded as a partnership, much 
greater levels of trust and commitment are necessary to make it work. They also point 
out that a problem may arise over who in each organisation is giving and maintaining the 
commitment and who is setting the example by trusting the other party. Key individuals 
could get the process on the go but it is critical that support is to be provided from the 
top of the organisation and staff should be consistent in their approach where they 
interact with one another to enable the process to continue successfully.  
 
In the SA context, politics may play a big role in this very important part of the 
governance process, especially in view of what Andersen21 refers to as a “strong 
symbolic appeal” which should, in forming a PPP, signify a commitment to act for the 
benefit of the community. He warns that because it could happen that power 
relationships are neglected when the symbolic and instrumental aspects are 
emphasised, the power aspect is particularly relevant from a governance perspective.  
 
20 Greenwell, Z.I and Shaw, B “Uneasy bedfellows?  Public-Private Sector supply chain partnership in the 
NHS” Public and Private Sector Partnerships, the Enabling Mix 245-246 
21 Andersen, O.J “Public-Private Partnerships:  Organisational hybrids as channels for local mobilisation 
and participation?” Scandinavian Political Studies 5-6 
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He further states that22 “Power is primarily generative and it pertains to the actors’ 
capacity to build coalitions and thereby to mobilise the resources that are required to 
handle collective problems in an efficient and appropriate way”. The importance of 
refraining from harbouring political agendas is also vital in this regard and the public 
party especially should be alert to this. Where the PPP is established as a means to 
meet the needs of the community, the personal interest of the public sector role-player 
should never be seen to take precedence over the goals and objectives of the PPP. 
 
Another important value to take note of is cultural differences, especially in the diverse 
context of SA politics and business. Not only does one have to take note of cultural 
differences within organisations, but the private and public sector also have different 
cultures and the profit motive may play a role. This may also impact on the trust that 
individuals hold in the profit motives, objectives and possible hidden agendas of the 
private sector. There may also be perceived differences and here the essence of 
partnership is especially important as it will be a value that could assist in overcoming 
these differences.  
 
In the context of the public and private sector working together in an on-going 
relationship, Sullivan and Skelcher23 point out some of the inherent difficulties in these 
types of relationships because of the following difference: “governmental activity is 
premised on the value of transparency and service in the wider public interest” whereas 
the business partner may be more secretive in his orientation towards private benefit 
and this may create tension between the parties. Furthermore, as they point out,24 a 
close compatibility of values may easily be assumed, although political tensions, 
professional perspectives and hierarchical relationships may cause tension.  
“Partnership can become a virtuous symbol designed to rally otherwise divergent public 
bodies – or perhaps to conceal significant differences behind the appearance of unity” 
and these issues are particularly relevant in the PPP unity where questions such as 
unity, control and authority for action can come to the fore. This again emphasises the 
importance of parties being sensitive and not taking for granted the values that they 
expect the others to adhere to in the relationship. 
 
22 Andersen 7 
23 Sullivan & Skelcher Working across boundaries: collaboration in public services 80 
24 Ibid 
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7.10 The essence of a partnership
 
“Partnerships are not easy; they require much greater levels of commitment and trust 
than any normal buyer/seller relationship”.25 It may be an obvious error to take for 
granted that two business parties who agree on the performance of a contract will make 
good business partners. If consideration is given to the fact that PPPs by nature are 
long-term relationships it soon becomes evident that their relationship needs to be 
founded on a solid basis to ensure a healthy partnership. It goes without saying that the 
values which need to form part of such a partnership are absolutely crucial for a 
successful partnership, particularly because of the importance of the ways in which 
different values as dynamics in a partnership affect the objectives of the partnership. 
However, Sullivan and Skelcher26 are of the view that as a result of the commitment of 
the parties to work together in a long-term relationship, trust and mutuality will replace 
“the suspicion and divergence of interests” which are often part of short-term contracts.  
Where there are perceived differences and difficulties, the idea of “partnering” should 
provide for much more than a product or service. This will be the added value which will 
determine whether or not a problem can be overcome. This is especially relevant if one 
takes into consideration that a solid partnership takes a long time to develop and it would 
obviously be in the interests of both parties to resolve differences. 
 
One of the first and foremost values is trust: a commitment has to be given and 
maintained by each partner so that they know they can trust each other. An individual 
can play an important role in starting the process on the right note, but the example 
needs to be set at the top of the organisation and the process will only be successful if 
all staff members follow the good example set for them. This makes it of paramount 
importance that the senior partners in the partnership are committed, as a lack of 
commitment in such circumstances can lead to many problems in the execution of the 
partnership objectives. Trust can also contribute significantly to the long-term stability of 
an organisation and, by the same token, of the partnership: according to Saad27 it can be 
developed on three levels, which are “mutual”, “competence” and “goodwill”.  Trust and 
 
25 Greenwell and Shaw 245 
26 Sullivan and Skelcher 83 
27 Greenwell and Shaw 245 
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commitment is especially important in a partnership involving technology and innovation, 
as the risks may be high and it will be expected from each partner to fulfil his role 
competently.  
 
Another value that is paramount in a partnership is respect for cultural differences. 
Himmelman points out28 that cultural differences between public and private sectors 
have been said to cause huge problems, especially because the profit motive can be a 
key divide. Unfortunately, where there are perceived differences based on cultural 
values, this may impact negatively on the trust between the partners. This may be 
compounded in instances in which where there is a perceived motive for hidden 
agendas on either side, or a profit motive on the side of the private partner. In the South 
African context one needs to take note of more than the cultural differences between the 
public and private sector as we have such a multi-cultural society and this multi-cultural 
diversity is especially evident in the public sector. 
 
7.11 Conclusion
 
The most critical area of good corporate governance in the sense of adherence to ethical 
values, is the procurement process in the PPP.  The procedures are lengthy and 
comprehensive in an effort to safeguard the process but if the underlying values such as 
transparency, accountability and honesty are not adhered to, the procedures will not 
ensure the type of transaction from which a solid relationship can be expected.  All role 
players need to be alert to, and at the same time committed in their approach to ensure 
that all who participate in the process maintain a standard:  every one person needs to 
ensure that the other adheres to the standard.  If the expectancy of adherence to ethical 
values is seen to be part of the process, it will be more realistic to expect all players to 
the party, to adhere thereto. 
 
 
 
 
 
28 Ibid 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CURRENT PROBLEMS 
 
While the great lord passes the wise peasant bows deeply and silently farts.  
- Ethiopian proverb 
 
Involving the private sector in adding value in terms of contributing towards economic 
growth and development in South Africa as a Developmental State makes good sense. 
The benefits are numerous but there are considerable challenges to overcome.  However, 
the frequency and seriousness of problems relating to a lack of trust in the public sector 
need to be recognised in order to approach the founding of any Public–Private 
Partnership prudently – if not, the risk may materialise that it will become just another 
bureaucratic creation that will not deliver to its full potential. 
 
8.1 Background
 
With losses as a result of corruption estimated at being between R50 and R150 billion 
per year for both the private and public sectors,1 it is of national concern that PPPs are 
formed on a solid foundation. This is especially so in view of the finding that the most 
money is lost to corruption in procurement transactions.  Another recent fraud survey 
performed by KPMG found that 76% of respondents from SA indicated that employees 
were the main source of fraud in an organisation.2 However, with such high losses to 
corruption there also is a general lack of values on both sides.  
 
Most of all, there is a lack of trust. This is regrettable because it is an essential ingredient 
for a successful partnership, and therefore the focus should be to try to restore this trust.  
Apart from the almost daily allegations in the press of fraud and corruption in the public 
service, our country suffered a huge embarrassment when our deputy president was 
relieved of his duties as a result of allegations of corruption. Not only was he a high 
profile politician, but he was also one of the first advocates of the advantages of PPPs to 
alleviate poverty3 and he was the chairman of the Moral Regeneration Committee. By  
 
1 “Transparency International Country Study report South Africa” Institute for Security Studies report 8 
2 Morris, R “Employees the major source of fraud, KPMG survey finds” Business Report 
3 Zuma, J “Keynote address by deputy president Jacob Zuma at the launch of the Community Public 
Private Partnership Program (CPP) Partnership for Growth” Helderfontein 99 
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the same token, it was equally embarrassing when a number of parliamentarians were 
found guilty of defrauding the government in the so-called parliamentary voucher 
scandal in which an amount of R17m was lost to fraud. This makes it a challenging task 
to again create and gain trust in any public sector dealings as they are easily perceived 
to be tainted. 
 
8.2 Lack of trust
 
If the poor rating by TI of SA’s anti-corruption efforts is to be based on a lack of trust, 
then one needs to consider what “trust” is. One view is offered by Jane Flax4 as: 
“Constructive debate about moral principles and standards of judgment requires the prior 
development of trust. Trust cannot develop unless each participant gives as full an 
account as possible of her particular commitments and acknowledges their potential for 
partiality, error, or harm.” This certainly applies to trust in PPPs, as both parties need to 
disclose as much as possible and it is on this that the envisaged agreement is based.  
Thus, where either or both parties are untrustworthy, the relationship and the agreement 
will develop tainted outcomes:  the corrupt official who sets out to gain privately from a 
PPP will then just contribute to the perception of corruption in the public sector.  
 
The Corruption Index 2005 issued by Transparency International5 again pointed out that 
corruption continues to remain a threat globally and that it not only causes poverty, but 
remains a barrier to overcome it. The relationship between corruption and poverty is so 
strong that these are in fact viewed as two sides of the same coin and to that extent they 
not only feed off each other but are barriers to overcome each other.6 Moreover, apart 
from the fact that SA slipped down two places from the 44th to 46th least corrupt country 
in the world, we are also on a continent that is regarded as the most corrupt in the world.  
 
Shortly after its release the TI report was criticised by President Mbeki7 and the Public 
Service Commission pointed out that its methods are not reliable,8 but the perception 
 
4 Sample, Mills & Sterba Philosophy, the big questions 476 
5 ”Corruption still rampant in 70 countries, says corruption perceptions index 2005” Transparency 
International press release 1 
6 Editorial “The Corruption Fight”  Business Day 
7 Rose, R “SA slips on graft index despite axing of Zuma” Business Day 
8 Ibid 
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remains that business leaders and analysts still regard corruption as a significant 
problem. The fact remains that perceptions are important, as corruption is regarded as 
one of the key risk factors that investors will take into consideration when deciding where 
their money is to be invested. For that reason SA is still regarded as vulnerable to 
corruption and, depending on how strong the perception persists, it will continue to affect 
investment opportunities. Neither is it something that can be addressed overnight but is 
clearly a long-term process. The fact that SA slid down two places, even though it may 
seem like a minor change in the overall assessment, was a disappointment, as the 
expectation was probably that the perception about corruption in the country would have 
been different because Zuma had to step down. Although Transparency International 
conceded that the incident improved foreign impressions on how serious the country is 
on fighting corruption, it is still an indication that a single event is not sufficient to contain 
the problem.  It also confirms that business leaders and analysts remain unconvinced 
that we have the situation under control. This is so despite the fact that a number of top 
officials were prosecuted in the past year and that Mbeki also indicated that he would be 
prepared to remove corrupt municipal officials even if it means that the district would 
temporarily be destabilised.  He also denounced those in the ANC who were using the 
ruling party to enrich themselves rather than serving the poor.9    
 
This again is a strong stance on fighting corruption:  but the fact remains that the results 
are outstanding and that is where the big challenge still lies. Implementing anti-
corruption legislation and dealing decisively with corrupt officials is a big and important 
step in the right direction, but the consistency of the implementation is absolutely crucial.  
Should some officials be allowed to get away with allegations of corruption, this would 
seriously undermine the good efforts. TI also reiterated that to fight corruption it is 
important to prosecute offenders and they should also be debarred from public bidding.  
 
Unfortunately, despite the positive inroads made since the Zuma debacle, our slate is 
not clean:  the fact that some politicians are perceived to get away with dishonesty is still 
a serious concern and will impact negatively on the successful establishment of PPPs. 
Not only may private parties be distrusted by the public sector as business partners, but 
some may even enter into public sector agreements anticipating to benefit through 
 
9 ”A titan that serves the people of South Africa!” ANC Today 
 104
Chapter 8: Current problems 
corrupt dealings with the officials involved. 
 
On a smaller scale but equally important, officials are perceived to get away with 
corruption and dishonest acts in the public sector because the criminal prosecution 
system is not always effective. It is so that there is regular exposure of dishonest officials 
being dismissed, but taking a strong public stance against corruption is just one of the 
ways of dealing with the issue.  If poverty and corruption are interlinked as closely as the 
Transparency International and similar surveys suggest, then government will have to 
back its corruption-busting activities with an equally aggressive plan to implement its 
new economic growth initiative, and involving the private sector in this effort will both 
enhance and improve such efforts. 
 
The lack of trust also creates a huge barrier to successful partnerships when the public 
and private parties do not trust each other. This is a problem recognised both by the 
treasury’s PPP Unit Head, William Dachs,10 and a spokesperson for the health sector, 
Sibani Mngadi. This may explain why fewer PPPs are established – particularly in the 
health sector despite its mention in the health-care charter.  
 
8.3 Lack of foreign investment
 
A country which is perceived to be corrupt will fail to draw foreign investment.  Not only 
is the ethical or unethical conduct of officials, particularly prominent individuals, in the 
country important, but so are the ways and means by which a country deals with 
corruption. Because it is a global problem, all countries belonging to the UN need to 
develop and implement anti-corruption measures, especially anti-corruption legislation.  
Although the latest TI report indicates differently, SA is regarded by Garratt11 as one of 
the countries who set a world standard in terms of our corporate governance code, 
namely the King Report especially as it also covers important aspects such a diversity, 
racial integration and nation-building. 
 
 
10 Pile, J “A faltering pulse, State hospitals are dying: Could private-sector partnerships help save them?” 
Financial Mail 
11 Garratt The fish rots from the head, the crisis in our boardrooms: developing the crucial skills of the 
competent director 185 
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Therefore, in order to obtain a balanced view, the criticism of the TI report also needs to 
be considered: as indicated, TI’s chairman Peter Eigen12 conceded that there were 
shortcomings in the organisation’s methodology, for instance the fact that only 
perceptions were measured and not actual improvements. He furthermore pointed out 
that Mbeki’s axing of Zuma had internationally been seen as “a very encouraging sign”, 
which underlined the fact that SA was “perceived as strong”. In addition, the Centre for 
Public Integrity, a US-based research organisation, also groups SA among the top third 
of “strongest countries” on tackling corruption13 and Claudia Fenor, head of the public 
sector research body “Research Surveys”, said that “generally, public opinion from a 
variety of sources showed an improvement in perceptions over the South African 
government’s efforts to combat corruption”.14   
 
Unfortunately the whole picture does not always seem to be considered:  the credibility 
of the TI Index is high and even though other organisations may voice positive opinions 
about the efforts in SA, it remains the case that the general perception always needs to 
be addressed.  As stated previously, developing and implementing legislation in itself is 
not sufficient to ensure good governance – neither in the public nor the private sector.  
Governance is not ensured by making rules but by ensuring that the role-players, 
especially the key role-players, are committed to its success.  In a sense, it then is true 
to say that ethical conduct starts with the individual, and, in our case, it starts at the top 
with the government, which represents the people of the country. To that extent the 
government has made great strides towards fulfilling the responsibility of developing and 
implementing anti-corruption legislation, but we need to see better examples of 
exemplary and ethical conduct by politicians in this country. There needs to be no doubt 
about the personal commitment of role-players towards the undertakings given by 
government. Stating that measures are being implemented to reduce corruption is one 
thing; living it personally is another – and it is much more difficult as it is something that 
should go much further than the spoken word and impressive speeches from the 
podiums.  The efforts by government to send out a message to other countries, 
especially to tourists, that the government realises the need to balance developmental 
objectives between direct income support, improved public service delivery and 
 
12 Rose, R “SA slips on graft index despite axing of Zuma” Business Day 
13 Ibid 
14 Ibid 
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investment in social infrastructure15 needs not only be sustained in the word but needs to 
be seen in deeds: therefore the government cannot fail in its objectives and especially 
not in delivery on infrastructural developments and service delivery. 
 
8.4 Bureaucratic Red Tape
 
It can safely be stated that any dealings with the public sector are wrapped in red tape 
and thus that the process usually takes much longer than in private-private party 
dealings. There may be parties from the private sector who are deterred from doing 
business with the public sector16 because there are alternative means to make a quick 
profit. Not only are the long processes before the PPP inception phase a deterring 
factor, but the perception also exists that public sector payments may be delayed as a 
result of red tape. 
 
A report published in June 200517 found that regulatory compliance cost SA business 
R79 billion in 2004, which is equivalent to 6,5 percent of GDP. Obviously this figure does 
not indicate what amount would relate to public–private dealings, and therefore it should 
simply be regarded as an indication of the bigger picture. However, although complying 
with red tape is a frustration for most individuals and businesses, it is necessary for 
instance to ensure the safety of food products, standards of products and of course, in 
public spending and particularly in PPPs, to ensure value for money in terms of public 
spending. But it comes at a cost and is regarded as creating significant efficiency costs 
in the economy and as such it discourages business growth and job-creation in the 
formal economy.18  
 
The key elements of the labour regulatory framework were pointed out19 as the following 
legislation: 
 
• Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 2003, which is to advance the  
 
15 Wadula, P ”The state of the South African economy” Savubona 62-64 
16 Workshop attended: “Key-lessons in Public-Private Partnerships” Gauteng Management Development 
Programme Senior Management Service Networking session   
17  “Counting the cost of red tape for business in South Africa” Strategic partnerships for business growth 
in Africa  report 5-6  
18 Ibid 89  
19 Ibid 7  
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• economic interests of all black people, including women, workers, youth, people 
with disabilities, and people living in rural areas; 
• Black Economic Empowerment charters, which are an ongoing process where 
charters are developed for the different industries, and in terms of which a target 
of 25% black ownership is to be attained over the next 10 years; 
• Employment Equity Act 1998, which is to promote the constitutional right of 
equity, the exercise of true democracy and the elimination of unfair discrimination 
in employment whilst ensuring the implementation of employment equity to 
redress the effects of discrimination and achieve a diverse and broadly 
representative workforce. 
 
These regulations are particularly relevant when read with the strict BEE criteria which 
are to be complied with during the feasibility phase of the PPP process. 
 
8.5 Fraud and corruption
 
In addition to the findings on perceptions of corruption as discussed above, the 2005 
TISA report20 placed a different emphasis on the issue of fraud and corruption. It found 
that the results of poor public sector ethics are not only measured in arrests for 
transgressions but also in terms of money lost to fraud and corruption. For example, in 
the Eastern Cape a total of R110 billion was found to have gone “missing” over a period 
of six years and only 12% of the Eastern Cape’s provincial budget had thus been 
adequately accounted for between 1997 and 2003. Another finding was that corruption 
in the wealthier provinces such as Gauteng and the Western Cape may be more 
“sophisticated” and could in fact involve larger sums of money. It was for instance found 
that Gauteng had lost R400 million to an unscrupulous housing developer who managed 
to manipulate the subsidy system. It also found that local and provincial government, 
which is a critical area for service delivery, also suffers from corruption – especially in 
the general mismanagement of funds and the awarding of tenders. 
 
It goes without saying that the government needs to be seen to take the necessary steps 
to address the situation and two of the more prominent examples include, firstly, the  
 
20 Institute for Security Studies report 21-22 
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investigation of 37 000 public servants for social grant fraud. To date, 160 have been 
arrested and more arrests are expected.21 Another example which made headlines was 
the dismissal of 68 officials in the Department of Internal Affairs for corruption.22  
 
The high levels of corrupt conduct in the public sector can be attributed to a number of 
factors, but the main reasons are a lack of leadership and a lack of ethics. The 
damaging results of these two problems normally become evident over a period of time.  
Unfortunately, a culture in an organisation can become so unethical that, over time, it 
becomes acceptable conduct to act unethically, and wrongful behaviour is no longer 
questioned or reprimanded. An example would be the misconception that many public 
officials have on the use of government garage vehicles: they sometimes find it 
incomprehensible why such vehicles cannot be utilised to transport family and friends.  
Often the abuse of public property is not questioned and this type of behaviour then 
becomes entrenched in the culture of the organisation. Therefore, if it is not questioned, 
for example, that a government vehicle is used to transport friends and family or to run 
personal errands, and management does not take any steps to address the situation, it 
becomes standard practice. Once it is standard practice, it will be very difficult to change 
the perception that it is wrong, and that things are to be done differently. It follows that if 
the manager in a section then allows for an unethical culture in his/her section or 
department to develop, it becomes a huge challenge to turn things around. Unethical 
cultures and unethical behaviour in the organisation therefore can be created through 
ongoing conduct. 
 
8.6 Political Dominance
 
The previous examples of current problems leading to poor corporate governance in 
PPPs could be termed as the most obvious ones. However, another very important risk 
in the successful execution of PPPs is the risk of political interference, as was raised in  
 
 
 
21 ”Police swoop on 160 fraudsters” Business Report  
22 Monare, M ”Cracking the whip on corrupt officials: Home Affairs Minister says zero tolerance policy has 
seen 66 arrests in a year” The Star 
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the Maputo case study23 and also exposed by the press.24 The role of the politician 
versus the businessman adds a totally different dimension to the partnership. Should the 
politician abuse his powers, it unfortunately adds a nasty flavour as it could change the 
rules unfairly against the private partner and if he is already committed to a PPP he will 
not have much leverage to address his situation. This will not only impact negatively on 
the spirit of the agreement, but on other aspects of execution and service delivery as 
well, such as staff morale, integrity, project plan deviations and ultimately corruption 
either by management and/or staff. 
 
Of particular concern is political interference in the municipalities. A number of examples 
confirm this25 where much money is spent to get rid of officials who do not “play along” 
and then substituting them with ANC lackeys who allow councillors to do as they wish.  
And too often the “replacements” do not have the skills to do the job. “The result is 
rampant corruption, mismanagement of funds, the removal of skilled managers and 
abuse of power”.26 The disastrous consequences include power black-outs, clinics 
without sewerage, and the extremely slow processing of permits and documents. Not 
only does this result in the community being denied essential service delivery but it 
impedes negatively on BEE as it hinders growth and development. The adoption of the 
executive mayoral system in 2000 in terms of which executive mayors were granted 
absolute power over policy matters created a possible conflict situation between mayors 
and municipal managers. The conflict can arise where the municipal manager needs to 
manage people brought on board by the councilor, who may not be properly qualified 
and/or may act under political influence of the councilor. Another problem that can be 
created by this scenario is that there may be lack of clarity as to the divide between 
political and managerial accountability, especially for the municipal manager who is 
prepared to take responsibility for his task. Says Paton,27 “Where political accountability 
and managerial accountability are confused, the result is that there is no-one telling 
politicians what they can and can’t do”. 
 
23 ”Public private partnership capacity building programme: phase 1” Case study: the Maputo development 
corridor roll road report 11 
24 Paton, C “Rusting Republics. Political domination in municipal councils is destroying administration and 
infrastructure” Financial Mail 20-22 
25 Ibid 
26 Ibid 20 
27 Ibid 23 
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The extent to which political and personal interests play a role in decisions tends to 
obscure the business inclination of public sector leaders and to business leaders this 
could mean that the public sector per se is not sufficiently capable of bringing about 
programmes for economic growth.  
 
8.7 Lack of Leadership
 
As no existing database is available from which to gain insight into previous corporate 
governance problems experienced in PPPs, the discussion of these problems, relating to 
leadership and management, will be of a more general nature insofar as they can impact 
on procurement transactions and particularly on PPPs. 
 
South Africa has good instruments in place to promote service delivery in the public 
sector. Two pieces of legislation that stand out are the Constitution and the PFMA.  But 
why, then, is our service delivery not up to standard?  Why are there so many problems 
emanating from poor service delivery and corruption at senior levels? 
 
The reason, as stated previously, is that there is a serious lack of leadership in the public 
sector and stronger leadership is needed: having solid structures in place and sending 
managers on management and leadership training courses lays a solid foundation and it 
also addresses the “perception” of corruption that is to be addressed in global terms.  
However, in my view, it may be insufficient to address the problem. From my perspective 
and the experience that I have gained in the past few years, the lack of leadership 
transpired in terms of the following: 
 
8.7.1 When senior managers do not take responsibility for their actions, the perception 
will be enforced that there is a lack of accountability, especially where senior 
managers tend to protect one another.  The exposure of the corruption scandal 
at the Gauteng Shared Service Centre during 2004 proves this point:  many 
managers at senior level were aware of nepotism by the CEO, Mike Roussos, 
but nobody was prepared to stand out and they all protected one another. When 
the investigations exposed him, a number of senior managers had their contracts 
terminated but only because an external investigation exposed them and only 
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because the MEC, Jabu Moleketi, implemented the necessary measures which 
included dismissing Roussos. 
 
8.7.2 Too often, managers are seen to abuse power especially where no disciplinary 
steps are taken against them:  this is particularly true of the abuse of state assets 
such as government garage vehicles, as well as non-disclosure of private 
interests, especially in private companies where there could be a conflict of 
interest.  When staff sees conduct such as this, they would not necessarily 
question it, not only because a senior person is implicated, but what is worse, 
they may even accept it as acceptable conduct and over time such conduct 
becomes entrenched in the work environment. Setting such a poor example 
certainly does not instill a culture of strong leadership: on the contrary, staff will 
not regard such a manager as a leader because he cannot possibly be perceived 
as ethical. What is worse is that the unethical nature of the conduct may not even 
be questioned. 
 
8.7.3 Managers at senior levels often are late for appointments or do not attend 
meetings. This may amount to wasteful expenditure of state resources, and it 
sets a poor example. Unfortunately this has become so entrenched in 
government culture that very few even question it anymore and the fact that no 
steps are taken against such conduct only serves to reinforce it. 
 
8.7.4 One of the biggest problems is a lack of communication. The true leader ensures 
that his team members are always informed, as opposed to the poor manager 
who informs his staff on a “need to know” basis. The role that the public sector is 
to play in the concept of SA as a DS is a good example:  I have never heard this 
terminology being used in the work environment. The government, at the most 
senior levels, has regular training sessions and briefings at great cost to its 
senior managers in order to inform them on what their roles are in achieving the 
goals of government. This information, however, does not seem to be sufficiently 
communicated to staff and therefore not only is the objective defeated, but staff 
may be denied important guidance. In my experience, insufficient feedback is 
given to staff and too often they remain excluded. Not only does this compound 
the communication problem, but it contributes to low staff morale – and as is so 
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well known, low staff morale leads to a myriad of other problems including an 
increase in fraud and corruption. 
 
8.7.5 Unfortunately, too often managers do not contribute sufficiently to ensure strong 
teamwork. The result of this may be poor communication, insufficient teamwork 
and poor or no feedback. Too often information is requested on an ad hoc basis, 
for example to give feedback during meetings or to compile reports. This could 
mean that essential information is never shared or may even get lost. An 
example is the feedback on exit interviews of staff, which does not seem to be 
properly disseminated back to the manager of the department from which a staff 
member had resigned. If no feedback is given to the manager, he does not have 
sufficient information to address the problem. 
 
8.7.6 If a manager has been properly trained in the skills of leadership, he would know 
how to motivate staff.  In my experience, this is often neglected as staff is not 
treated as individuals who contribute towards the goals of a team, but as 
subordinates who need to execute orders. Authority is often exercised in a 
manner that demotivates staff and the only recourse staff normally has is to seek 
protection from the workers’ unions.  This results in an ongoing power-struggle 
that too often is counter-productive. Perhaps, as in the private sector, if 
managers had to take more responsibility for occurrences in their sections, such 
as high staff turnover or exposure of fraud and corruption, they would be more 
careful.  
 
8.8 Poor Management
 
An article in the Financial Mail on the poor state of government hospitals,28 may create 
the impression that PPPs will come to the rescue of the health sector because they are 
in such a state as a result of poor management. In the plea for PPPs in the hospitals, the 
author recognises a number of managerial problems, such as a lack of autonomy of 
managers to dismiss staff for misconduct and poor performance, and a lack of 
accountability. A specific example was given of 26 babies who died in the Mahatma  
 
28 Pile 20-22 
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Gahndi Hospital in Durban and the incident successfully being covered up for months.29 
Then, despite the exposure, no one was held responsible for the deaths. Similarly, 
despite 76 children dying at Natalspruit hospital, the hospital denied any wrongdoing and 
only when an audit was conducted was negligence exposed. Again, no steps seemed to 
have been taken against the staff who were responsible for preventing this from 
happening.  
  
The objectives in terms of the regulations are firm on how the need for a PPPs is to be 
established; and, on a broader interpretation, the government as a DS needs to both 
establish and improve initiatives – for instance on infrastructural development, in order to 
meet its objectives. Could it be that the public has an expectation that is somewhere in 
between? As is often the case with pressure groups in instances of unethical conduct 
where an organisation is forced to take note and finally adhere to external pressure to 
reform its conduct, could the public play a role in expecting, and ultimately demanding, 
the same from the government? These questions are not easy to answer and one 
cannot afford to move away too far from the established structures within which solid 
measures are to be implemented. However, cognisance is to be taken in view of meeting 
the voters’ and communities’ needs and expectations. Neither can the increasingly 
frequent exposure of poor management in the public sector be ignored. 
 
8.9 Challenges identified in Municipal Public-Private Partnerships
 
In 1999 the MIIU identified30 a number of problems envisaged to be overcome in 
MPPPs. They recognised that the existing infrastructure, because of years of neglect as 
a result of insufficient funding for maintenance, was a huge problem in which PPPs were 
to play a definitive role. Other problems relating to limited institutional capacity were 
identified as:  
 
• Experienced staff members took early retirement; 
• Staff and systems from separate administrations were not always combined 
successfully; 
 
29 Ibid 
30 Jackson, B.M and Hlahla, M “South Africa’s infrastructure delivery needs: the role and challenge for 
public-private partnerships” Development Southern Africa 1-13 
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• A lack of trust between new councillors and officials who had been working in the 
environment for many years caused extensive problems; 
• Many new councillors did not understand their roles and through their 
interference in the professional duties and responsibilities of other professional 
officials, caused officials and staff to become demotivated; 
• These problems resulted in reduced productivity both amongst management and 
staff. 
 
Another obstacle identified was the problem of raising capital and it was suggested that 
it would be essential to borrow from the private sector.31 This problem could of course 
directly be resolved by creating PPPs, as infrastructural development, where the private 
party raises the capital, is one of the main advantages of a PPP. However, this soon 
proved to be problematic as the municipality for which capital was to be raised needed to 
demonstrate “a degree of competence and financial soundness”. As many 
municipalities, especially in the current situation, would have difficulty in meeting these 
criteria, this proves quite challenging and would also impact on the risk identification and 
the degree to which the private party would be prepared to assume risk. Similarly, banks 
are then reluctant to extend credit, but it was suggested that banks might be prepared to 
provide limited resources in the limited capacity of a special purpose vehicle.  
 
8.10 Conclusion 
 
As stated in the beginning, the public sector party has many problems to overcome in 
order to win the trust of those that it wishes to conduct business with. The government 
has made great strides in addressing many of these concerns but it needs to be done 
consistently and on as wide as possible a scale in order to sustain credibility. The 
seriousness of corruption that need to be rooted out on all levels cannot be 
underestimated, and especially not so in a concept as vital as the PPP. 
 
 
 
31 Ibid 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
EVALUATION 
 
Information is endlessly available to us;  
where shall wisdom be found? 
- Harold Bloom 
 
There are a number of reasons why Public–Private Partnerships do not deliver 
optimally: some of these relate to the process, but most relate to the way in which the 
process is driven, in other words they relate to people; there also are specific concerns 
relating to municipal Public-Private Partnerships.  The reasons are explored in order to 
suggest how the shortcomings are to be addressed so that Public-Private Partnerships 
can make a bigger contribution to relieve some of the pressing needs in the economy. 
 
9.1 Introduction
 
The value of virtue ethics and the relevance of creating a culture in which moral conduct 
is to be promoted generate the expectation that morality in business is a realistic goal.  
Even though general business publications focus the attention, perhaps in much simpler 
language, on the benefits of value-based decisions, the foundation for this was laid long 
ago by Aristotle when he said that we need to act in accordance with our virtues.  
Therefore I believe that value-based PPPs can be created where solid foundations in 
terms of leadership and good values are laid.  Global awareness of the need for morality 
in business affirms this need, and in SA in particular, the PPP can do much to restore 
the trust lost as a result of the perception of corruption in the government. 
 
9.2 Towards greater efficiency
 
Björk and Johansson suggest1 that public bureaucracies have become too large to be 
truly effective and therefore that the private market should play a bigger role in realising 
government objectives, especially in view of the expectation of politicians’ accountability.  
 
Closer cooperation between the public and private sector, as the authors point out, is 
 
1 See chapter 2: 4  
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necessary to improve efficiency.2 If public servants are to open their minds to be 
receptive to learn new things, they could not only learn new skills in the process but 
eventually this could positively influence the culture. If the culture could be influenced 
positively, it could enhance productivity and quality in service. This is where PPPs can 
play a significant role: bringing about a culture change in the public service is a huge 
task and if it could be done on a smaller scale in more PPPs it could ultimately influence 
the public sector service on a broader scale and contribute towards creating a healthier 
public sector service culture.  
 
9.3 Key role-players in the Public–Private Partnership process 
 
The importance of more efficiency, especially in the bureaucracy, is emphasised as one 
of the requirements for a successful Developmental State3 and the PPP as a special 
form of partnership can be a valuable vehicle to realise these goals:  the inefficiencies of 
a bureaucracy are not addressed and resolved overnight but creating successful 
partnerships can play a fundamental role in addressing specific identified needs, and 
can make positive inroads towards achieving the developmental goals – especially in 
terms of infrastructural development. Other advantages of utilising more PPPs would 
include increased efficiency, job creation and poverty reduction.  
 
Moreover, an argument by Beeson4 that the success of a DS is dependent on the 
functionality of a pilot agency deserves closer consideration. In my view there is no SA 
governmental body that fits the description of a pilot agency: the PPP Unit plays an 
important part in the whole PPP process for national and provincial PPPs and although 
the MIIU was to have played a similar role in the MPPPs, the results seem to indicate 
that its participation was limited.  Apart from that, the MIIU is to be wound up and I could 
not find any indication that another similar body is to take over its functions. Even if that 
were the case, neither the PPP Unit nor the MIIU could be described as a pilot agency 
because neither is completely independent.  Furthermore, Beeson indicated that the 
 
2 See chapter 2: 5 
3 See chapter 3 
4 See chapter 3: 1 
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proposed pilot agency would be more involved with business partners in order to 
oversee the implementation of PPPs in the national interest. The facilitation role played 
by the PPP Unit, in my view, does not fall within this description. Other parties that 
deserve mention here, but that also do not fit the description, are the National Business 
Initiative and the Development Bank of SA. Both play an important role in terms of 
support, advice and facilitation and to that extent they enhance the objectives of the 
government in establishing PPPs, but neither was specifically appointed to further mainly 
PPP goals.  
 
Two PPP role-players in the UK that need specific mention are Partnerships UK and the 
Public Private Partnerships Programme (4Ps). PUK as a private company in which the 
private party holds a 51 percent share plays an important independent role in advancing 
the PPP concept in the UK governmental objectives. Similarly, 4Ps promote PPPs in the 
local authorities. The independence of these role-players, in my view, is probably one of 
the reasons why PPPs are so successful in the UK when compared with PPPs in SA.  
 
9.4 The resistance to Public–Private Partnerships
 
Apart from the lack of an independent body to promote PPPs and ensure their creation 
and development, a number of other problems were identified as reasons for the poor 
progress of PPPs: 
 
9.4.1 The bureaucratic red tape not only prolongs the process but is a deterrent to 
private parties;5   
 
9.4.2 Public sector managers are reluctant to enter into PPPs because they may not 
understand or are not informed on the benefits,6 or because they may be 
reluctant to share their power-base;7 
 
 
5 See chapter 8: 7 
6 Workshop attended: “Key-lessons in Public-Private Partnerships” Gauteng Management Development 
Programme Senior Management Service Networking session  
7 Paton, C “Rusting Republics. Political domination in municipal councils is destroying administration and 
infrastructure” Financial Mail 20-23 
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9.4.3 Because PPPs are regarded as an alternative procurement method8 as opposed 
to a means to promote development in the economy, many are not aware of the 
advantages that PPPs can offer. In addition, the procurement processes are 
centralised9 and there does not to seem to be much initiative to implement the 
PPP concept.  
 
Unfortunately, one of the main PPP “deterrents” is ignorance:  because the role of the 
public sector in the economy as a DS is not communicated sufficiently,10 in my view, the 
value of PPPs in playing a role in this regard is not appreciated.  If better communication 
in the public sector had promoted the concept of the DS goals as well as PPP goals, 
PPPs may by now have been implemented on a broader scale. This view is taken 
especially in relation to the Webb report finding11 that both period and ad hoc contracts 
have extensive commercial involvement and activity and could therefore have a 
“profound economic effect”: PPPs can play a vital role in this regard, both in terms of 
long-term risk-sharing and economic gain by the public sector. The mere fact that 
traditional procurement methods still seem to be the only consideration for such huge 
contracts seems to confirm the view that insufficient note is taken of the benefits of 
PPPs. 
 
Note also need to be taken of the weaknesses identified in the procurement process12 
that can be addressed by PPPs: 
 
9.4.4 In advancing the interests in SMEs, progress is not measurable whereas, in 
smaller PPPs, the degree to which compliance of BEE objectives had been met 
would be known. 
 
9.4.5 Because the procurement is so process-focused, there is less focus on people 
development, which is one of the great benefits of PPPs. 
 
8 Gauteng Provincial Government Procurement Manual 33 refers to PPPs as other types of “commercial 
arrangements” which need to be approached differently 
9 See chapter 5: 9 
10 See chapter 8: 11 
11 See chapter 5: 9 
12 Ibid 
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9.4.6 Where the cost-effectiveness of traditional procurement is not readily 
measurable, the PPP management process allows for the assessment of 
effectiveness throughout, especially as the terms of the agreement need to be 
adhered to. In the traditional procurement transaction, by contrast, the 
performance of the contract may take place under circumstances where the 
contract is interdependent of other processes. The PPP is specifically entered 
into to promote an objective as part of a larger development – for example a 
hospital would enhance improved health services, which forms part of the 
governmental service delivery objectives. 
 
9.4.7 Unfortunately data that can be shared for the benefit of future procurement 
transactions does not seem to be readily available, and in this regard the PPP 
process similarly does not have this benefit. The database which is to be 
established in terms of the TR would hopefully at least partially address this 
situation when information is to be made available.  My concern is that the 
information, which would be supplied by a government body, would need to be 
“politically correct” and my experience in the public sector is that vital business 
information often is withheld in order to prevent embarrassment. Again, if an 
independent body, in my view, had to exchange information with parties in order 
to learn from PPP experiences, it would increase the probability that the 
information would be unbiased.  In addition to the database that the PPP Unit is 
to establish, the NBI already shares experiences in its newsletters with clients 
and as such makes the information available that it has gained on previous PPP 
experiences with others who may benefit. Unfortunately no similar, independent, 
initiative exists for MPPPs. 
 
9.5 The advantages of Public–Private Partnerships
 
The many advantages to be gained by the PPP relationship are elaborated on 
extensively in Chapter Five. In summarising these, I would like to make a distinction 
between advantages in terms of process and people. The PPP process, in which there is 
collaboration and true teamwork between the public and the private sector, offers the 
opportunity for the sharing and development of skills and true partnership in working 
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towards a common goal. This should contribute towards more efficiency where there is a 
value-based partnership. Obviously, where for instance there is general lack of trust and 
resultant poor cooperation, it would be to the disadvantage of the PPP but that could be 
accepted as a general poor result in any partnership relationship. That is why values are 
so important in a partnership: the ethical values should go beyond the legalised 
foundation of the agreement and the partnering concept should be the “glue” that holds it 
all together.13
 
Where partners truly trust each other, the planning, execution and management of the 
partnership is ultimately much more successful than a relationship that relies on 
formalised structures where compliance is only measured in terms of the adherence to 
rules and regulations. In the partnership where there is trust, the partners are more likely 
to share ideas and, because they trust each other, they would be more inclined to be 
creative to ensure that the end product is as successful as possible.  This could only be 
to the benefit of both parties, as the benefits are numerous. 
  
The second distinction made relating to the advantages for those that are part of the 
partnership, the “people”, is made on the premise that the individual, the team and the 
manager who is part of the successful partnership can gain greatly thereby. The 
individual who is keen to improve on his skills will have the opportunity to do so; equally, 
the team that is prepared to learn can improve its teamwork. The concept of transitional 
leadership is elaborated on more in the next chapter, but the collaborative nature of the 
PPP also offers the manager the opportunity to enhance his management and 
leadership skills. To this extent, the regenerative nature of the PPP works in favour of all 
who play their part to ensure that a successful partnership is established, nurtured and 
maintained.  
 
As argued previously,14 there should be a stronger focus on the individual who is part of 
(and responsible for!) the process, than on the process itself. Farmer15 argues that as 
one of the challenges of governance, there should be a stronger emphasis on 
developing the individual, as we tend to label people without developing their potential.   
 
13 See discussion of values and partnering in the partnership as discussed in Chapter 7 
14 See chapter 3: 4 
15 Farmer To Kill the King, post-traditional governance and bureaucracy 39-40 
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He uses as an example a description of Locke that failed to give any indication of the 
great philosopher that he proved to be and the contributions that he made to the thinking 
world.  The narrow description merely stated: “Locke was the son of a country lawyer”. 
As such, Farmer argues16 that we should rather be directed towards what that person 
can become instead of judging him on what we think he is. He also illustrates this with a 
reference to Aristotle, who said that “the quality of a life cannot properly be assessed 
until the person is dead. The person just does not know how her life will turn out.”   
Therefore if we are prepared to accept that there should be a stronger focus on the 
development of the individual as a person and not just a named staff member, the 
person whose potential is developed will make a much better contribution in his working 
environment and towards the success of his work objectives. Therefore, in the PPP 
where there is a strong focus on people because of the advantage of realising their 
personal potential to enhance the project potential, there is bound to be more success 
than one in which there is a mere focus on compliance and procedures. The ordinary 
procurement contract that is short-term based does not offer this potential and it should 
be recognised and developed in the long-term PPP. An approach like this would also 
reap the benefits as suggested by Steele:17 viz. that the blending of cultures offers 
opportunities for development as different cultures influence each other. However, it 
would of course depend on the manager’s incentive to develop his team members where 
the culture blend offers the opportunity. 
 
9.6 What are the expectations? 
 
The PPP can be a valuable vehicle in realising the objectives of SA as Developmental 
State in order to address a number of critical areas: we need infrastructural 
development, we need to alleviate property, we need to create jobs – to name but the 
most obvious. The PPP as a means to establish the relationships and create the 
avenues through which these objectives can be realised should not be underestimated.  
Unfortunately it seems that, often, because of misinterpretations and ignorance about 
the importance of PPPs, PPPs are not taken seriously enough. On provincial and 
national level the PPP Unit is working towards establishing a number of PPPs but on  
 
16 Farmer 40 
17 See chapter 5: 3 
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municipal level the commitment does not seem to exist to the same degree.  
 
PPPs also need to play an important role in service delivery, especially in local 
government.  As stated before, this does not seem to be the case and direct outsourcing 
could threaten the PPP objective because legislation allows for direct outsourcing even 
though the option of an outsourcing PPP was created. The expectation by the public is 
clear, as mentioned in various newspaper and magazine articles that were quoted and 
although PPPs are not the solution to poor management,18 MPPPs can play a much 
bigger role in improving service delivery. It thus is regrettable that the PPP route does 
not seem to be followed in the municipalities. 
 
As for assessing the success of PPPs in SA to date, mention needs to be made of a 
report compiled and published in 2000 by ENS Consulting where the DBSA conducted 
research on the impact of PPPs on the poor.19 By measuring the contributions of 
partnerships in addressing their service needs, particular attention was given to issues of 
improved service delivery, the affordability of services provided, the expansion and 
maintenance of infrastructure to the benefit of all consumers, the promotion of 
opportunities for local economic development and the implementation of social 
responsibility programmes by the private sector. It was found that PPPs are to play a 
bigger role but the impression the report created was that PPPs were confused with 
ordinary procurement and to that extent the findings of the report are questionable.  
However, the approach that PPPs are to play an important role in alleviating poverty in 
SA as a DS needs to be taken note of insofar as development of infrastructure and 
rendering of essential services are relevant. 
 
In assessing the success of PPPs, a number of guidelines offered by various authors 
can be considered. 
 
9.7 Role of Public–Private Partnerships in management 
 
In order to assess the aspect of management in PPPs, a theoretical foundation is laid  
 
18 See chapter 5: 19 
19 “Public private partnership capacity building programme: phase 1” Case study: the Maputo development 
corridor roll road report 24 
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and the concept then applied to facts as they have been stated supra. As an 
introduction, Linder20 proposes six uses of the PPP term: 
 
9.7.1 PPP as management reform:  is promoted as an innovate tool that will change 
the way that government functions, mainly by tapping into the discipline of the 
market. Public sector managers must therefore obtain the collaboration of profit-
seeking firms who already enjoy the benefits of the discipline. There may 
however, be a closer resemblance in this collaboration to mentoring rather than a 
joint undertaking as the focus is on the development of the individual manager. 
The initiative for this approach may develop from the perception which may exist, 
whether rightly so or not, that public sector managers, without the competitive 
pressures that are experienced in the private sector, may have grown less 
efficient in their bureaucratic organisation:  the presumption thus is that new skills 
from markets are needed to enhance productivity to improve the way government 
works, and partnerships are viewed as the way to accomplish this. But in 
developing the public sector manager’s business skills he will become more 
entrepreneurial and flexible, wanting to enter into new transactions and attract 
capital rather than be pre-occupied with administrative procedures. 
 
9.7.2 PPP as problem conversion: from this perspective it is not to be viewed as a 
management solution but rather as a universal solution for most public service 
delivery problems. This changes the scope for the public sector manager from 
not reforming himself but to induce others to perform government’s tasks for less 
money, and thereby shifting his task from aligning his own practices with 
entrepreneurial thinking to reframing problems in a way that will attract profit-
seeking collaborations. The public sector manager will thus approach problems 
from the point of view of the commercial businessman and not only as the public 
sector employee, especially in terms of financial decisions. 
 
9.7.3 PPP as moral regeneration: the effects that PPPs have on the people involved 
also need to be considered: the expected work ethic includes values such as  
 
20 See in general Linder, S. H “Coming to terms with the Public-Private Partnership: a grammar of multiple 
meanings” American Behavioural Scientist 42-47 
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self-reliance, initiative, hard work, integrity and prudence, and direct privatisation 
would not create the expectancy that these would be adhered to. Furthermore, 
because public sector managers are drawn into entrepreneurial activities via 
partnerships which strengthen their characters and stimulate their creative 
problem-solving skills, they also have the opportunity for personal growth. 
 
9.7.4 PPP as risk-shifting: partnering can be viewed as a means of responding to fiscal 
stringency on the part of the public sector.  Capital spending in the public sector 
needs to be used for infrastructure and other capital-intensive projects and 
getting a private party involved offers the potential for creating value in this 
means of development. So, the public sector party needs to obtain private 
interests and in return promises potential profit to the interested party. The end 
result, where the private party would in turn be sharing risk, is that the load is 
shared, but not in terms of privatisation and the public sector party is in a position 
to do “more with less”. The concept also ensures financial viability because the 
result should be to restrain public spending. The perception may also be created 
that risk-shifting is meant to transform a public problem wholly into a private one 
or that the commercial activity and market discipline place the public sector party 
in a subordinate role. However, by sharing the risk, a supporting role is assigned, 
not to the public sector party, but to commercial interests. And, furthermore, the 
private sector party is meant to join in a cooperative venture to leverage the 
public sector party’s resources, not to displace them: although the resources are 
eventually mixed, the purposes remain public. 
 
9.7.5 PPP as power-sharing: where privatisation tends to devolve control vertically 
downward towards the consumer, the PPP spreads control horizontally, 
especially in the regulatory environment where control has always been 
centralised in government. What happens now is that an ethos of cooperation 
and trust has the potential to replace the adversarial relations endemic to 
command-and-control situations. Furthermore, the relationship is to promote a 
mutually beneficial sharing of responsibilities, knowledge and risk and both 
parties bring something of value to be invested in or exchanged. Another benefit 
is that an expectation is created of give-and-take between the partners, and a 
negotiation of differences which formerly were litigated.   
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It is suggested that these arguments are particularly relevant if the view as held by 
Farmer, is considered:21 the PPP for instance as management reform will provide the 
opportunity for the public sector manager to develop his entrepreneurial skills to the 
extent that he could focus more on the development of his staff as individuals, as 
opposed to treating them merely as subordinates carrying out orders. The argument 
presented earlier22 that the individual should play a bigger role in the success of the 
bureaucratic organisation then finds application here.  
 
Secondly, the PPP as problem conversion could be valuable given the suggestion by 
Björk and Johansson23 that bureaucracies have become “obsolete” and that the “new 
public management” approach should focus more on a combined solution towards 
problem-solving. By shifting the focus from the lonely manager who needs to be held 
accountable for a big problem, combined efforts could not only relieve the burden of the 
individual, but in the long run are to the benefit of all parties involved in the process.  
Focusing on an efficiency-based outcome with governing as the central issue instead of 
an input-based outcome where the manager, for instance, is measured on his SLA, 
would in my view be more in line with the potential of PPPs as it would focus more on 
the team effort of the parties than the accountability of the individual. 
 
The third argument for PPPs as moral regeneration could include the distinction between 
the PPP and the normal privatisation or outsourcing agreement, where the relationship 
will be arranged by contract and there would be less focus on the benefits of partnering.  
In a partnership, both manager and staff have the potential for personal growth and the 
cultivation of values that are needed to sustain the agreement over the long term.  
 
The risk-sharing characteristic of the PPP agreement is probably one of the main 
reasons and one of the greatest incentives for the public sector to enter into PPPs with 
the private sector. The PPP Unit plays a pivotal role in ensuring that this term of the 
agreement is properly negotiated, but unfortunately the option to outsource services in 
the municipalities instead of establishing PPPs does not bring about the same benefit.   
 
21 See chapter 2: 3 
22 See chapter 3 
23 See chapter 2: 5 
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As stated previously,24 it is a concern that outsourcing where risk-sharing would form 
part of the agreement seems not to be in favour and ordinary outsourcing for the 
provision of services seems to be preferred. An explanation for this may also be the 
difficulty with which risk is to be determined where the municipality in question does not 
demonstrate the required degree of competence and financial stability that would be 
required by the private party25 and for that reason that the private party may be deterred 
from entering into a PPP. However, the possibility that the private party can create an 
SPV in order to obtain limited financing from the banks26 does not seem to have been 
implemented. This is regrettable and the conclusion is still drawn that the easiest option 
is chosen (direct outsourcing) even though the PPP route may still be a viable 
alternative. 
 
Finally, the PPP as power-sharing is probably one of the best advantages as its role in 
the Developmental State. By creating PPPs where BEE objectives form part of the 
developmental criteria to promote the social-economic interests of the community, the 
outcome can serve the public so much more. By involving both the public and private 
sectors in the developmental goals, the strong relationship from which the positive 
outcomes would develop could also promote nation-building as public and private parties 
take hands to work together. 
 
9.8 Lessons learnt from previous PPPs 
 
In respect of this argument, a study in the education sector conducted by Davies and 
Hentschke,27 which found that PPPs were successful in various ways, offered some 
valuable insights: 
 
9.8.1 Increased focus on core tasks:  this was the result of the nature of the activities 
being defined precisely and the partner being assessed on the execution of these 
activities; 
 
 
24 See chapter 5: 22 
25 See chapter 8: 13 
26 Ibid 
27 Davies, B and Hentschke, B “Public/private partnerships” Journal (Education) 6 
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9.8.2 Enhanced service quality through enhanced human capital:  by changing the 
work force and attracting high quality people, human capital was enhanced and 
was seen as a response to new leadership and greater involvement and 
commitment by existing staff to a new sense of purpose and focus; 
 
9.8.3 Improved performance on outcomes, both processes and products; 
 
9.8.4 Proactive leadership style: because the organisation was willing and able to take 
on large, complex problems, there was a shift towards a more proactive 
leadership style; 
 
9.8.5 Increasingly entrepreneurial culture and attitude reflected in behaviour: the 
previous points will combine to create a new culture in the involved parties, and 
this provides a greater sense of empowerment and fosters a more 
entrepreneurial culture. The partners will be encouraged to be creative in the way 
they approach contractual and other possibilities for work. 
 
The advantages28 of PPPs, and especially their role in management, must thus be clear 
and it is to be hoped that the concept will gain more momentum. It is regrettable that 
there is still ignorance and a low level of knowledge about the advantages of the PPP. If 
they are promoted more broadly, the country can share in their many benefits.   
 
9.9 Role of business in Public–Private Partnerships
 
Ethical management in business has particular point when one accepts that business 
could contribute to the fulfilment of the goal of becoming part of both the problem as well  
as the solution:29  the contribution can take the form of innovations in technology and 
process, as well as through the different approaches to conducting its activities. This 
results in a situation in which boundaries of responsibility are redefined for business in 
some areas of social development and human rights. Corporate responsibilities are then 
merged with those of governments and this requires that business addresses social  
 
28 See chapter 8: 13 
29 Warhurst, A “Future roles of business in society: the expanding boundaries of corporate responsibility 
and a compelling case for partnership” Futures 37 155 
 128
Chapter 9: Evaluation 
development goals, thereby increasing partnership with other societal actors.30 The 
importance of the role that business can play in developing public sector goals is 
strongly emphasised in the UK through the adoption of a policy that stipulates that it 
uses “the advice of business more proactively and more deeply in developing policy 
across a much wider range of policy areas than before”.31 The purpose is to introduce 
new thinking and relevant experience in resolving long-existing policy problems as well 
as meeting innovative challenges to modernise government. The UK is also of the view 
that it could meet their objectives better if they draw on private sector knowledge, 
disciplines, incentives, skills and experience.32
 
Apart from the obvious differences in the way business is conducted in the private sector 
the difference in culture should always be borne in mind. In this regard, a number of 
interesting findings were made in a research project on the engagement of the private 
sector in government service delivery.33 One of the findings was that business people 
are not used to a culture that involves long meetings with large groups of 
representatives. Another finding was that there was little pooling of experience amongst 
individuals to develop and improve the process even though they learnt from it, with the 
result that knowledge is not carried over to the next group. Practical lessons are 
therefore not learnt. Simultaneously, participating in and leading such groups involve a 
range of skills that people cannot be expected to have as a matter of course.  
 
It is important to bear these difficulties in mind when approaching such a situation, as the 
benefits of involving the business sector are too many to ignore. The public sector also 
has an obligation to enhance effectiveness in this manner: there is an expectation by 
society that global business will work with others to provide solutions to humanitarian 
crises and endemic problems facing the world and in this sense businesses are 
encouraged “to re-invent themselves as a force for positive good in society”.34 What also 
emanates from this is that stakeholder demands are growing from “do no harm” to the 
responsibility of being “a positive force” in contributing to worldwide social development 
 
30 Ibid 
31 Steele, J In the Public Interest?  Engaging the private sector in government 5 
32 Ibid 
33 See in general Steele 45 
34 Warhurst 151-152 
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goals.”35 Warhurst36 argues that social development is the government’s responsibility, 
and not the responsibility of business; another, opposing perspective, is based on the 
moral imperative or social legitimacy in terms of which businesses are to play a bigger 
role in society. This is particularly relevant for governments in developing countries, as 
they are often found to be weak both in terms of democracy and financial stability as well 
as drawing up and enforcing relevant regulation. The result is that the benefits of 
globalisation are not available for large parts of their populations. This clearly is a socio-
economic inequity and therefore society expects business to contribute more directly to 
development goals and poverty alleviation. The evolution of partnerships between 
businesses and NGOs or local community groups to address these social challenges is 
therefore becoming increasingly apparent. A significant driver of this process is the 
emergent role of stakeholders in defining the roles and responsibilities of business in 
society:  the role that municipalities play as service delivery, where their outputs are 
measured in terms of delivery as separate, accountable entities, can be regarded as 
similar to this development. Therefore, the values of transparency and accountability as 
applied in triple bottom-line thinking would also apply. This would entail37 the focus on 
economic prosperity, environmental quality and social justice. In the PPP concept this is 
particularly relevant as the development of human capital will require the public-private 
sector collaboration especially in emerging economies and developing countries.38 This 
becomes even more apparent when the positive role that stakeholders expect from 
companies to play in society as corporate citizens is considered.39 This means being 
responsible in the way they work, in other words, social justice in the workplace, as well 
as being responsive to stakeholder concerns – not just giving charitable donations when 
times are good. “40  
 
9.10 Some weaknesses identified
 
In addition to the comments offered on a number of aspects, in the bigger scheme of  
 
35 Warhurst 152 
36 See in general Warhurst: 152-154 
37 Elkington Cannibals with forks 70 
38 Elkington 85 
39 Warhurst 165 
40 Ibid 
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things there are specific weaknesses that cannot be ignored. These relate to aspects in 
the procurement process as well as previous views held by the MIIU of MPPPs to date – 
which may, in my opinion, be a significant cause of the poor progress of MPPPs. 
 
Firstly, there are a few weaknesses that were identified in the procurement process.41 
These amount to the following: 
 
9.9.1 Fronting in BEE happens on a big scale: the registration procedures at the 
Companies Office unfortunately are open for abuse by many who “front” BEE 
companies in order to obtain procurement transactions with the public sector. 
In the eagerness to promote BEE in commercial activity, this is a very real 
risk which is not easily identified and can seriously prejudice the soundness 
of the procurement transaction, including the PPP. 
 
9.9.2 Too often the procurement process amounts to a “paper exercise” and the 
result is that the institution does not secure the best procurement deal.  The 
reasons for this are manifold and include the fact that the process is often too 
complicated for those working with it and officials do not understand all 
aspects.  The result is that there is insufficient communication and that the 
objectives of the transaction may be defeated if there is no proper compliance 
to secure the best deal in the circumstances. 
 
9.9.3 Too often officials only do the minimum in order to meet the procurement 
requirements: in order to ensure that the best value and best results are 
obtained, it is often necessary to go further than just following procedures.  
This could for instance be the case where a public tender is advertised in the 
government gazette, but in addition to that, officials should ensure that the 
best firms for the specific procurement transaction are indeed notified in order 
to promote their participation in the bidding process.  This should ensure that 
the best service providers are chosen from for a specific type of transaction, 
as opposed to just relying on public information. 
 
41 For the sake of confidentiality, I would prefer not to identify each statement in relation to the comments 
that I received from a specific interview 
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9.9.4 Similar to fronting in companies, a consortium can also be “dressed up” in 
order to be called a consortium so that it meets the requirements of the 
process.  In order to prevent this from happening, officials dealing with the 
consortium or SPV should ask the right questions:  they should determine 
beforehand what the intention of the consortium is and how applicable it is to 
the situation in order to ensure that it was not created merely to meet the 
requirements for a specific proposal, for example in terms of BEE. 
 
9.9.5 The bidding committee must ensure that they ask the right questions and that 
they are properly trained in order to be able to do so.  Too often it amounts to 
a rushed process just to get it finalised.  Furthermore, it is preferable that not 
only one person is responsible for recording the events, as this may be 
abused and is insufficient to ensure transparency of the meeting procedures.  
It should also be ensured that the minutes are signed off. 
 
9.9.6 Too often a procurement committee is guided by what is presented to them 
instead of ensuring that the process is correctly and properly scoped from the 
start.  Proper planning of the project from the outset is thus absolutely critical.  
It may also happen that a project may only be allocated within the planned 
budget but that it may not necessarily be the best deal – this may also 
happen because the officials involved failed to ask the right questions at the 
right time.  
 
“Good business floats on a sea of ethics.”42 This saying suggests that even if the noblest 
of efforts are made to ensure proper compliance, adherence to ethical values is 
necessary to ensure that the best transaction is concluded.  Where there is a deficiency 
in the system that may open the door for abuse, the morality of the official in the situation 
is what is important: Farmer43 compares a situation like this with the executioner who 
claims not to have the right to make moral judgments because he is obligated to follow 
the system. This simply means that the person hiding behind the system is failing  
 
42 Author unknown 
43 Farmer 138 
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himself because, as Farmer suggests,44 he is not prepared to take “unlimited 
responsibility on your own personal shoulders for each and every aspect of your official 
acts”. It is conceded that some officials may not realise that their conduct may be 
prejudicial to the system, for example where they are not properly trained to exercise 
better judgment.  But for the official making the unethical choice, there is no excuse. 
 
The second discussion relates to what I regard as weaknesses identified in the MPPP 
process, and is based on the article by Jackson and Hlahla.45 In 1999, when the article 
was published, they were the policy coordinator and CEO respectively of the MIIU, and 
some of the aspects they raised include the following: 
 
9.9.7 It was suggested that the participation of the private sector involvement in 
service delivery in municipalities was optional where the investment of capital 
was necessary.  This led me to conclude that one of the main advantages of 
PPPs was overlooked, and this is the long-term benefits of a specific 
partnership as opposed to the immediate benefits of a procurement contract.  
This approach indicates that the risk-sharing, infrastructural development and 
people development as a result of a PPP seem not to have received 
sufficient, if any, consideration. 
 
9.9.8 The lengthy procedures and comprehensive nature of the PPP transaction 
seemed to be a discouraging factor, as no preference was given to PPPs and 
service delivery agreements seemed to be preferred.  Again, it is regrettable 
that the value of the PPP concept seemed to have been underestimated 
and/or under-appreciated. 
 
It was indicated that competition is the primary mechanism for securing the best price for 
PPP service delivery, which is in contradiction with Linder46 who argues that PPPs are 
not about competition but cooperation. 
 
 
44 Farmer 138 
45 Jackson, B.M and Hlahla, M “South Africa’s infrastructure delivery needs: the role and challenge for 
public-private partnerships” Development Southern Africa 3-6 
46 Linder: 26, mentioned in Chapter 5: 4 
 133
Chapter 9: Evaluation 
I cannot agree with these arguments, as they amount to non-recognition of the 
developmental advantages of PPPs insofar as they can positively influence the public 
sector culture, as well as develop both staff and management. It is an open question 
whether this may be the reason why so few, if any, PPPs were facilitated by MIIU.  
Perhaps the Unit’s focus determined its planning and the reluctance of the private sector 
may have delayed the process if private sector investment was what MIIU was mainly 
looking for. 
 
9.11 Conclusion
 
The expectation of PPPs to deliver in terms of the DS objectives is realistic if the 
information that is available is utilised to address the weaknesses so that the process 
can be made more efficient.  In this process there are a number of key role-players who 
need to become more involved in the process; these include the private sector as a 
business partner in developing the economy of the country.  After all, public intervention 
– as opposed to leaving economic development to business – is what the DS concept is 
built on.  There are too many advantages to be discounted and too much to be gained to 
leave the process as it is.  I hoped to demonstrate that the PPP concept is not delivering 
optimally but that there are several options to address the situation. Some more specific 
recommendations in this regard are offered in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Ballpoint pens will not work in 0 percent gravity. NASA scientists unhesitatingly 
spent a decade and $12 billion developing a pen that writes in zero gravity, upside 
down, underwater, on almost any surface including glass and at temperatures 
ranging from below freezing to over 300 degrees centigrade.  
The Russians used a pencil. 
 
There is a saying that sometimes one is so close to the trees that one cannot see the wood 
for the trees – that the solution to the problem may be so close and yet not be recognised. 
I do not propose that the recommendations that I wish to put forward had never been 
recognised before, but what I do want to suggest is that the information has always been 
there and that all we need to do is best utilise what we already have. 
 
 
10.1 Introduction
 
In the previous nine chapters I laid the foundation for the recommendations which I 
believe will address the problems and weaknesses that I identified and discussed.  
These I would like to categorise under the following sub-headings: 
 
• Improved risk management:  the manager’s responsibility 
• Innovation and entrepreneurial thinking in the development of the public sector 
culture 
• Involvement of civil society in the broader PPP scenario 
• The public sector manager must be accountable! 
• The quest for stronger leadership 
 
In the introduction I invited the reader to be receptive to new ideas: this is the arena in 
which I would like to play out this invitation. Einstein said that one cannot not solve a 
problem on the same level that it was created, and throughout this study a number of 
authors were quoted who are visionary about the PPP concept and about people 
development. In this chapter I would like to explore some of these ideas, and even add a 
few more. 
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10.2 Recommendation number 1: Improved risk management – the manager’s 
responsibility
 
Poor corporate governance in any organisation creates risk and, apart from the many 
expected advantages identified with good governance, one of the most important risks 
that is to be managed is the risk of fraud and corruption. The realisation of this risk 
brings with it many repercussions including reputational risk, high staff turnover, low staff 
morale, poor management, and low productivity, to name but the obvious few. Given the 
problems relating to a lack of trust in the public sector in SA, it goes without saying that 
good corporate governance in Public–Private Partnerships is absolutely essential. 
 
Risk management in the public sector is a high priority and all government departments 
are expected to conduct regular identification of risks with subsequent risk-management 
strategies and fraud-prevention strategies. Therefore, the information necessary to 
identify the risks that would impact on agreements to be concluded on behalf of a 
department or institution should be available and thus must form part of the 
considerations that are relevant in the process. Where specific risks are uncertain, such 
as is typical of an envisaged PPP, it may not be that straightforward and therefore the 
parties need to bear the unrealised risks in mind in their detailed project planning, and 
ultimately, execution. The focus throughout should be to bear in mind how a specific 
transaction is exposed to risk and how it can impact on the effectiveness of the project 
management and ultimately the project goals. It follows that management plays a critical 
role in the risk management process and it should not be left to those individuals or the 
section in the department that normally takes responsibility for risk identification, analysis 
and descriptions. This may be a problem in larger organisations, where the left hand too 
often does not know what the right hand is doing, and specifically for that reason the 
vigilant manager must take note that he is to make first-hand knowledge his priority. He 
will also have to ensure that procedures are followed, that his staff is trained and that all 
know what is expected from them: assumptions can be embarrassingly exposing where 
they were made on the wrong facts and the skilful manager should not walk into this 
trap. 
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10.3 Recommendation number 2: Innovation and entrepreneurial thinking in the 
development of the public sector culture
 
Linder1 argues that public officials and actors need to develop entrepreneurial thinking 
and private actors need to embrace public interest considerations and expect greater 
public accountability. This is very much in line with previous arguments discussing the 
advantages of the public–private culture mix and how it could impact positively on the 
public sector culture. This suggestion is supported, especially in view of the impact that 
successful PPPs can have on the broader public sector culture, as argued previously.2
 
The suggestion was made to the UK Labour government3 that outdated approaches in 
the public sector should be eliminated as they “prevent public servants from 
experimenting, innovating and delivering a better product”. The PPP offers virgin soil to 
implement this suggestion: not only is there a lot of work to be done in terms of informing 
prospective parties about the advantages that are to be gained from the collaborative 
nature of the PPP agreement, but the advantages of mixing cultures, as argued 
previously, surely should be explored. I am convinced that the average public sector 
employee would gladly accept the hand extended to him to improve his skills and 
explore new ground:  in our young democracy we have made great progress in adapting 
to a multi-cultural, diverse society. We can do even more in developing our employees 
as individuals in their own right. As Farmer also points out,4 employees have to rely on 
external market forces to protect their rights as they have no say in corporate 
governance: the king owns the people. By developing the individual in the greater 
purpose of the organisation, by making him feel valued and appreciated, these artificial 
barriers will be crossed and the results can be astounding.  
 
If this approach is to be adopted, another barrier would hopefully be broken down: too 
often training sessions and workshops are conducted for the benefit of public sector  
 
1 Linder, S. H “Coming to terms with the Public-Private Partnership: a grammar of multiple meanings” 
American Behavioural Scientist 36-37 
2 See chapter 9  
3 Greenwell, Z.I and Shaw, B “Uneasy bedfellows?  Public-Private Sector supply chain partnership in the 
NHS” Public and Private Sector Partnerships, the Enabling Mix 245-246 
4 Farmer To Kill the King, post-traditional governance and bureaucracy 164 
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employees to develop their skills and they are invited to think “out of the box”. However, 
I believe that these sessions, insofar as they are to influence the culture positively, have 
little impact because the approach is what I would call “culture-resistant”. The reason for 
this can be explained with reference to a case study conducted at NASA after the 
Columbia disaster:5 it was found that poor management decisions were made because 
the values in the organisation had changed to the extent that time and production 
became more important than the consideration for, ultimately, human lives. The term 
“culture” can be described in the following way: 
 
• Culture is the values, norms, beliefs and practices that govern how an 
organisation functions and it thus is a crucial determinant of human behaviour; 
• Culture is learnt and leaders play a major role in establishing an organisation’s 
culture; 
• A significant portion of the organisation’s culture lies beyond the level of 
consciousness and as such is tacit, not tangible: the layers comprise technology, 
infrastructure, and how people and technology react. Deep down is the 
emotional level which can largely drive the organisation’s behaviour. 
 
If the tacit, emotional culture of the organisation, in this discussion the public sector 
organisation, is one that is resistant to change, then a “think-out-of-the-box” invitation will 
not be enough. What is then needed is to engage with staff on a level that they feel 
comfortable with and this is the type of environment that can be created where the 
leaders of the project have “people development” prioritised sufficiently high on the 
agenda.  It can be cultivated in an environment where staff members feel comfortable 
knowing that their leaders believe in them and where the development of their potential 
is important, not just a coincidental by-product of a successful project. Where the leaders 
of the project accept and appreciate this, they can create a situation in which a culture-
change can be effected and where, consequently, barriers can be broken down. That is 
what needs to be done: it is necessary to go beyond the external party’s invitation to 
think differently – it is necessary to take ownership of the situation and to create the sort 
of environment in which the individual will flourish. 
 
5 O Mason, R “Lessons in Organisational Ethics from the Columbia Disaster: can a culture be lethal?” 
Organisational Dynamics 131 
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10.4 Recommendation number 3: Involvement of civil society in the broader 
PPP scenario
 
The suggestion made in this recommendation is mainly based on an argument by Greer6 
as well as previous discussions on the benefits of partnering.7 He suggests that civil 
society can be enriched by involving voluntary or community representatives and 
encouraging the development of participatory democracy. Their participation in 
governance will encourage local communities to express their concerns, to find out 
about the activities of government, and to hold officials accountable. If voluntary and 
community groups act together as a representative body for the disadvantaged and 
excluded sections of the society it will give them a voice to protect their own interests. In 
addition, collective action will entrench the social values of trust amongst the citizens 
and will facilitate the development of a pluralist political democracy. The lack of trust and 
the expectation of accountability by the community have been particularly prevalent in 
the numerous incidents of citizen unrest in the municipal areas where the communities 
demanded greater accountability and improved service delivery by the municipal 
councils. Offering them an opportunity to help rebuild their communities by joining hands 
with the government in PPP agreements can address this situation to a significant 
degree. 
 
As Greer explains,8 “Being part of a partnership board has helped the voluntary sector to 
be reconciled into the mainstream. Together the private, voluntary and community 
sectors, councillors and the statutory bodies are making decisions together daily. They 
have begun to realise the importance of helping communities who have lost hope to 
regain hope and build on their self respect again, helping marginalised groups in society 
to take the first steps to reintegration into the mainstream.” 
 
This concept has been applied successfully in Northern Ireland, where a programme has 
made a contribution to peace and reconciliation. The process helped to set up structures 
that ensure the nurturing of cherished traditions on an equal basis by representatives of  
 
6 Greer, J “Partnerships and Public Policy: implications for the future governance of Northern Ireland”  
Public and Private Sector Partnerships, the Enabling Mix 267-268 
7 See chapters 4 and 5 
8 Greer 267-268 
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traditions within the partnering setting. The value of seeking justice from tradition is also 
argued by Farmer,9 who points out that justice cannot be found in an intellectual vacuum 
because the insights that are to be found must be open-ended. Justice is to be found in 
the tradition of the individual and his or her relations with others around him.  
 
10.5 Recommendation number 4: The public sector manager must be 
accountable! 
 
The PFMA is a great piece of legislation, if only it were enforced.  Much training is 
conducted in the public sector, particularly with managers, about their obligations in 
terms of the PFMA, and, more recently, also in terms of the Prevention and Combating 
of Corrupt Activities Act. However, very seldom is legislation really effectively enforced 
and too often threats of accountability are but idle words. Someone who feels equally 
strong about this is Public Service Commissioner Ms P.M. Tengeni, who published an 
article (in her personal capacity) on the subject.10 A few relevant suggestions she made 
would be valuable to consider: 
 
• The solutions to the more complex demands for accountability lie beyond the 
borders of institutions and governmental borders and therefore the notions of 
accountability must be reconceptualised to accommodate emerging 
relationships. 
• Responsibilities are obscured in partnerships and networks between government 
and civil society, where such relationships fall outside of government:  the 
hierarchical model of accountability fails to cater for these new relationships in 
new service delivery approaches. 
• Independent bodies enhance good governance through their oversight 
functions.11 
• There is “both need and potential” for increased involvement by the civil society 
in governance, especially as modern governments grapple with excessive  
 
9 Farmer 113 
10 Tengeni, P.M “Promoting accountability as a tool of making government stronger and building 
partnerships and networks” 
11 There is no independent body to oversee good governance in PPPs and the arguments raised in 
relation to the PUK and 4Ps might be considered here 
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• demands and complex challenges. Civil Society Organisations can play a vital 
role in this regard as they could engage as credible partners in governance and 
alter perceptions of lack of accountability and legitimacy. 
 
• The public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making as this will ensure 
that the process is accountable and transparent. 
 
• The perception and application of the principle of accountability is narrow and 
fails to capture the essence of relationships on a broader scale. There are 
numerous actors in governance and service delivery, and this makes it more vital 
that the flow of accountability be multi-directional and cascade down to all levels 
of government. It should extend to intergovernmental relations and also reach 
groups as well as individuals in civil society, and again flow back to the formal 
government structure. 
 
These suggestions in my view are very much in line with what is demanded of the 
government, given the expectations that the community has. There is also adequate 
focus on the responsibility of managers to take a broader view of their situation and not 
to remain simply within the comforts of current applications. The accountability of the 
accounting officer or the public sector manager in the PPP is thus of paramount 
relevance in the corporate governance of PPPs. 
 
10.6 Recommendation number 5: The quest for stronger leadership 
 
“We don’t question our leaders”. These words, which I heard during an interview,12 rang 
true for me in the interesting times that we find ourselves in. By this I do not want to 
propose disagreement for its own sake, but it is one of the strongest foundations for 
accountability. The strong leader is prepared to be held accountable for his or her 
actions and this is one of the valuable characteristics that we need to promote and, 
where necessary, cultivate in our society. 
 
In my view, the foundation for sound leadership lies in ethical, value-based 
 
12 Interview Robert Cameron-Ellis Johannesburg 
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 decision-making. Thus, I will begin with a discussion of some more ideas by Farmer13 
on the approach to ethics in the organisation. 
 
Where does unethical, dishonest behaviour originate? Farmer14 is of the view that our 
self-interest is embraced by the capitalist society in which we all function: “Capitalism did 
not invent self-interest”. Capitalism “is a principal component of civic religion. It brings to 
the mix faith and ethical commitment, and a vast population of believers. It possesses 
the equivalent of cathedrals in corporate office buildings and of churches in malls. CEOs 
are given adulation that saints would envy. Free market economics is a kind of 
theology.” Are we not then creating the self-interested, greedy manager? If capitalism 
can be viewed as a replacement of the faith that many had always based their morality 
on, is that not the reason why we have so much difficulty rooting it out? But then, for the 
preacher in the capitalist congregation, for the ethicist who would like to reinforce the 
belief that there are advantages in choosing the narrow path of morality, there is justice 
to be found.  Justice is what is right, good and fair: and therefore the pursuit for ethics 
should be for what is just. Justice is about the minimum that each person should 
consider he owes to another, “not as a matter of law, love, politeness, or prudence but of 
what morally ought to be the case.”15 This, then, should be the foundation for our 
approach in decisions – especially in management. 
 
However, taking it a few steps back, Farmer warns that we may overlook changes in our 
culture over time as well as the changes in sub-cultures within our culture16 because of 
our rationalisation of cultural core values, which is particularly true of bureaucracies.  
This happens because we tend to hold on to well-known interpretations of what we are 
comfortable with.  Instead, we should be alert to an approach of ongoing searching for 
new interpretations of existing values. By way of example he reminds the reader of the 
biblical belief in slavery, which has changed over the years and has today become a 
belief that there is no justification for it. This ongoing search for values should start with 
the individual, which is the search within, the search with the self: “I want to suggest that 
searching within the self is a critical part of justice-seeking for individuals and even for  
 
13 Farmer 80-96 
14 Farmer 81-82 
15 Farmer 87 
16 Farmer 90 
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bureaucracies.”17 This search should be undertaken in order to identify what should 
motivate one’s whole being18 and, as Aristotle believed, it should be to fulfill one’s full 
potential. This search for the wholeness of being of the individual is what Farmer terms a 
form of spirituality,19 and he also relates it to the spirituality of the bureaucratic 
organisation. As such, the bureaucracy should substitute the motivation toward 
spirituality for a “motivation towards mere efficiency”. On a similar level but from a 
different perspective, this may be interpreted to tie in with the view by Aburdene20 that 
corporations are moving towards greater spirituality, in other words that there is a 
general search for wholeness that is found in some form of spirituality, which again can 
be found in sound values.  
 
If the foundation for good management by the ethical leader is to be the value-based 
decisions that the individual is prepared to make, then how would he be guided to 
exercise his choices in a manner that would ultimately be acceptable in his 
environment? It is true that the ethical, consistent leader has his own credibility but he 
still needs a number of skills to successfully implement what he believes in. That is why 
guidance in leadership is not only invaluable, but essential in preparing our leaders for 
what is expected from them. A few guidelines, as taken from Gandossy and Sonnenfeld, 
will thus be suggested:  
 
• “through the scandals of the last three decades, there was no absence of 
regulation with clear purpose, no lack of accounting rules with overintentions, no 
lack of corporate codes of conduct, no lack of board member financial literacy, 
and no shortage of many of the other governance remedies that abound as 
panaceas.”21  In other words, having rules and regulations is not enough; 
• Employees may become apathetic in an environment where they feel that they 
are alone and this may be exacerbated when they observe a diffusion of 
responsibility by managers. This is especially so where there is misconduct22 by  
 
17 Farmer 84 
18 Ibid 
19 Farmer 96-97 
20 See chapter 1: 6-7 
21 Gandossy and Sonnenfeld Leadership and governance from the inside out xviii 
22 Gandossy and Sonnenfeld 7 
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top management which seem to gain an aura of legitimacy wrongly conferred; 
• Too often it is assumed that “someone else will act”. In addition, it may happen 
that information is fragmented and there is a reliance on “specialists” who also 
may only have limited information, and often these specialists do not know 
enough about the big picture to ask the right questions. Furthermore, it may not 
be in their best interests to speak up or act on observed illegal activities: it may 
reflect poorly on them as they may create the impression that they may have 
been wrong in the past;23 
• Upward challenging of the system should be encouraged in order to maintain 
corporate integrity even though it may be difficult.24 This implies that employees 
must be informed about and trained in maintaining ethical standards both for 
themselves and for their managers; 
• It sends out the wrong message if small violations of ethics are tolerated as these 
infractions begin to escalate and employees are more likely to break the law on 
major violations;25  
• Managers should proactively ask for suggestions on how to improve the 
organisation rather than passively wait for employees to express concerns, as 
this will create an environment for open communication. If employees are 
encouraged to participate in business concerns they are more likely to express 
themselves on unethical concerns;26  
• Greed, dishonesty and corporate misconduct are the reasons why the credibility 
of corporate leadership is so poor and, in addition, what makes corporate 
leadership vulnerable is the “failure to create a culture of candor …. It is not easy 
to welcome criticism, however honest and tactful. But the willingness to do so is 
one of the indispensable qualities of authentic leaders.”27  
 
These suggestions address the concerns that I had raised in previous chapters relating 
to poor management, unethical organisational culture and unethical behaviour both by 
managers and employees. In improving corporate governance in any environment, it will  
 
23 Ibid 8-9 
24 Ibid 83 
25 Ibid 86 
26 Ibid 85 
27 Ibid 91 
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be inadequate to follow one or two suggestions for some time: the leader implements all 
that are necessary and makes them part of the culture in order to sustain a healthy 
organisational culture. This is particularly relevant for the huge bureaucracy as too often 
decision-making and management styles are fragmented and ultimately ineffective.  
However, the public sector manager is very reliant on and to an extent comfortable in the 
regulated environment in which he/she functions. The question then is, how is the 
transition to be made? Trofino28 made a few suggestions based on previous successes 
in PPPs. Transformational leadership can be described as a process that is to motivate 
followers by appealing to higher ideals and moral values.29 This means that the approach 
should articulate a vision, foster the acceptance of group goals, provide individualised 
support, and explain that effective leaders are able to change basic values, beliefs and 
attitudes of followers so that they are willing to perform beyond the minimum levels 
specified by the organisation.  An approach such as this comprises four dimensions:30  
 
• Charisma or idealised influence as leader behaviour that results in follower 
admiration, respect and trust. This requires that leaders should share risks as 
followers regard this as a consideration more important than needs, and ethical 
and moral conduct by leaders; 
• Inspirational motivation, which should be done in a way that offers meaning and 
challenge to the followers’ work: what needs to be articulated are clear 
expectations, a demonstration of commitment to organisational goals and 
arousing team spirit through enthusiasm and optimism; 
• Intellectual stimulation, by soliciting new ideas and encouraging problem-solving 
from followers, as well as supporting new and inventive approaches to 
performing tasks; 
• Individualised consideration requires that the leader listen attentively and pay 
special attention to followers’ growth needs as well as to their achievements, by 
providing strategies for recognition and praise. 
 
The focus is therefore very much on the relationship that the leader is prepared to  
 
28 See in general Torifino, A.J “Transformational leadership: moving total quality management to world-
class organisations” International Nursing Review 232-241  
29 Trofino 233 
30 Ibid 
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cultivate with his team members. The focus is not only on the expectations that would 
otherwise be communicated in terms of policy descriptions, but rather on developing the 
potential of the individual and inspiring the individual to grow beyond, possibly, self-
imposed limitations. 
 
Strong leadership is not only essential in addressing the corporate governance problems 
in PPPs:  it is also being demanded by the public! In an article published in the Sunday 
Times,31 it was indicated that up to 43 percent of South Africans do not trust politicians 
and that they need to restore the perception of integrity. Reference is also made to the 
TI index and the requirements of the person in public office as well as the need for 
transparency. This would require from both the leader and his organisation to be 
transparent in respect of procedures both internal and external to the operations of the 
organisation in all aspects of reporting and operating activities.32
 
10.7 Conclusion
 
In the end, when it becomes necessary to assess the effectiveness of any process, one 
needs to revisit the original planning against the outputs. Insofar as public sector 
management goes, there is no need to reinvent the wheel, but one of the main causes of 
ineffectiveness in my opinion is that the information available is not being used optimally.  
There are so many procedures that provide for the assimilation of information, but there 
is no point in making good decisions if they are not implemented. The recommendations 
made in this chapter, I hope, are practical insofar as they should address needs that I 
believe have been identified by many who would like to see the management process 
improved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 Oliver, W “SA needs moral leadership to retain legitimacy” Sunday Times  
32 Oliver What is Transparency? 74 
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CHAPTER 11 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
“Society increasingly expects global business to work with others to provide solutions to 
humanitarian crises and endemic problems facing the world….the (sic) challenges of 
these expanding boundaries of responsibilities are best addressed through strategic 
partnerships”.1 The PPP, it has been argued, could be the vehicle to create these 
partnerships and it should be playing a much more significant role in the development of 
the economy than is the situation currently. It would be most regrettable if the PPP 
concept and the expectations that exist in terms of its delivery prospects indeed 
becomes just another bureaucratic initiative viewed from a limited scope.  PPPs can, 
and should, play an instrumental role in the realization of the Developmental State goals 
such as improving the functionality of the bureaucracy, and fostering solid relationships 
with the business sector.  If this can be achieved successfully, then we can truly ensure 
that the South African government creates a better life for al. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Warhurst, A “Future roles of business in society: the expanding boundaries of corporate responsibility 
and a compelling case for partnership” Futures 37(2005) 151 
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